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Conflict, Security and the  
Reshaping of Society
This book is an examination of the effect of contemporary wars (such as 
the ‘War on Terror’) on civil life at a global level.
 Contemporary literature on war is mainly devoted to recent changes in 
the theory and practice of warfare, particularly those in which terrorists or 
insurgents are involved (for example, the ‘revolution in military affairs’, 
‘small wars’, and so on). On the other hand, today’s research on security is 
focused, among other themes, on the effects of the war on terrorism, and 
on civil liberties and social control. This volume connects these two fields 
of research, showing how ‘war’ and ‘security’ tend to exchange targets and 
forms of action as well as personnel (for instance, the spreading use of 
private contractors in wars and of military experts in the ‘struggle for 
security’) in modern society. This shows how, contrary to Clausewitz’s 
belief that war should be conceived of as a ‘continuation of politics by 
other means’, the opposite statement is also true: that politics, insofar as it 
concerns security, can be defined as the ‘continuation of war by other 
means’.
 This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, 
war and conflict studies, terrorism studies, sociology and international 
relations in general.
Alessandro Dal Lago is Professor of Sociology of Culture and Communica-
tion at the University of Genoa. Salvatore Palidda is Professor of Sociology 
in the Faculty of Education at the University of Genoa.
This book series will establish connections between critical security studies 
and international relations, surveillance studies, criminology, law and 
human rights, political sociology and political theory. To analyse the 
boundaries of the concepts of liberty and security, the practices which are 
enacted in their name (often the same practices), will be at the heart of the 
series. These investigations address contemporary questions informed by 
history, political theory and a sense of what constitutes the contemporary 
international order.
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Introduction
Alessandro Dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda
Who came up with the idea that the civil order is an order of battle? Who 
saw war just beneath the surface of peace; who sought in the noise and 
confusion of war, in the mud of battles, the principle that allows us to 
understand order, the State, the institutions, and its history?
(M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended)
War and the changing face of the enemy
Barack Obama’s speech during the awards ceremony for the Nobel Peace 
Prize on 10 December 2009 confirmed, without a shadow of a doubt, that 
the Democratic administration’s foreign policy would not stray too far 
from the course already set by its Republican predecessor. As a noted com-
mentator on military affairs observed, Obama tried to show public opinion 
that ‘even a Nobel Peace Prize winner is capable of using force, albeit dif-
ferently to Bush’ (Hanson, 2009).1 The US president’s reference to the 
theory and necessity of ‘just wars’ (Walzer, 2006) during his acceptance 
speech in Oslo simply implies that violence will remain a normal resource 
in US foreign policy, just as it was before. Apparently, and in actual fact, 
there is not much that is new.2 In contrast to the age of Clausewitz, the 
first to pronounce the principle of a logical continuity between foreign 
policy and war, in today’s globalized society the resort to arms is no longer 
a solemn and ritualized moment of rupture with the civil order, but merely 
a question of opportunity.3 The decision to fight a war is taken without 
any declaration, reasons are invented that nobody believes (as with Iraq in 
2003, Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008), public opinion is outrageously 
manipulated, and proclamations are made about striving for peace at the 
same time as more troops are sent into the battlefield. In short, periodic 
organized violence is a characteristic and constituent element of globaliza-
tion, particularly during the period of aggressive neo- liberalism that has 
followed the end of the bipolar system.4
 If, at the end of the first decade of the twenty- first century, a world 
order based on diplomacy and negotiations seems a utopia, then it is indis-
pensable that we examine the effects of permanent armed conflict upon 
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global society. A first step consists of defining the most widespread type of 
war. The slogan ‘Global War on Terror’, coined by the Bush administra-
tion after 11 September, identifies ‘terrorism’ as the principal enemy at a 
global scale. As a result, the era of war as an interstate conflict seems, at 
least in principle, to have declined. Even when a sovereign country is 
invaded, the stated goal is the elimination of terrorists (as in Afghanistan 
after 11 September 2001 and Lebanon in 2006) or the removal of a regime 
that controls a rogue state (Iraq in 2003), while any recognition or legiti-
macy to the enemy is denied (as illustrated in Alain Joxe’s chapter). This 
means that war has lost its formal features, which gives rise to ambiguous 
and paradoxical situations. For example, war had not been declared when 
NATO bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, and so 
Yugoslavian ambassadors were able to appear on television in Atlantic 
Alliance countries to put forward their side; something which would have 
been unthinkable at the time of ‘traditional wars’. The resort to arms can 
therefore be understood as a sort of ‘occasional global police force’, in 
which alliances of variable geometry (albeit until now always US- led) inter-
vene to rid entire regions of regimes, armed groups, insurgents or terror-
ists, as and when they are singled out as enemies of peace and civilization 
(Dal Lago, 2008, 2010).
 Directly connected to the operational method of resorting to arms is an 
emphasis on the political–moral objectives of the US- led alliances: export-
ing or building democracy, defending human rights, protecting minorities 
and so on. For around two decades, we have seen the proliferation of what 
could be called ‘postmodern oxymorons’: ‘humanitarian war’, limitations 
placed on freedoms in the name of security, detention centres placed 
beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of war, physical restraints (in other 
words, torture) in the name of democratic justice, and the deprivation of 
any legitimate status for enemies (as captured in the very broad definition 
of ‘enemy combatants’). It is in this context that embedded NGOs find 
their legitimacy and that it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between the mass of organizations and individual civilians (contractors, 
administrators, entrepreneurs, journalists and even anthropologists) who 
participate in various ways in foreign military missions (Fassin and Pan-
dolfi, 2009).
 Over the last two decades or so, ‘terrorism’ has taken on the role of 
principle enemy of the Western world.5 Although not located to a particu-
lar country or region, but coinciding in each case with the social, religious 
and political inclinations of the ‘Arab world’ and ‘Islam’ (be this Sunni or 
Shiite), the enemy is by definition ubiquitous and yet in hiding; active in 
their own social environment – in other words, countries defined as Arab 
or Islamic – but also, and above all, ‘among us’ in Western or developed 
societies. This kind of enemy transcends the traditional geopolitical imagi-
nation, which still provided, to a certain extent, the frame for Hunting-
ton’s famous essay on the ‘clash of civilizations’ (1996). In contrast to the 
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other ‘civilizations’ that were destined – according to Huntingdon – to 
clash with the democratic and liberal West (first and foremost ‘Islamic’, 
but also ‘orthodox’, ‘Chinese’, ‘South American’, ‘African’ and other civili-
zations),6 the current enemy does not represent any civilization in the eyes 
of the liberal West but, if anything, the perversion of a religion that is 
easily able to penetrate the defences of ‘our world’.
 The process of defining radical Islam as a global enemy dates back to 
decisive events in the early 1990s: the Gulf War of February 1991 and the 
coup d’état in Algeria on 11 January 1992. The expulsion of the Iraqis 
from Kuwait represents the first war waged by Westerners against an Arab 
country since the Suez crisis of 1956. The elimination of FIS (the party 
which regularly won the elections in Algeria) by the pro- Western regime in 
Algiers is the event that sparked a full- blown war between the Algerian 
state, supported by the West, and armed Islamic groups. It should be noted 
that the social construction of the enemy at a global level was a relatively 
sudden process: between the 1970s and 1980s, the anti- Soviet guerrillas in 
Afghanistan, financed and supplied by the United States, were presented in 
popular culture as real freedom fighters (for example, in the film Rambo 
III), and it was only after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan that the 
‘Islamic’ guerrillas acquired the status of absolute enemies of the West. As 
Robin Cook, former British foreign minister who resigned from the 
Cabinet in protest at the Anglo- American invasion of Iraq in 2003, wrote:
Bin Laden was [. . .] a product of a monumental miscalculation by 
Western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the 
CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occu-
pation of Afghanistan. Al- Qaida, literally “the database”, was origin-
ally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were 
recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians. 
Inexplicably, and with disastrous consequences, it never appears to 
have occurred to Washington that once Russia was out of the way, Bin 
Laden’s organisation would turn its attention to the West.
(Cook, 2005)
In any case, as a result of these developments, over the last two decades the 
dominant enemy of the West has changed face, not only from an ideo-
logical point of view (by shifting from communism to Islam), but also from 
a strictly military perspective. In place of the regular armies like those of 
the Iraqis in 1991 or the Serbs in 1999,7 a physiognomically variable 
enemy has emerged, able to exploit the techniques of guerrilla and urban 
warfare together with those of suicide terrorism. The West’s dread of 
al- qa-’ida (and similar or affiliated groups) consists exactly in its character 
– culturally constructed for the most part in the West8 – as the global inter-
connection between armed groups. This is not only because terrorists and 
enemies in general prove themselves adept in the use of the Internet, but 
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because their network is, from a symbolic point of view, the opposite of 
the web. While the Internet appears as an instrument of freedom, economic 
development, creativity and democracy, the enemy represents the dark 
side, destruction, blind opposition and terror.9
 Since this enemy operates on a global scale, combating it cannot be 
limited to the internal or external use of traditional military instruments. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the United States had already initiated a 
‘turn’ in strategy: identifying the global ‘South’ (and no longer just the 
Communist East) as the front of the new enemy, and ‘low intensity’ wars 
and operations that ignored international law on the conduct of war as 
the principal forms of combat.10 However, it was not until the end of the 
1980s that Western, and in particular US, strategic culture began to 
formulate a concept of war geared to the emergence of new global 
threats. Expressions such as ‘fourth generation warfare’ and ‘asymmetric 
warfare’ allude to the existence of an enemy that no longer fights in the 
Clausewitzian sense, but in a total way, even if its resources are limited.11 
An explicit variant of this transformation is the so- called ‘Revolution in 
Military Affairs’ (RMA) which, developing from the mid- 1990s onwards, 
essentially steered neo- conservative political and military strategy during 
the two terms of George W. Bush. The principal tenets of RMA consist 
in absolute military supremacy, the most advanced technology and a 
limited use of ground troops. Although its strategic failures were exposed 
during the war in Iraq,12 RMA has nevertheless produced a lasting effect, 
namely the growing integration between the military industrial produc-
tion and applied and fundamental scientific research (see Guzzetti in this 
book).
 During this process of militarization, the fight against a global enemy 
has extended to the inside of our societies. A ‘generalized fifth column’ 
has visibly become the object of security practices that today tend to 
transform the social life of the Western and developed world (as Didier 
Bigo demonstrates in this volume). For ten years or so, non- European 
Union or Muslim citizens have become increasingly implicated in control 
practices. Migrants originating from Muslim countries in Africa and Asia 
are considered in the reports of various security agencies as a fertile 
terrain for fundamentalism and therefore terrorism (National Intelligence 
Council, 2004; Palidda, 2010). Naturally, fighting the enemy inside 
complex urbanized societies with sophisticated infrastructures entails both 
innovative tactics and a redefinition of those liberal standards that repre-
sent the very foundation of Western societies. It is for this reason that 
present- day international politics, in a much more radical way than during 
the Cold War, are reflected in the internal order of developed countries 
(Walker, 1993). In other terms, it might very well be argued that a contin-
uum has been created between global war on terrorism, war on migration 
and war for the internal security in ‘democratic’ countries (Palidda, 1998, 
2000, 2009).
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The role of war in the transformation of global society
By the expression ‘civilization of war’ that appears in the sub- title of this 
book, we allude precisely to the culture – at the same time, civilian and mili-
tary – that has been produced by Western countries in just under two 
decades in relation to the conflicts with those who threaten (or are presumed 
to threaten) Western security. In particular, we have in mind the ambiguous 
connotations – halfway between war in the narrow sense and armed repres-
sion – that have been assumed by contemporary conflict, both inside and 
outside our societies.13 It is an intentionally paradoxical definition that has 
nothing to do with either the stereotypical ideology of Western civilization14 
or the so- called ‘clash of civilizations’ theorized by Huntingdon. For us, the 
expression ‘civilization of war’ refers above all to the Western world’s pre-
sumption of asserting its material, political and economic culture on a global 
scale through the use of arms (Fisk, 2006). It is precisely due to this pre-
sumption that the armed interventions of the last twenty years have assumed 
both a military and a civilian nature, as highlighted by the prevalent defini-
tions (‘humanitarian wars’, peace keeping and so on) and slogans such as 
‘War on Terror’, ‘Enduring Freedom’ and ‘Iraqi Freedom’.
 From a general political point of view, war has undergone a spectacular 
metamorphosis. We no longer fight against an enemy state in order to 
impose our will on a set of questions (as in the classic war à la Clausewitz), 
but we intervene in another country or society in order to topple its regime, 
to control its resources and to transform its economic system. The wide-
spread rhetoric of multiculturalism in the USA and Europe cannot hide the 
reality of global standardization, which is first and foremost economic and 
military, but which also extends to political structures and lifestyles. The 
most concise expression of this culture can be found in the ideas of ‘exporting 
democracy’ and ‘nation- building’, both dear to the conservative radicalism 
of the George W. Bush era.15 This should not be strictly defined as imperial-
ist because, in contrast to classic imperialism, it aspires to basically Ameri-
canize the world without the direct and territorial rule of other countries 
being decisive. As an exponent of the US Republican right has written:
Contrary to the exploitative purposes of the British, the American 
intentions of spreading democracy and individual rights are incompat-
ible with the notion of an empire. The genius of American power is 
expressed in the movie The Godfather II, where, like Hyman Roth, 
the United States has always made money for its partners. America has 
not turned countries in which it intervened into deserts; it enriched 
them. Even the Russians knew they could surrender after the Cold 
War without being subjected to occupation.16
The imposition of the Western way of life on other worlds passes today 
through a combination of economic, financial, political and obviously 
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military practices that can no longer be adequately explained with the 
labels of ‘imperialism’ or ‘colonialism’. It would be more accurate to 
instead speak of a ‘political–economic hegemony’ that not only is shaped 
by a variable geometry – which shifts according to different occasions, 
expediencies and alliances – but is also extremely flexible in its methods. 
The fate of Iraq over the last thirty years perfectly reflects how a strategic 
objective – which first and foremost consists in the direct and indirect 
control of oil resources – can be pursued through apparently divergent pol-
icies: support for Saddam Hussein when the Iraqis were losing the war 
against Iran (1980–1988), the war of 1991 and the subsequent embargo 
against Iraq (1991–2003), and the invasion of 2003, which involved the 
elimination of Saddam and the imposition of democracy in Iraq. If, up to 
2003, the West’s relations with Iraq followed the traditional path of diplo-
macy and war, following its invasion the country has literally been ‘recon-
structed’ by the developed world. The economy, law, police and education 
have all literally been reinvented from a Western perspective after the end 
of the dictatorship.
 The integration of military rule and economic and cultural hegemony 
entails a ‘civilizing’ of the mix of activities connected with war and, in 
particular, with the arms trade (Dal Lago and Rahola, 2009). This process 
concerns a series of aspects both inside and outside our societies. With 
regards the outside, the most conspicuous aspect is by far the huge prolif-
eration of contractors, namely the civil operators, armed or otherwise, 
who now complement Western troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and other the-
atres of war. It is calculated that their number today surpasses the total 
figure of US troops in both countries (Singer, 2004). While in the 1991 
war in Kuwait, they represented 10 per cent of the force, by the start of 
the war in Iraq in 2003 they had reached 20 per cent (about 40,000 
units). According to some observers, today they are more numerous than 
regular troops.17 Contractors not only deal with logistics, supplies (includ-
ing those to the battlefield), the personal protection of diplomats, civil 
functionaries and high- ranking officers and the training of local troops, 
but they are also increasingly involved in operations on the ground (which 
has given rise to talk of ‘corporate warriors’) (Traynor, 2003; Singer, 
2004). Besides the involvement of civilians in military operations, atten-
tion also needs to be paid to the set of activities that fall under the title of 
‘humanitarian intervention’:18 the presence of NGOs in the protectorates 
established by NATO in the Balkans after 1999, the ‘reconstruction’ of 
civil, administrative and judicial infrastructures in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
as well as, clearly, economic colonization and the exploitation of natural 
and energy resources. If the various practices emerging in recent conflicts 
are examined, we can begin to talk of a true global hybridization of the 
‘military’ and ‘civilian’ elements of Western hegemony in the areas of 
crisis.
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 In regards to the internal transformations of societies involved in global 
conflicts, the decisive aspect has been the full- blown institution and 
normalization of the ‘war discourse’ in its various declinations. With the 
concept of ‘discourse’, Michel Foucault (1981) essentially alluded to the 
textual formations, principally written, that organize knowledge and com-
munication in society. In contrast to the classic idea of ideology, the ‘dis-
course’ privileges structures of implicit, indirect, self- referential and 
procedural meanings, which subsequently tend to present themselves as 
‘objective’, ‘shared’, ‘necessary’, ‘indisputable’ and so on. In the 1970s, 
Foucault’s attention was repeatedly drawn to the role of war in ‘govern-
mentality’ (the range of practices, not necessarily linked to the state but to 
intellectual, scientific, cultural and other dimensions, which ensure the 
government of society) (Senellart, 1995). For Foucault, war is a regulative 
instrument of power relations both inside and outside society. In developed 
societies, the discourse of war is articulated through extremely complex 
practices that end up making the militarization of social relations appear 
‘obvious’, ‘customary’ and ‘normal’. As already explained, after 11 Sep-
tember 2001, the discourse of war inside our societies has been inflected in 
terms of security: the control of foreigners, the exclusion of certain cat-
egories of ‘enemies’ from legal guarantees as well as limits on the freedoms 
of citizens. These are just the most conspicuous consequences. On a closer 
look, the intrusiveness of military discourse in society is much more perva-
sive, thorough and ‘microphysical’, as Foucault would have said.
 A revealing, and at the same time strategic, example of this process is 
provided by the research policies of the European Union. Their interest lies 
in the ways in which the various drafting processes, procedures and discur-
sive strategies reveal the positions of powerful bodies and pressure groups 
within the European Union. Put another way, research policies express the 
aspired model of society of European elites, including those lesser- known 
ones operating in EU think tanks and bureaucratic apparatuses. An ana-
lysis of the documents in question allows us to lay bare the ways in which 
the ‘war discourse’ operates in sectors of society that are apparently and 
officially distant from the ‘military’. Let us consider, for example, the 
‘Seventh Framework Programme for Research (FP7) 2007–2013’.19 This 
programme starts by defining the wide- ranging objectives set by the Euro-
pean Union:
The programme has a total budget of over €50 billion. [. . .] The 
Framework Programmes for Research have two main strategic objec-
tives: to strengthen the scientific and technological base of European 
industry; [and] to encourage its international competitiveness, while 
promoting research that supports EU policies.
We therefore find ourselves in the common situation whereby research is 
subject to industrial goals that minimize fundamental or basic theoretical 
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and scientific work. This burden is made all the more explicit in the part of 
the presentation that identifies the suitable participants for a partnership:
research groups at universities or research institutes, companies 
intending to innovate, small or medium- sized enterprises (SMEs), 
SME associations or groupings, public or governmental administra-
tion (local, regional or national), early- stage researchers (postgraduate 
students), experienced researchers, institutions running research infra-
structures of transnational interest, organisations and researchers 
from third countries, international organisations, civil society 
organisations.
The strategic objectives laid out in the programme could be compatible 
with the military and control logic embodied in RMA and the practical 
concepts illustrated above. In other words, whether the theme is health, the 
environment, social exclusion, migration or technological innovation and 
experimentation (especially in the fields of communication, information 
and transport), the military framework of the strategic discourse steering 
research policy remains evident. This, of course, is even clearer in the pro-
gramme on the specific theme of security.20 The title of the brochure that 
presents the programme’s first results is eloquent: ‘Towards a more secure 
society and increased industrial competitiveness’.21 Here it is possible to 
read, among other things:
Making Europe more secure for its citizens while increasing its indus-
trial competitiveness, is the goal of European Security Research. 
Europe has never been so peacefully consolidated, so prosperous and 
secure, yet at the same time so vulnerable against threats like terror-
ism, organised crime and natural disasters. 
[. . .]
 In order to protect our fundamental rights and freedom, technolo-
gical preparedness and response of society to potential or actual 
threats are essential. At the same time, the overall societal dimension 
and preparedness is of highest importance at all stages, including pre-
vention, crisis and after crisis management.
The theme of security is not only legitimated by its ‘popularity’ (inevitable 
following 11 September 2001 and the attacks in Madrid and London), but 
also by the broad and consensual objectives of economic competitiveness 
and the ‘rights’ of citizens. In other words, military and security technolo-
gies become the vector of the economic and civil development of Europe:
Moreover, the relationship between defence technologies on the one 
hand, and security technologies on the other, is particularly notice-
able in the field of R&D, with technologies that show potential 
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developments in both areas (Dual Use). At both research and indus-
trial development levels, synergies are possible and desirable.
It is not simply the subordination of scientific research to industrial and 
military goals that is at stake here. It is also that the security industry aims 
to literally open an internal market for its increasingly far- reaching serv-
ices. Starting with the fight against ‘external threats’ in the name of citizen 
‘rights’, the security industry extends its interests to the control of ‘abnor-
mal behaviour’ and ends up placing the whole population under surveil-
lance, denying or limiting its right to expression and demonstration of 
political ideas. This reflects, in essence, the aims of one of the funded 
research projects. It is worth quoting its objectives in full:
ADABTS (Automatic Detection of Abnormal Behaviour and Threats 
in crowded Spaces) aims to facilitate the protection of EU citizens, 
property and infrastructure against threats of terrorism, crime and 
riots, by the automatic detection of abnormal human behaviour. 
ADABTS aims to develop models for abnormal and threat behaviours 
and algorithms for automatic detection of such behaviours as well as 
deviations from normal behaviour in surveillance data. ADABTS aims 
to develop a real- time evaluation platform based on commercially 
available hardware, in order to enable high- performance low- cost 
surveillance systems. 
ADABTS will gather experts in human factors, signal processing, 
computer vision, and surveillance technology. In a first stage, focus 
will be on human factors in order to define and model behaviours. 
Then, the focus will be shifted towards automatic analysis of surveil-
lance data (video and audio). Finally, a demonstration system will be 
implemented. ADABTS will create models of behaviour that can be used 
to describe behaviours to be detected and how they can be observed. 
[. . .] ADABTS will develop new and adapt existing sensor processing 
methods and algorithms for detecting and tracking people in complex 
environments, involving groups of people or crowds. Extracted 
sensor data features (e.g. tracks, voice pitches, body articulations) 
need to be related to the behaviour primitives, and, moreover, to be 
dynamic and adapt to the context. [. . .] ADABTS will communicate 
results to the various kinds of identified actors: Security stakeholders 
like European and national authorities, police organisations or event 
organizers; Security system operators and security service companies; 
Security system integrators; Technology developers; the Research 
communities for psychology, human factors, and signal processing 
communities. ADABTS will involve all these actors, either as prin-
cipal contractors, as subcontractors, or in an associated stakeholder 
group.
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Given such objectives, one wonders, first of all, what the definitions and 
protocols are for identifying ‘abnormal behaviour’. Perusing the different 
research projects that are either completed or still in progress,22 it would 
not be too far- fetched to argue that we are faced with a process that aspires 
to a sort of surveillance of a sizeable part, if not all, of the European 
population.
It is seen as necessary to protect the citizens from dangerous groups 
such as terrorists, criminals, or political subversives, or all other risks 
[. . .] the social control is then justified as ‘protection’, as a necessary 
sacrifice of liberties and privacy and which necessarily involves high 
costs for a kind of ‘Electronic Police State’.23
It is evident that this spread of surveillance involves the direct funding of 
social control agencies (i.e. public and private police) and the security 
industry, rightly defined as one of the principal businesses of the twenty- 
first century (Glassner, 1999). In fact, the partners of this project, similar 
to others already funded, include university researchers, structures of inte-
rior ministries of different countries, the military industry and private cor-
porations specialized in so- called ‘postmodern’ controls (Palidda, 2000, 
2007a). Furthermore, many of these public and private research centres, as 
well as the participating public and private companies which have bene-
fited from European funding, have already completed or are currently con-
ducting similar projects in joint venture with North American firms. Thus, 
the research funds actually end up ‘indirectly’ supporting forms of interna-
tional cooperation that the European Union ignores or claims to ignore.
 A decisive aspect of these projects regards their definition of ‘military’, 
and, in turn, their particularly narrow and ideological definition of ‘secur-
ity’. As Davis (1990) and Bauman (2006) have observed, this definition has 
acquired an almost mythological meaning because not only does it amount 
to a veritable passe- partout of social control, but it also functions as a label 
that allows any other discourse or action on security, especially of a social 
kind, to be marginalized or excluded. In its dominant or military meaning, 
‘security’ implies the exclusion of structural problems of the weakest indi-
viduals, namely the poor, workers in underground or informal economies, 
precarious workers, nomads, migrants and marginalized people in general, 
who are a part of the European population or who at least live in 
Europe.24
 The causes of insecurity of the partially included and excluded are not 
just questions about income, housing and health, but also include the risk 
of enduring violence at the hands of more powerful social actors, public 
and private police forces and organized crime (Palidda, 2010). Moreover, 
workplace injuries and illnesses affecting the least- protected social actors, 
such as those working in the informal economy, are ignored in dominant 
definitions of security. And yet it is a well- known fact that workplace 
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injuries and illnesses are often closely linked to economic activities that 
produce harmful goods and environmental pollution, in other words inse-
curity for both the immediate victims and society in general (Palidda, 
2009). But the FP7 (concerning security issues) does not contemplate 
research projects on these matters.25
The contents of this book
Research policies are just one, albeit significant and revealing, aspect of the 
increasing domination of the ‘military discourse’ over other influential 
forms of rhetoric in our culture. But they demonstrate – precisely in virtue 
of their strategic objectives – how civil life is largely conditioned and 
remodelled by the ascendancy of the fight against external threats and by 
the practical rhetoric of security. It is precisely these conditions that are at 
the centre of attention of the contributions to this volume. Renouncing the 
temptation of ‘big brother’ theories, but bearing in mind the objective 
capacity of the ‘military’ (and those who command it) to give form and 
purpose to the action of public and private actors, the research collected in 
this volume analyses different aspects of the militarization of society during 
peacetime. The first part sets out the historical and theoretical premises of 
the strategic changes that are currently in progress. The second part analy-
ses the rise of the ‘securitization’ paradigm in crucial fields of global com-
munication strategy, surveillance and justice. The third part investigates 
the restructuring of society on a global scale in relation to media rhetoric, 
the logic of humanitarian interventions and new forms of detention and 
social control.
 The essays collected in this volume reflect a decade of theoretical and 
empirical research, conducted at the University of Genoa in collaboration 
with various European universities and research centres, on the links 
between armed conflict and society. From an epistemological point of 
view, our goal has been to integrate social science and the analysis of con-
flicts on a global scale. Indeed, we believe that sociology, in particular, 
cannot limit its range of action to the level of national societies, but must 
examine the relationship between the global and local dimensions of social 
phenomena. As such, armed conflicts take on crucial meaning because, as 
we try to demonstrate here, they are able to influence and mould con-
temporary societies. Never before as in this present historic period have 
social life and global conflicts constituted such a continuous dimension.
 In the first chapter, Alessandro Dal Lago argues that a theoretical frame-
work structured around the centrality of warfare in the current world 
system has yet to emerge in the social sciences. On the one hand, there is a 
lack of any real awareness about the role that war has played, and con-
tinues to play, in the rise and advance of Western hegemony across the 
planet. It has become common to define this logic as ‘exceptionalism’, 
which makes reference to the German debate of the 1930s about the ‘state 
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of exception’. However, this definition conceals a misinterpretation. Viol-
ence and war are not a violation of rules or an exception to some kind of 
international order, but rather the conditions for the normal exercise of 
power on the international stage. What we are witnessing at present is a 
new type of normality. This does not amount to just a terminological ques-
tion but to the intimate connection between war and politics (and the 
economy) in the globalized world.
 Alain Joxe defines the current state of the world as ‘barbarianism’ and, 
hence, as a process of ‘barbarization’ of peace through the proliferation of 
civil wars and never- ending overseas operations. In the present global 
crisis, the barbarization of war passes through policing strategies that also 
contaminate the notion of peace. The current strategic mechanisms indicate 
a close connection between war and the macro- economic, political and 
social strategies inherent to globalization. Modern ‘war’ has not led to a 
state of total chaos in the world. Rather, it has given rise to a structured 
chaos that organizes a false portrayal of war by censoring or cleverly 
concealing the action of social and political strategies. Wars create insecu-
rity for civilian populations because their political objective is no longer the 
plunder of territories by a conquering state nor the control (and, by impli-
cation, the ‘protection’) of their inhabitants by regular troops. According to 
the dominant Western ideology, only the political administration of the 
irresponsible classes of the ‘new rich’ (who are the cause of disasters across 
every continent) is able to impede the multiplication of environmental and 
financial crimes that are an upshot of contemporary wars.
 Roberto Ciccarelli’s chapter concentrates on the relations between war 
and the debate on sovereignty. Despite the difficulty of conceiving the 
existence of a sovereign (be it a state, a confederation or an alliance of 
states) in a position to dominate the world, the theoretical debate on 
exceptionalism has nonetheless been overshadowed by political theology. 
In fact, it is commonly assumed that the ‘state of exception’ is ‘permanent’. 
Contrary to this assumption, the ambivalence between order and conflict, 
peace and war, norm and exception, between the will to create a ‘demo-
cracy’ and the need to guarantee a multinational company’s interests has 
reached such a point as to make it difficult to distinguish between violence 
and authority, well- being and sacrifice, domination and freedom. Most sig-
nificantly, the distinction between peace and war has become increasingly 
hard to maintain. Today, ‘security’ is no longer an internal question of 
public order that is exclusively managed by states, but rather requires a 
series of military, humanitarian and policing policies to simultaneously 
neutralize global threats and safeguard the living conditions of Western 
populations.
 Massimiliano Guareschi’s chapter examines how the relationship 
between politics and war was theorized by Michel Foucault, Giles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, and Raymond Aron at a time when much of French 
philosophy was committed to a critique of Western political categories. 
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One of the most interesting aspects of their reflections regards the reversal 
of Clausewitz’s famous formula about war representing the continuation 
of politics by other means. Foucault’s approach to the question is marked 
by the need to elaborate an analysis of power that moves beyond econo-
mistic and substantialist perspectives. War, as an analytical operator, thus 
plays a similar role to that of the contract in political philosophy. On their 
part, Deleuze and Guattari refer directly to Clausewitz when they describe 
the dynamics of the ‘nomadism’ of war and the ‘capturing’ functions of 
states. Despite the refusal by some theoreticians and scholars of Clausewitz 
to invert the classic formula (and here the focus falls on Aron), the work of 
both Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari provides us with fundamental 
insights for understanding the role of wars in the globalized world.
 In his contribution, Luca Guzzetti examines the relations between 
techno- scientific research and the military from the end of the Second 
World War to the present. Guzzetti focuses primarily on the United States. 
First, this is because the US, one of the two military superpowers during 
the post- war period, is now the only superpower left. Second, the US has 
always led the technological race (apart from a few years following the 
Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik), both in the civil and military sector. 
Today, the United States alone invests more than half of what is spent by 
all countries worldwide on military research. In his chapter, Guzzetti anal-
yses new changes in the technology of war and its dependence on recent 
strategic thought, in particular the so- called Revolution in Military Affairs.
 Didier Bigo examines how public opinion has tended to accept in an 
uncritical way the series of narratives that followed 11 September. Even 
when we try to adopt a critical stance, our main arguments are borrowed 
from the narratives of global insecurity and a necessary state of emergency. 
In his chapter, Bigo discusses these narratives by adopting Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of ‘habitus’ – in other words, the set of perceptive and cognitive 
frameworks embedded in the different fields of social actors. The term 
‘regression’ is used to explain public opinion’s acceptance of control and 
surveillance as solutions able to halt transnational political violence in the 
so- called age of hyper- terrorism. The question of regression is much 
broader than the argument about the state of exception, especially now 
that, after the end of the Bush era, Obama’s policy of limiting the excep-
tion has seen the continuation of war (in Afghanistan) and surveillance 
against terrorism.
 In his chapter, Salvatore Palidda argues that social research lacks an in- 
depth, coherent analysis of changes in police practices at the same level as 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). He therefore proposes to 
examine the ‘Revolution in Police Affairs’ (RPA) by first discussing the 
main theoretical and methodological aspects that are indispensable for an 
analysis of the management of the neo- liberal/neo- conservative disorder of 
the current era. This can be understood, in Foucauldian terms, as the shift 
from pastoralist governmentality to a form of occasional management that 
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is interested only in the hic et nunc (the here and now) and has no concern 
for the future of society. It is in this general context that we can consider 
the rise of the violent management of disorder and the concomitant weak-
ening of a peaceful social order. Despite the spread of the military dis-
course in the West, the police are unable to abandon their informal and 
sometimes unlawful rapports with different members of local society 
because they cannot declare permanent war with any one particular group. 
As Palidda demonstrates, the apparent victory of the neo- conservative 
revolution in police affairs appears entirely ephemeral precisely because – 
unlike military forces – it is an institution that is embedded in society and 
cannot survive according to a logic of permanent war.
 Eric Heilmann analyses the development of the new technologies of 
surveillance and demonstrates how this phenomenon has removed the 
barrier that once separated private from public life. Anyone today can 
have a webcam or mobile phone with which they can produce their own 
images, from the most banal to the most intimate, which can then be 
placed on a personal or community website. For the police, these technol-
ogies, which were of only limited use a few years ago, have produced a 
significant breakthrough in identifying individuals. More importantly, 
argues Heilmann, the use of these new systems should encourage people 
to consider how surveillance is affecting them. The success of CCTV was 
based on creating a dichotomy between the respectable majority (who 
have nothing to fear) and a deviant minority (who should feel threatened). 
If the argument put forward here turns out to be correct, then it is pos-
sible that with this distortion, we are beginning to see the first signs of the 
emergence of a genuine, identity- based resistance to images produced by 
CCTV.
 Gabriella Petti discusses the results of an empirical study of trials of ‘ter-
rorists’ in Italy. In her analysis, courtrooms are not just a place where defi-
nitions of criminals (or terrorists) are assigned and tested, but are also the 
arenas in which the rights to punish and the powers to divide the guilty 
from the innocent are ritually celebrated. Thus Petti finds the courtroom 
interesting primarily as the setting where discourses, forms of knowledge 
and practices that reproduce social images of terrorism are developed and 
redefined. Trials tell us something about terrorism that is difficult to 
discern from official discourse. They demonstrate how the practices and 
activities of courts produce effects and influence legal definitions of terror-
ism. According to Petti, the court, by following the ceremonial procedures 
laid down by law, represents the possible point from which terrorists, 
migrants and an entire body of abnormal humanity set out on an invisible 
journey towards their own ‘disappearance’, to the general indifference of 
the public.
 According to Marcello Maneri, the global success of the war discourse 
during peacetime cannot be understood without taking into account the 
role of the media. This role, however, has been increasingly conditioned 
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by the consequences of the neo- liberal globalized order. A first key 
consequence has been a veritable war against migration, while a second 
major repercussion has been the series of military interventions that are 
defined by oxymorons such as ‘peace keeping’, ‘international policing’, 
‘pre- emptive war’ and ‘humanitarian war’. At a communicative level, 
these two effects underline a sort of global ‘regime of discourse’. Wars 
around crime, drugs, terrorism and security have released military per-
sonnel and police forces from the binds of red tape and exempted them 
from any accountability. The peacetime war discourse is thus discussed 
by Marcello Maneri as a disciplinary regime founded upon the use of 
force that is useful to govern our societies.
 In their chapter, Laurence McFalls and Mariella Pandolfi examine the 
case of Kosovo as paradigmatic of the new global ‘therapeutic’ order. At a 
discursive level, Kosovo has illustrated the rhetorical efficacy of a global 
appeal to the ultimate value of human life. Accordingly, we face what 
seems to be a democratically constructed information mechanism: a space 
that appeals to the need for interventions or the prevention of catastrophes 
and appears democratically irreprehensible. The authors thus confront the 
paradox of the coexistence of the noblest will to share information and 
the most opaque procedures implemented in zones of intervention. The 
combination of the mobility of the ‘cosmopolis’, the urgent need for action 
in the face of real (or feared) emergencies, and the undeniable social utility 
of many interventions makes it nearly impossible to establish any global 
democratic mechanism for controlling interventions, despite their appeal 
to a certain democratic legitimacy. Be it in Kosovo, Afghanistan or any-
where else, the notion of a humanitarian management of crises in the grey 
zone pathologizes any peace accord, development and democratization 
process (staged with endless rhetoric but with little promise), just as it has 
pathologized the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence in February 
2008. The urgency/emergency is permanent: a paradigmatic oxymoron of 
our contemporaneousness.
 In the final chapter, Federico Rahola examines the realm of ‘detention 
camps’ and suggests a different approach to interpreting their political and 
social ‘status’, which questions the borders in which camps are supposed 
to have been instituted and where exclusion is included. Detention camps 
are not areas of ‘waste’ or a suspension of the law, but excessive places, in 
the sense that they are spaces that exceed the reach of the ‘national’ legal 
system but nonetheless are invested with a proliferation of administrative 
decrees and security policies. According to Rahola, to write a ‘genealogy of 
camps’ means to relocate camps in a territory that exceeds every represen-
tation of modern national borders and indicates, at the same time, this ter-
ritory’s spectral artificiality and intrinsic weakness. From this perspective, 
camps are the symptom of a space that has always transcended the specific 
space of nations, within which it has been historically colonized, plundered 
and racialized, but never totally absorbed.
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Notes
 1 The observation is interesting and revealing because the author, as well as being 
an eminent historian of war in ancient Greece, is also an ultra- conservative 
commentator. In any case, the fact that the winners of the Nobel Peace Prize are 
not always pacifists is not a novelty. Henry Kissinger, who had actively collabo-
rated with the dictatorial regimes of South America, was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his negotiations with North Vietnam.
 2 As the chapters of Dal Lago, Bigo and Ciccarelli here demonstrate, the coexist-
ence of war and peace appears today more than in the past as something 
normal, indeed ‘banal’ in the sense provided by Arendt (2006).
 3 On this aspect, see the chapters by Guareschi, Dal Lago, Bigo and Joxe in this 
volume.
 4 There exists an abundant bibliography on this matter. See, in particular, Kaldor 
(2000) and Zolo (2000). For a definition of neo- liberalism, see Harvey (2005) 
and Foucault (2008).
 5 Among the first strategic declarations regarding terrorism in the US context, see 
Weinberger (1984).
 6 On the purely conventional and artificial character of the definition of ‘civiliza-
tion’ in Huntington, see Dal Lago (2006a).
 7 The Iraqi army that was defeated in 2003 was also ‘regular’. But, as Ricks 
(2006) has shown, the true war began in Iraq after George W. Bush officially 
announced its end. From this moment, the war in Iraq has become the ideal 
model of every asymmetric conflict fought between a hypermodern army, on 
the one side, and insurgents or guerrillas, on the other. For the concept of asym-
metric war, see Hammes (2006).
 8 By ‘constructed’ we mean ‘objectified’, ‘unified’ and so on. This does not mean, 
also in reaction to the rising hostilities towards Islam in the west, that Islamic 
radicalism is not capable of global influence. On the cultural significance, and 
in particular the great capacity for propaganda, of contemporary radical Islam, 
see Kepel (2004). This theme is examined in depth in the chapters by Maneri 
and Petti.
 9 For a description of the principal categories of the conflict between the 
developed world and these new enemies, see Barber (2001).
10 For an analysis of this strategic turn, see Joxe (1990, 1991).
11 Traditionally, first generation warfare is defined as a conflict where troops con-
front each other face to face with firearms; second generation when indirect 
artillery fire is used; third generation when the aim is to penetrate the enemy 
lines to defeat it without necessarily destroying its forces (as in the so- called 
Blitzkrieg). For the respective definitions, see Lind et al. (1989) and Hammes 
(2006). Others speak of contemporary warfare in terms of a ‘fifth’ dimension 
that is composed of the infosphere (Lonsdale, 2004). The concept of asymmet-
ric warfare refers to armed conflict between conventional armies and insurgents 
who use the methods of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
12 For a critique of RMA and its real impact on contemporary war, see Gray 
(2005). On US strategy in Iraq, see Record (2003a, 2003b).
13 See the chapters of Dal Lago, Ciccarelli and Bigo in this volume.
14 For a terminological analysis, see Benveniste (1971).
15 See, for example, Fukuyama (2006).
16 See Kagan (2003). The reference to The Godfather II is suggestive. It is worth 
recalling that, in the film, Hyman Roth is a gangster financier closely associated 
to the godfather Vito Corleone.
17 See T.C. Miller, ‘Contractors outnumber troops in Iraq. The figure, higher 
than reported earlier, doesn’t include security firms. Critics say the issue is 
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accountability’, Los Angeles Times, 4 July 2007 (available at http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na- private4):
The number of US- paid private contractors in Iraq now exceeds that of 
American combat troops, newly released figures show, raising fresh ques-
tions about the privatization of the war effort and the government’s capacity 
to carry out military and rebuilding campaigns. More than 180,000 civilians 
– including Americans, foreigners and Iraqis – are working in Iraq under US 
contracts, according to State and Defense department figures obtained by 
the Los Angeles Times.
According to the report of Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contrac-
tors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, 14 December 2009 
(assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40764_20091214.pdf ): ‘These analysts point to 
recent contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans—the three 
largest operations of the past 15 years—where contractors have comprised 
approximately 50% of DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel 
workforce.’
18 On the logic of humanitarian interventions, see Fassin and Pandolfi (2009).
19 See ‘FP7 in Brief. How to get involved in the EU 7th Framework Programme 
for Research’ (http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/understanding/fp7inbrief/home_
en.html). The quotations are taken from this document.
20 According to official documents of the Commission, the European Commission 
has made 1.4 billion euros specifically available for Security Research (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/understanding/fp7inbrief/home_en.html).
21 See ‘Towards a more secure society and increased industrial competitiveness’, 
Security Research Projects under the 7th Framework Programme for Research, 
May 2009 (ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/security/docs/towards- a-more-
 secure_en.pdf ).
22 Funded research includes the AMASS (Autonomous Maritime Surveillance 
System) project, which is concerned with providing the Blue Border Surveillance 
the technological capacity to better contend with ‘continuous 24/7 surveillance 
as a counter measure to illegal immigration’. The BeSeCu project (Human beha-
viour in crisis situations: A cross cultural investigation in order to tailor 
security- related communication) claims ‘to investigate cross- cultural and ethnic 
differences of human behaviour in crisis situations in order to better tailor 
security related communication, instructions and procedures with a view to 
improving evacuation and protection’. It consists of a study of natural or crimi-
nal catastrophes that claims to improve the reaction time in such events. In 
short, it is one of those sorts of research projects that often contributes to culti-
vating fears. The same can be said for the CAST project (Comparative assess-
ment of security- centred training curricula for first responders on disaster 
management in the EU), which explicitly refers to the risk of terrorism. COCAE 
(Cooperation Across Europe For Cd(Zn)Te Based Security) is instead a project 
about security in relation to nuclear risks. COPE (Common Operational Picture 
Exploitation) concerns crisis management (although after Hurricane Katrina we 
know that such management can turn into opportunities for business and social 
Darwinism). CPSI (Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions), in its 
own way, enters into the core of the mechanisms that produce alarm about 
fears and insecurity: 
CPSI aims to create a methodology to collect, quantify, organize, query, 
analyse, interpret and monitor data on actual and perceived security, deter-
minants and mediators. The four main objectives of the project are to: 
develop a conceptual model of actual and perceived security and their 
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determinants; design a methodology to register and process security- related 
data; develop a data warehouse to store amassed data and; carry out an 
empirical proof- of-principle study to test the model, methodology and data 
warehouse. In CPSI we focus on security related to ‘everyday’ crime, such as 
theft, assault and vandalism. The CPSI methodology, however, can be 
applied to other areas of security as well, such as terrorism or financial 
security.
DETECTER (Detection Technologies, Terrorism, Ethics and Human Rights) is 
a project that is clearly inscribed in the activities of the security agencies. The 
same is the case for EFFISEC (Efficient Integrated Security Checkpoints). It is 
not a coincidence that in these kinds of projects there are also Israeli partners. 
ODYSSEY (Strategic Pan- European Ballistics Intelligence Platform for Combat-
ing Organised Crime and Terrorism) is clearly useful for the police forces and 
secret services. The same can be said for SAFE- COMMS (Counter- Terrorism 
Crisis Communications Strategies for Recovery and Continuity) and for 
STRAW (Security Technology Active Watch).
23 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance; many critical articles on 
these questions can be found in the journals Surveillance & Society, Cultures & 
Conflits and Conflitti globali.
24 According to Eurostat (2009), approximately eighty million EU citizens (equal 
to 16 per cent of the population) are directly affected by the phenomenon of 
poverty.
25 In 2008, the head of the European Agency for Security and Health at Work 
(EU- OSHA) declared:
Every three- and-a- half minutes, somebody in the European Union dies from 
work- related causes, and every four- and-a- half seconds, a worker in the EU 
is the victim of an accident that forces them to stay at home for at least 
three working days. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/health- eu/newsletter/14/newsletter_it.htm)
Part I
The constituent role of 
armed conflicts

1 Fields without honour
Contemporary war as global 
enforcement
Alessandro Dal Lago
I’m a war president. I make decisions here in the Oval Office on foreign 
policy matters with war on my mind, and the American people need to 
know they got a president who sees the world the way it is.
(George Bush)1
At the end of the 1980s, with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, some 
believed that capitalism would rule supreme as the only form of economy 
and society on Earth and, as a consequence, would give rise to a lasting 
phase of prosperity and peace.2 Today, we know that this was an illusion, 
also in the case of Europe, which had actually been at peace for almost 
fifty years since the end of the Second World War.3 At first, the progressive 
disintegration of the Yugoslav federation led to a series of armed conflicts 
that engulfed the Balkans. From here on, various US- led coalitions inter-
vened in different parts of the world in the name of ‘international legality’ 
(Kuwait in 1991), ‘humanity’ or ‘human rights’ (Somalia in 1993 and 
Kosovo in 1999), ‘enduring’ freedom (Afghanistan in 2001), the war 
against terrorism or simply in order to exert hegemony (Iraq in 2003). A 
state of war has now existed for almost twenty years and, more import-
antly, seems destined to continue indefinitely. But it was only with the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 that vast layers of Western public opinion 
realized that war, even if it now assumed a new form, had reappeared in 
everyday life (Munkler, 2004; Kaldor, 2007a, 2007b).
 It is therefore necessary to establish if and how the permanent war that we 
have effectively become accustomed to is changing our society. In order to be 
approached correctly, this problem requires an understanding of the nature of 
contemporary war. This is a source of great difficulty in social analysis. The 
majority of current conflicts elude the typical notion of warfare that had held 
for most of the twentieth century. In contrast to the world wars that charac-
terized European life for thirty years,4 during the conflicts that occurred after 
1989, Western everyday life would continue more or less unaltered. In a 
certain sense, for most of European public opinion, ‘permanent war’ remained 
a distant rumble, just like the colonial wars of the nineteenth century.5
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 After the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, 11 March 2004 
in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London (not to mention those in Bali, 
Morocco, Pakistan and elsewhere), this was clearly revealed to be a fragile 
façade. But the presence of war in our lives is not limited to the spectre of 
terrorism. Rather, it has led to a mobilization that, far from constituting 
an exceptional situation, has steadily redirected our habits – in other 
words, the forms that social life normally assumes. Some of these changes 
are clear to everybody and can be summarized by the primacy of security 
formula: harsher controls at borders, airports and transit places in general, 
the strengthening and pervasiveness of intelligence services, a generalized 
suspicion towards foreigners, especially if they have North African, Middle 
Eastern, Arabic or ‘Islamic’ origins, and the setting up of camps for prison-
ers who lack a precise status and hence any sort of guarantee (such as 
Guantanamo and the camps in Iraq and Afghanistan).6
 The primacy of security ultimately means the militarization of social 
control, namely, the militarized management of threats faced by Western 
societies, not only from the outside (terrorist infiltration), but also from 
within (terrorist sleeper cells, as well as various types of dangerous sub-
jects).7 The militarization of control entails two main consequences: the 
first is that certain categories of human beings who are suspected of con-
nivance with the enemy are withdrawn from the normal judicial guaran-
tees upon which the West has constructed its self- portrayal as the cradle of 
the law. The Patriot Act signed by Bush in October 2001, the setting up of 
detention camps like Guantanamo, the evident normality of torture in Abu 
Ghraib prison all represent the establishment of a special military regime 
reserved for ‘terrorists’.8 The second consequence is the virtual and actual 
indictment of those human types, in particular migrants, who are con-
sidered susceptible, as a result of their irregular social ‘nature’, to the prop-
aganda of the enemies of the West. In this sense, detention centres for 
unlawful or ‘clandestine’ migrants (which today are spread across the 
world) are not formally different from special military prisons, insofar as 
they are reserved for subjects who lack any sort of social legitimacy. It may 
also be noted that the principle of enmity (on which the militarization of 
control is based) tends now to encompass any threat to the established 
order (and, under specific circumstances, can also include internal opposi-
tion in the West, as well as different types of social outcasts).9
 The most decisive change that is probably able to produce unpredictable 
effects can be summarized in the formula of the primacy of armed decision. 
As of 1999, with the NATO war against Serbia undertaken without the 
UN’s consent, the principle of the West’s military interference throughout 
the world has prevailed. The justification or legitimation of this global 
enforcement activity rests on the threat of terrorism and of those who sup-
posedly support it (first and foremost, the so- called rogue states), but it is 
at the same time essentially self- referential and tautological. Assuming that 
only the West enacts the law in internal and international relations (finding 
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itself in an ideal judicial situation) and that it has the means to enforce 
compliance, the premises are effectively established for constituting a 
global military power legitimated by circumstances. Moreover, these cir-
cumstances are long- lasting, for it is deemed that any foreseeable armed 
opposition to the exercise of a global military power falls within the cat-
egory of terrorism. This is the underlying meaning of the enduring freedom 
slogan and Bush’s declarations that the struggle against terrorism may last 
for ‘entire generations’. Hence, the war against terrorism rests on a de 
facto power or the capability of military intervention that can be explicitly 
justified by appealing to the cultural (economic, social and also military) 
superiority of ‘western civilization’, or to ‘human rights’ and even a liberal 
ideology.10 In this sense, the power of intervention – that is, war – takes on 
a constituent function that is thus capable of reconfiguring global power 
relations.11
 To claim that war presently assumes a constituent power or role is 
therefore to imply that it is the source of new social and political relations. 
First of all, alongside national and international political authorities, on 
the one side, new powers develop and, on the other, those that have been 
established for some time are able to change their functions and areas of 
intervention. Examples of the former are the ad hoc alliances that have 
fought the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and present themselves as the de 
facto armed wing of ‘international legality’, with or without a UN 
mandate, as well as the European rapid intervention military force, whose 
range of action is certainly not limited to Europe. The latter includes 
NATO, which intervened in Kosovo in 1999 and presently operates in 
Afghanistan. In both cases, these military structures, regardless of whether 
they are occasional or permanent, tend to promote or impose new forms 
of political and economic organization for the countries in which they 
intervene: a military and civilian presence in Afghanistan, a NATO mili-
tary protectorate in the southern Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and, broadly 
speaking, Macedonia and Albania) or the coalition that has managed the 
occupation of Iraq. This last case was formed by the armed forces of the 
two states that overwhelmed the Iraqi army in 2003 and by the military 
forces deployed by various European, Asian and South American countries 
undertaking military policing tasks. In reality, these forces are merely the 
armed vanguard of an occupation structure that includes substantial 
private security forces,12 businesses assigned the task of rebuilding the 
infrastructure and economic system (a majority of which are American) 
and public or part- public Western agencies (such as secret services, NGOs 
and UN personnel) that manage civilian structures, from education systems 
to cultural heritage. It hence amounts to a political, economic and admin-
istrative occupation, whose only source of legitimation is the military 
victory of 2003.
 War is therefore a dimension that is capable of transforming society in 
largely innovative directions. The same concept could be expressed by 
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defining contemporary war as a ‘social system of thought’. The expression 
is inspired by the work of Michel Foucault and identifies a cultural 
complex that, without necessarily being organic, explicit or represented by 
official or canonical traditions, is nonetheless capable of guiding the theo-
retical and practical way of thinking of a certain epoch. It could be con-
sidered a type of ideology. Foucault analysed systems of thought as the 
minor scientific representations spanning the Enlightenment, the image of 
madness in the classical age, modern prisons and discipline, and the ‘will 
to know’ in the contemporary culture of sexuality. But he also identified 
the essence of modern wartime thought in ‘state racism’ (Foucault, 2003) 
and started to study the relationship between war and ‘governmentality’ – 
namely, the complex of political and non- political powers that govern a 
society. While these provide extremely fertile insights, Foucault’s perspec-
tive was still limited to national states and single societies and did not 
extend to the trans- state and transnational dimensions which are now 
understood under the label of globalization.
 Foucault insisted on the need to overturn Clausewitz’s longstanding 
maxim whereby ‘war is nothing but a continuation of politics by other 
means’. For Foucault, on the contrary, politics is the continuation of war 
by other means (as, in a certain sense, it was for Thomas Hobbes and Carl 
Schmitt). For Foucault, what is ‘political’ is the manifestation of a funda-
mental and largely latent civil war between social groups, essentially 
between the dominant class and a riotous social body. In my opinion, this 
position aptly innovates the Clausewitzian theory, according to which the 
continuity between war and politics was exclusively limited to relations 
between states and, hence, to foreign policy.13 But today it is impossible to 
assume a clear separation between internal and foreign policy. And this is 
not because of the decline of national states, which have supposedly given 
away parcels of sovereignty to global authorities, but precisely for the 
opposite reason – namely, the reorganization of national states into con-
stellations or coalitions that vary to a greater or lesser degree and that act 
on a global stage for hegemonic reasons. In other terms, one could re- 
translate Foucault’s version of Clausewitz’s maxim into the following pro-
position: global politics is the continuation of global war by other means. 
With this, the existence of a continuous dimension of global war and pol-
itics, even if this can obviously be divided and differentiated, is essentially 
established.14
 Overall, Foucault’s intuition allows us to free ourselves from the 
common- sense opinion whereby war is supposed to be an anomaly, the 
deviation from the right path of humanity, the emergence of an anti- 
progressive irrationality, the unleashing of archaic impulses, and so on.15 
Of course, there is something true in these judgments, at least if one places 
oneself at the level of the individual combatant and the horrors that he or 
she takes part in. But matters appear to be entirely different when the ana-
lysis concentrates on military mechanisms and systems in their organic 
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connections with global politics and the global economy. Here, instead, 
war appears as the other side of global politics, a system of choices that is 
not alternative, but rather entirely complementary to peaceful systems of 
government.
 Since the end of the Cold War, military violence – that is, the imposi-
tion of political choices through the use of weapons – has appeared to be 
a continuous, normal, daily resource within an evolving political frame-
work. Wars have been political to varying degrees and aimed at diverse 
targets that have not always been evident or entirely comprehensible 
according to the rational framework that was supposed to motivate or 
justify them. They have consisted in wars for the control of resources, for 
the elimination or containment of local resistance (as in the case of the 
permanent state of war in Palestine), for the redefinition of areas of influ-
ence or for all of these reasons placed together. The fact that some of 
these wars have not only never been declared but, in some instances, have 
not even been considered as such simply shows that today the state of war 
is ubiquitous.16
 This is certainly not a novelty. Rather, the fact that the scale of conflicts 
today is global in every corner of the world (which means that, in prin-
ciple, any local conflict has effects on the entire world) has torn through 
the veil of Western ideology that had marginalized the role of war in the 
ascendency of Euro- American culture: a liberal, economistic, democratic 
ideology, according to which the success of Western ‘values’ – economic 
well- being, political freedom, representative government, scientific and 
technological development – is supposedly the result of a superior intrinsic 
ability and not, instead, the outcome of a state of war that, over a 
couple of centuries, has left in its trail hundreds of millions of corpses. It 
is an explicit, but more often implicit, ideology that is based upon the 
characteristic removal of an extreme division of intellectual work. The 
erasure of war and its normality in social sciences and political and 
economic theory, philosophical aphasia, the reduction of war in historical 
discourse to a variation in the political–diplomatic game: these deletions 
reach their climax in the bizarre idea of the pathology, as if war were a 
disease suffered by the West rather than its physiological condition.
 Following Foucault, one could proceed to draw up an archaeology or a 
genealogy of the removal of war in the self- construction of Western 
thought. This task is not impossible if only one were to rely on the coun-
terpoint in philosophical discourse of the lack of interest and the occa-
sional belligerent drive – something which, between instances of reticence 
and homicidal rage, would take us back to the source of the Western nar-
rative.17 The occasional intuitions of a Machiavelli or a Schmitt, Kant’s 
convoluted pacifist projects, the lightning bolts of Nietzsche – and even 
Foucault’s or Deleuze’s brilliant historical- philosophical plots18 – are not 
enough to absolve the philosophical tradition from the suspicion of a 
general connivance and silent approval on the matter of war.
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 To claim that war presently assumes a constituent function more than 
in the past, even if this is implicit or removed, means recognizing not only 
that political–social and military planning are in perfect agreement, but 
also that it is the latter that largely determines the rhythm of the former. 
Here, the discussion is not restricted to the technologies that have become 
perfectly normal in everyday life (and, rather, are assumed as a symbol of 
peaceful development and even the freedom to communicate) and that, in 
some cases, like the Internet, have military origins. It is enough to limit 
oneself to the fact that in the currently triumphant market societies, where 
the role of public intervention is considered scandalous, the most extra-
ordinary apparatus of military welfare that the world has ever seen is 
thriving. If Rome, which had around thirty active legions at the time of its 
maximum development, was considered the most militarized empire of 
ancient times, and Frederick II’s Prussia, with an army of men totalling a 
few tens of thousands, represented a veritable barracks state, what then are 
we supposed to say about the contemporary United States, whose Depart-
ment of Defense has over two million men on its payroll, without taking 
into account its reservists, the National Guard and millions of other people 
working in the civilian sector of its military- industrial complex?19 And 
what should be said about the millions of other armed people (and dis-
counting mercenaries) with civilian tasks, such as various types of police 
officers recruited in the endless war against terrorism?
 The military system, apparently silent or frozen in peacetime, and more 
or less triumphantly deployed in wartime, has seemed to be a sort of 
implicit necessary evil until, after 1989, the intellectual, political and judi-
cial conventions began to crumble, revealing the world as a single great 
battlefield. Naturally, it was a profoundly new martial landscape, but per-
fectly in line with the directions that the economy and technology have 
been taking over the last decades. To begin with, the early 1990s witnessed 
the prevailing of a new technocratic utopia in war strategy, known as 
RMA or Revolution in Military Affairs. To understand the significance of 
this transformation, it is necessary to recall that European military history 
had been conventionally marked by shifts that were termed ‘revolutions’.20 
Examples in the modern epoch include the large- scale diffusion of firearms 
(between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), the introduction of con-
scripted armies (between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and the 
aforementioned adoption of armoured forces and strategic aviation (in 
the first half of the twentieth century). RMA marks a further shift, and the 
most radical of all, insofar as it is not just capable of assuming the whole 
world as the arena for its implementation, but also, and most importantly, 
it can in principle achieve the progressive reduction of the human element 
in combat, if not its total disappearance (O’Hanlon, 2000). The strategic 
core of RMA is basically constituted by the use of new computer, commu-
nication and robotic technologies in the military sectors where the human 
element has always prevailed: information gathering on the ground and 
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combat. Here, flesh- and-bone soldiers would be progressively, if not 
entirely, replaced by the automation of information systems (infowar) and 
a predominant use of aerial and missile warfare to neutralize enemy armed 
forces (De Landa, 1991).
 In a certain sense, the second Gulf conflict of 1991 represents the 
transition from the twentieth- century type of warfare to RMA.21 Although 
the communication and air defence systems (as well as the Iraqis’ land 
defences) were entirely neutralized by the allies, the land forces (armoured 
and infantry) were assigned the task of ‘completing the job’ and of ‘clean-
ing’ Saddam Hussein’s troops out of Kuwait. In any case, the extraordinary 
disparity in the calculated losses (little more than 300 among the allies; 
several tens of thousands among the Iraqis) gave rise to the illusion that 
the incomparable Western dominance in terms of computer, aerial and 
missile technologies had now rendered land warfare marginal. Even land 
warfare, based as it now was on the integration of armoured forces and 
tactical aviation (flying gunships and combat helicopters), would also 
become more or less a formality.
 Immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, the ideology of ‘zero losses’ 
(among Westerners) was hatched, together with propaganda about the 
capabilities of missiles and ‘intelligent’ bombs to cause a minimal number 
of victims (‘collateral damage’) among the civilian population (warfare 
with ‘zero human cost’). The height of the combination of utopia and 
propaganda that comprised RMA came with the 1999 war in Kosovo 
where, for the first time in the history of NATO alliance attacks, there was 
not even one death among the attackers and a ‘few hundred’ (but, in 
reality, a few thousand) victims, who were primarily Serbian- Yugoslav 
civilians.
 Moreover, the theory of ‘asymmetrical’ warfare prevailed during this 
period. Among the more visionary theorists, the idea began to circulate 
that the enemy’s response to Western invincibility would be to abandon 
conventional warfare as well as traditional guerrilla warfare (epitomized 
by the people’s war theorized and practised between the 1950s and 1970s 
by the Vietnamese general Giap) because these were too costly in human 
terms. The asymmetrical response would consist primarily in forms of 
‘netwar’ where small, autonomist terrorist cells lacking any centralized 
structure would seek to strike at the nerve centres of the West and the 
USA, following the well- known strategic precept of ‘swarming’, in which 
all move separately so as to strike together.22 There is no doubt that, from 
the very start, American strategists had the Al Qaida model in mind, which 
they knew perfectly because the US had participated, directly or otherwise, 
in financing Osama bin Laden at the time of the guerrilla warfare against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan (Burke, 2004). The underlying principle is that 
terrorist guerrilla warfare must be opposed with a counter- guerrilla effort 
that is based on the same strategic principles.23 The first response to 11 
September (which US analysts had widely predicted, even if they had 
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obviously been unable to pinpoint the attack) was the war in Afghanistan, 
where RMA appeared to find its fullest implementation: strategic bombing 
of Taliban and Al Qaida sanctuaries, with the Northern Alliance acting as 
proxy for the dirty work (eliminating Talibans on the open battlefield) and 
the use of small counter- guerrilla units (including CIA and British officers, 
Rangers, Delta Force and British Special Forces) to swarm against the Al 
Qaida network in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 The American and British decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 with 
a relatively ‘light’ force was not just the result of errors in strategic 
assessments (nobody had foreseen the Iraqis’ choice not to sacrifice their 
troops in land clashes where the outcome was a foregone conclusion and 
to instead save themselves for the fighting after the ‘victory’), but was also 
the upshot of their excessive confidence in the new way of conducting war. 
Convinced that the victory in 1991 and subsequent embargo, coupled with 
the usual and devastating aerial attacks, would have annihilated any pos-
sible resistance, the American and British forces entered into an undertak-
ing that immediately revealed itself to be infinitely more difficult. At this 
point, it is essential for us to ascertain the distance between theoretical 
strategies and practical applications. This distance also depends on con-
flicts between civilian advisors (fundamental to the American decision- 
making system) and military hierarchies, and, in the case of the latter, 
conflicts between different strategic schools. By and large, military hierar-
chies are cautious when it comes to espousing the more futuristic strategic 
concepts and are bound to a traditional military culture. Here, at least two 
relevant conflicts can be noted: the first was the removal of General Wesley 
Clark during the aerial war in Kosovo, who had argued that a land inter-
vention in Kosovo was indispensable, while the second was between the 
US army’s chiefs of staff and the defence minister, Rumsfeld. The military 
officials felt that the invasion of Iraq had been prepared too hastily and 
that the 300,000 or so individuals who had initially taken part (of whom 
only a third were combatants) were not sufficient to maintain order after 
the possible capture of Baghdad.24 All this demonstrates that RMA is 
merely a theoretical vision, and one that is also controversial, and thus we 
must not draw any long- term conclusions regarding the evolution of con-
temporary war.25
 The current method of waging wars appears to be faced with an array 
of options that are largely political, often in contradiction with each other 
and broadly coincidental. But this means admitting that there is no solu-
tion of a fundamental continuity in the choices between peace and war in 
the Western hegemonic system.26 The strategic failure in Iraq widely condi-
tioned the US presidential election in November 2008 (which was not at 
all a referendum on peace, but rather on the optimal way of conducting 
war). Although the adventurist strategy of the American neo- conservatives 
was defeated with the election of Barack Obama, the military options did 
not fade away but were inserted, exactly as had happened in the past, into 
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a scenario in which the military apparatus is ready, at any time, to act as 
the armed wing of the ‘security’ policy, that is, of American hegemony.
 War also exercises a constituent function in a wider sense, insofar as it 
influences the global structures of culture. Let us consider the sphere of 
information. Although apparently pluralistic at a planetary scale, due to its 
articulation into countless local and national spheres, in reality global 
information is influenced by a small number of news sources and media 
organizations that fall within the orbit of the West and, above all, the 
United States. Even television channels praised for their impartiality ulti-
mately depend, during international crises, on networks that are close to 
the American political–military establishment, such as Fox TV. Moreover, 
the events of 11 September 2001 ensured that almost the entire Western 
media aligned itself with the positions of the American government, in the 
name of patriotism or in the defence of civilization. At the same time, since 
information came to be openly considered essential to military strategy, the 
media has effectively been recruited into Western armies, rendering inde-
pendent coverage of conflicts impossible.27 In 1991, the chiefs of staff of 
the coalition prohibited freedom of movement for reporters in the theatre 
of operations. In 2003, journalists were embedded – in other words, 
dressed in uniform and attached to second- line units. Alternative or inde-
pendent information was discouraged by swift and, in any case, military 
means. In 1999 during the war in Kosovo, Serb television was destroyed 
by a missile attack, while in Iraq several film crews of Arab broadcasters 
like Al Jazeera were repeatedly targeted by the Americans during the 
capture of Baghdad.
 The militarization of information is not in contradiction with the appar-
ent communicative pluralism that befits a global market society. Rather, it 
acts intermittently during the phases of mobilization and at the height of 
conflicts. Furthermore, it extends to the ordinary processes that filter news, 
providing them global prominence or demoting them to the background or 
causing them to disappear altogether off the media map. Even without any 
diktats from the military or politicians, news items that contradict the offi-
cial political truths vanish, simply because there is no media organization 
interested in reporting them.28 Given the mass of information theoretically 
available, something becomes news only when it is politically supported – 
in other words, when it is produced, filmed or validated by the institutions 
that are equipped with authority on a global level. The American govern-
ment was capable of convincing the world that the Iraqis were in a posi-
tion to strike the West with weapons of mass destruction only because, 
after 11 September, it was endowed with a sort of claim or right to truth.29
 The influence of war on culture is also exercised at a far wider level than 
the mere imposition of a political–media agenda. While Western leaders 
(apart from the more amateurish ones like Berlusconi) are capable of 
showing cautiousness in making correlations between terrorism and the 
Arab world or between global subversion and Islam, this is not the case 
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with their advisors, the most influential intellectuals or simply those com-
mentators whose purpose is to stir up the waters in order to sell articles or 
books. Huntington’s essay on the ‘clash of civilizations’, which was aimed 
at an educated public, or Oriana Fallaci’s obscurantist pamphlets, which 
were aimed at the general public, confirm the opinion that there is an 
ongoing war between cultures and religions, or a general terrorist attack 
against the West.30 This does not need to be a widely held opinion (in fact 
it is not, if one is to believe the surveys by international research institutes). 
It is sufficient for it to be legitimated and diffused by the popular media 
and for it to therefore build the foundation for Western governments to 
justify their strategies, explicitly or implicitly.
 The militarization of culture translates, above all, into widespread 
modes of thought (or non- thought) that do not always need to be explicitly 
expressed. In any kind of war, the enemy loses every specific connotation 
to become the exclusive target to strike.31 Nowadays, the generalization of 
the hostility implicit in contemporary wars – ‘terrorists’ thus refer to Arabs 
or Muslims and ‘rogue states’ to the whole of a population – ensures that a 
considerable part of humankind becomes a potential target and is hence 
dehumanized. This gives rise to the notable indifference towards the fate of 
populations involved in contemporary conflicts. Very few voices were 
raised to denounce the effects of the UN embargo against Iraq after 1991, 
which caused, directly or indirectly, the death by starvation or lack of 
medical treatment of one and a half million people. Likewise, few people 
were concerned about the civilian victims of Western military actions and 
bombings in Somalia, Kosovo, Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Massacres, 
torture, extermination camps and the suffering of civilians are only 
brought to light when the West is not involved.32 As Derrida observed, the 
current political–military terminology reduces enemies or targets either to 
enemies of humanity (terrorists, scoundrels, bandits and criminals, when 
they exercise an active role) or to animals or inert material (when ‘other’ 
populations are involved in the West’s wars) (Derrida, 2005).
 The debasing of the enemy has varying nuances. It ranges from the crea-
tion of ad hoc categories, like the one of ‘enemy combatant’, used to define 
the ‘terrorists’ captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere and imprisoned in the 
American base in Guantanamo, to the straightforward cancellation of 
the registering of victims. From 1991 to date, there has not been a single 
war in which the victors have bothered to calculate civilian casualties. The 
use of the expression ‘collateral damage’ to indicate the civilian victims of 
bombings perfectly expresses the way in which ‘other’ human beings are 
equated to mere things fatally affected by war. Moreover, this style is 
entirely coherent with the military practice of ‘indiscriminate response’, 
which establishes a pure and simple linguistic extension. When a Western 
combat unit is attacked on the ground, it reacts by creating a void around 
itself. As the enemy is, and always will be, a terrorist, the aim is to destroy 
their civilian habitat, and hence not just to strike ‘anything that moves’ but 
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also the population amongst which they might be hiding. The dynamics of 
urban fighting in Mogadishu (1993), Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq (particularly 
in 2004) and today in Afghanistan are basically the same.33 The regular 
armed forces strike civilians in a generalized manner, bombing the sanctu-
aries of terrorists or guerrillas that are found in urban areas, and hence 
essentially seek to ‘obliterate’ any support, actual or otherwise, for the 
enemy. In this way, Western tactics are substantially a mirror image of 
those of the terrorists, whose aim is to mobilize civilians against the West.
 As we have already pointed out, we are dealing here with a clear case of 
asymmetrical warfare, which can be defined as a conflict where one side 
equipped with overwhelming force seeks to destroy an infinitely weaker 
enemy that fights in an unconventional and ‘improper’ way (Metz, 1997; 
Pape, 2005). However, the asymmetry has a far broader significance 
beyond its military dimension. In general, when the West fights it could be 
considered an anthropological type of asymmetry. The military definition 
of the enemy as barbarian or criminal excludes any recognition of their 
status as combatants. Accordingly, they are treated as a mere technical 
problem, at the same level as a disaster or natural calamity. Unlike in the 
past (particularly during the 1930s and 1940s), today there is no need for 
an explicit theory about the inferiority of races to justify the use of asym-
metrical warfare. As long as it is assumed that ours is the only (legitimate) 
culture, the others will always be considered to lack culture or to be 
bearers of abnormal or monstrous cultures (as in the case of fundament-
alism). Therefore, asymmetrical war is not fought against different indi-
viduals, but against non- persons. As such, the treatment of the enemy is 
racist to a new extreme because it does not assume its inferiority, but 
rather its a priori exclusion from humankind.34
 It is not necessary to read between the lines of their texts to see that the 
advisors of Western leaders are entirely aware of the racist character of 
contemporary conflicts.35 The ‘right to wage war’ is proclaimed at present 
on the basis of the claim to an absolute cultural superiority (Kagan and 
Kristol, 2005). The ‘barbarization’ of the enemy enables both the produc-
tion of consent across most of the West for permanent war and the man-
agement of conflicts without any reference to the judicial ‘forms’, 
conventions or constraints imposed by international law.36 In this field, the 
only formality is ideological and has the purpose of conditioning Western 
public opinion by justifying, in the name of higher goals (the defence of 
our civilization, ‘human rights’ and so on), measures such as the intern-
ment of enemy prisoners in camps beyond any external form of control, 
the systematic use of torture and the use of weapons of mass destruction.37
 If this is the reality of contemporary war, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that, for the time being, we do not possess adequate theoretical tools to 
imagine future developments and, even less so, to prefigure exit strategies. 
A political thought based around the centrality of warfare in the current 
world system has still not even begun to emerge. On the one hand, there is 
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a lack of real awareness of the role that war has played and continues to 
play in the rise and advance of Western (first European and later Amer-
ican) hegemony around the globe. On the other hand, while it is not empir-
ically difficult to trace the military expressions of Western supremacy as 
this has developed since 1989, obscurity and confusion reigns as to the 
nature of the opposition to this supremacy. I believe that it is not too far 
away from the truth to stress that this opposition is composite and hetero-
geneous, insofar as it is a reaction to the logic of what tends to be defined 
as empire.38 It has become common to define this logic as ‘exceptionalism’, 
drawing on the German debate of the 1930s about the ‘state of exception’ 
(Agamben, 2005). However, this definition conceals a number of misinter-
pretations. According to Carl Schmitt (who took to the extreme the Webe-
rian definition of the state as the holder of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence), the state of exception is the measure that the beatus possidens of 
a formally legitimate power may structurally assume to eliminate a situ-
ation of internal civil war.39 Hence, it is difficult to understand how such a 
concept can be extended to a planetary level, since never, other than 
through the partial duplicity of world institutions like the UN, has it been 
governed by a legitimate monopoly of force. Violence and war are not the 
derivation of a legitimate order, but rather the conditions for the normal 
exercise of power on the international scene.40 What we are witnessing at 
present is a new type of normality. This does not amount to a mere termi-
nological question but, more simply, to the intimate connection between 
war and politics (and economy) in the globalized world.
 For as long as the world economy is based on what Weber called the 
‘economic struggle for existence, atrocious and without compassion, which 
the bourgeoisie defines as the “peaceful work of civilization” ’ (Weber, 
1988: 41), war in any form – traditional or otherwise – will remain the 
interface of global social life. For those who live in the more or less safe 
confines of the empire, this consists, at most, of the spreading of paranoia 
in culture and the echoes of nearby or distant explosions. Everybody else, 
whether real or virtual enemies, is faced with the concrete possibility of 
destruction and death. A movement of global opposition to war, capable 
of neutralizing the militaristic nature of imperial powers, is little more than 
a utopia. It is up to us, inhabitants of the imperial constellation, to assume 
the theoretical and political duty to begin to deconstruct the global racism 
upon which the present state of war has constructed and which is charac-
terizing its project in an increasingly explicit manner.
 Translation by Yasha Maccanico and Nick Dines.
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 1 G.W. Bush, interview with NBC on 23 February 2004.
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history (Sheehan, 2008).
 4 For an analysis of the ‘twentieth- century thirty years war’, see Ferguson 
(2006).
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wars in Dal Lago (2010).
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arbitrary nature. However, this does not mean, as is often argued, that the 
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control of ordinary law. It is an apparent paradox that has some famous prec-
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(Fraenkel, 1941). For a discussion on the impact of exceptional measures in 
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10 By way of example, see Berman (2003).
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ority over any other kind of culture, past or present. In this sense, Hanson 
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the time of Marathon through to the Gulf War, and Landes (1998), who 
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both emblematic. For a critique of retrospective Eurocentrism, Said (2002) 
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sound remains the comparative one adopted by Louis Dumont (who owes 
much to Marcel Mauss). Cf. Dumont (1986).
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13 For a recent summary of the Foucauldian analysis of war, see Guareschi (2005).
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passage from government to ‘governmentality’, in which war loses any 
element of exceptionality (Foucault, 2008, 2009). On the idea of regulatory 
violence in globalization, see among others Kurtenbach and Lock (2004). For 
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violence, see von Trotha (1997) and Dal Lago (2008).
15 This amounts to a mythology that has been widely advanced by human sci-
ences, in particular psychoanalysis (Pick, 1996).
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16 As such, it becomes the object of theories that can be applied without distinc-
tion to complex matters, from economics and history to natural catastrophes. 
For an illustration of this argument, see Buchanan (2001).
17 Ancient- war historians noted that in Greek philosophy the contemporary 
ubiquity of war did not merit any more than an occasional reflection (Garlan, 
1975; Villatte, 1999).
18 Obviously, the reference here is to the chapter on nomadology and war 
machines in Deleuze and Guattari (1987).
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tuses. The anti- Iraqi coalition of 1991 comprised around 700,000 individuals, 
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by Preston et al. (1956), and also Parker (1996) and Knox and Murray (2001).
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22 See Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2000) and Edwards (2000). It is worth noting that, in 
these hyper- theoretical and utopian theories, the ‘swarm’ is considered, to a 
certain extent, a timeless tactic and, as a consequence, old (including ancient) 
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throughout history for ‘minor wars’, border wars, anti- insurrectional warfare and 
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tackling irregular or non- conventional combatants, such as Turks, Pechenegs and 
Arabs. See, in particular, the Strategikon by Emperor Maurice and Taktika by 
Leo VI the Wise. Ample excerpts of these treatises, which have become fashiona-
ble again in American military thought, can be found in Chaliand (1990).
23 The literature on this matter is extensive. For a recent synthesis, see Berkowitz 
(2003). The idea that war necessarily evolves in this direction is very controver-
sial. For a traditionalist view, see Gray (1999).
24 Shortly before the Iraq war, the magazine of the US Army War College, one of 
the most important academic institutions of the American army, published a 
scathing rebuttal of the Bush–Rumsfeld doctrine (Record, 2003a: 4–21). Later, 
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is that of the appropriation by the Chinese of the ‘secrets’ of RMA. A few years 
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reality, almost all the material cited by the two authors is easily accessible on 
the Internet.
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fusion of information. While the web may shift important, albeit minority, 
sectors of world public opinion, it cannot impose specific news items in the 
political–media agenda, which remains dominated by major television networks 
and press organizations.
29 Even after the story about Saddam’s weapons was revealed to have been 
unfounded, the media close to the US establishment have largely absolved Bush 
and the government, by assigning responsibility to people in subordinate posi-
tions or bad advisors. See Hosenball et al. (2003).
30 On this point, see Dal Lago (2006a).
31 It is nonetheless easy to demonstrate how this perspective based on fear makes 
the system (today, the USA) that supports it fragile, forcing it to perpetually 
keep its finger on the trigger (Barber, 2003).
32 This reflects the cross- eyedness, cultural before moral, that I feel is prevalent in 
the widespread literature about the different types of genocide, as if ‘democra-
cies’ were by definition immune from such practices. Recently, while discussing 
Clausewitz’s work, René Girard stressed the systemic character of contempor-
ary global violence (Girard, 2007).
33 Desh (2001) discusses the insurmountable difficulties of urban combat for a 
conventional army, even when this is equipped with the most sophisticated 
weapons.
34 For a discussion on the evolution of conflicts in this direction during the twenti-
eth century, see Sloterdijk (2004).
35 On the relations between racism and contemporary war, see Girard (2007).
36 I use the term ‘barbarization’ here to indicate the a priori debasing of the 
enemy. The idea of ‘barbarianism’ as the deviation of Western rationality often 
conceals the destructive forces that Western rationalism constitutively unleashes. 
For a discussion on this issue, see Miller and Soeffner (1996).
37 These higher goals can also be found occasionally in ‘human rights’. For a wide-
 ranging rebuttal of the premises for ‘humanitarian’ interventions, see Zolo 
(2002).
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38 Hardt and Negri (2004) appear to put forth the hypothesis that imperial war is 
opposed by a sort of global democratic movement that, after a patient gathering 
of forces, may be able to turn, sooner or later, into a sort of general insurrec-
tion. Obviously, a thesis of this kind cannot be refuted, as it is based on a 
petitio principii. Here, the constitutive weakness of the no- global movement 
becomes, through a theoretical contrivance, its strength. I limit myself to 
observing that the concept of ‘multitude’ disregards the extreme (political, eco-
nomic, social and military) heterogeneity of those who oppose imperial policies.
39 See Schmitt (2007). Foucault (2009) has also shown how the concept of ‘state 
of exception’ may be traced back to the classical notion (for example, in G. 
Naudé) of the coup d’état as a measure for the monarch to re- establish order. It 
is rather peculiar that among Schmitt’s work discussed today, his essay on the 
international order and war is far less cited, where he expresses a sort of nostal-
gia for a time when war supposedly ‘complied with regulations’; in substance, a 
bloody game regulated by the conventions between its antagonists (Schmitt, 
2003). The reading of this text (alongside others such as Land and Sea) 
indicates that Schmitt saw in the supremacy of resources the advent of a war 
of destruction in which the old categories of international law could no 
longer apply. Hence, it is not exceptionalism in this Schmitt, but the political 
normality of global war.
40 This is easily deduced from the fact that UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan’s 
definition of the Anglo- American aggression against Iraq as ‘illegal’ (after an 
initially ambivalent response) did not have any practical consequences. In this 
sense, it is more realistic to define the contemporary global situation as a con-
dition of anarchy, in which the strongest military power (the USA) no longer 
seeks to found or support a legitimate order, but rather to exploit the situation 
for its advantage through a continuous, military mobilization. For a definition 
of international anarchy, see Bull (1995).
2 The barbarization of peace
The neo- conservative transformation 
of war and perspectives
Alain Joxe
For gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite 
sufficient to find gold.
(Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy)
Introduction
This contribution seeks to describe the current state of the world as barba-
rism and, hence, as a process of ‘barbarization’ of peace through the pro-
liferation of civil wars and never- ending external operations (OPEX). In 
the present global crisis, the barbarization of war passes through strategies 
of international policing that also contaminate the notion of peace.
 Barbarism is laden with details and any description is not wholly satis-
factory unless it is accompanied by an analysis of such ladenness. To that 
end, we would need the breadth of a whole book and the attention to his-
torical anecdote that, for instance, we find in Guicciardini’s political 
suggestions.1
 The new wars always have political and social goals, but these are 
neither national political objectives, nor traditional imperial objectives 
any more. This transformation can be explained by the change in the 
dominant classes, which manage the globalization of the market economy 
thanks to the digitalization of the financial system and to the technical 
change in the morphology of the use of violence, also made possible by 
the electronic revolution. Under this double relationship, the space–time 
of national objectives of the bourgeoisies of yore has disappeared. It is not 
a big loss, but it is a big change that, for the time being, destroys the con-
sensual framework of democracy that has long been tied to the scale of 
the nation- state, which has become inadequate, not to say stupid, in the 
presence of global strategies. The destruction of ‘national’ or ‘Westphal-
ian’ war objectives has, as its corollary, the proliferation of wars of polic-
ing and permanent repression that, without the control and adaptive 
answers coming from popular forces, could everywhere turn into a form 
of concentrated and globalized fascist strategy, which would drag the 
38  A. Joxe
oikoumene2 towards a permanent, Schmittian state of exception. A sort of 
universal barbarism (the inverse of Kant’s universal peace) would thus 
provide legitimacy to all kinds of pillaging and destruction of the environ-
ment, capable of increasing the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the 
poor to a boiling point.
The barbarization of aims: deconstruction of a process of 
strategic globalization
In Europe, since the sixteenth century, the predatory logic of conquest by 
the prince or monarch and eventually the Republic (or Commonwealth), 
which was formalized by Machiavelli and Hobbes, had as its objective the 
pacification and the economic and military exploitation of conquered and 
protected peoples. This objective has disappeared with anti- statist neo- 
liberal deregulation. This disappearance is so recent that it has engendered 
a major strategic confusion. Moreover, all the ‘laws of war’ – jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello – are constantly violated, as are human rights and UN res-
olutions. These four types of regulation, archaic or modern alike, had been 
conceived for an inter- national system, which has now been dismantled by 
trans- state market forces.
The end of the imperial strategies of conquest/protection
The principle of sovereignty, which we may refer to as ‘Roman’ in the 
West, is based on the logic of the protection of conquered peoples, a pro-
tection that is necessary to exploit them. This principle, pulverized under 
the barbarian kingdoms and feudal anarchy of the early Middle Ages, was 
subsequently re- federated by monarchs who fantasized about the revival of 
the Roman Empire, with the geopolitical projection of the Crusades and 
the conquest of the Americas. The principle of protection had been pre-
served, as they competed for world power, by the colonialist nation- states 
and by the industrial armies of the twentieth century (the First and Second 
World Wars). In spite of the massacres of conquest, the protective political 
objective of Pax Romana had not disappeared from the ideology that sup-
ported colonial empires (also to put a brake on decolonization). According 
to Lyautey or Galliéni, ‘protected’ societies were asked not to rebel and 
survive in conditions of ‘acceptable poverty’ on the path to progress, while 
their cultural identities were respected.
 It is not a matter of paradise lost, but of rational strategic and political 
objectives to organize an economic dominion, which, at the time, neces-
sarily passed through domination and political control of the entire local 
society. Exploitation of the colony, composed by tribes, and large tradi-
tional or colonial landowners, by indigenous farmers or small- scale coloni-
zation by settlers, commercial networks, water and mineral resources, 
called for complete geographical command to enable a selective and 
The barbarization of peace  39
peaceful predation of natural stocks and heterogeneous flows of profits, 
some of which were already deriving from the globalization of certain 
markets. Hence the necessity of maintaining permanent order in a political 
space bounded and defended from appetites foreign to Empire.
 The Second World War put everything back into flux, but the imperial 
principle of the ‘protection of conquered peoples’ and ‘imperial peace’ did 
not disappear amidst the bipolar and nuclear clash of the Cold War 
(1945–1990). Although the ‘protection of peoples’ through the ‘threat of 
planetary destruction’ led to an oxymoron, the global strategic outcome 
that was finally sought amounted to the peaceful coexistence between the 
two imperial blocs and peace within the two rival systems.
The US imperial module: the Latin American paradigm
Historically, in Latin America, the United States has given rise to a mod-
ernized definition of Empire. South of the Rio Grande, Washington 
organized a domination that was without conquest nor imperial annexa-
tion; just a few border corrections here and there, some operations by the 
Marines and, even better, indigenous military coups were sufficient to 
defend the economic dominance of the American empire, the first empire 
managed by a dominant class that was essentially industrial after the 
victory of the Union over the Confederacy in the Civil War. Thus, Ameri-
cans have been more advanced than Europeans, including the Russians. 
By renouncing to annex all of Latin America beyond Texas and Califor-
nia, the US meant to unshoulder the burden of responsibility for and pro-
tection of the traditional feudal and slave- driven agrarian structures 
deriving from the conquista. This freed the American government from 
direct responsibility of the violent archaism of the states and classes of 
the Spanish- and Portuguese- speaking colonialists who stayed for a long 
time at the head of the post- colonial state and were responsible for the 
old- style management of social apartheid structures. The Latin American 
paradigm was later useful to the United States to make the liberation of 
European peoples from Nazism a sort of post- imperial balkanization of 
the fascist Third Reich (including Mussolini, Franco and Pétain) and to 
reduce them, without conquest, into a space integrated into the American 
empire through a community of interests of dominant classes facing the 
communist threat. Hence, since 1942, to the eyes of Roosevelt and then 
his successors, Gaullism has looked like an archaism, a phenomenon of 
autonomy first related to the protection of the French empire, and later 
to the likewise ‘archaic’ maintenance of the social autonomy of the 
Republican nation- state. Conversely, British strategic alignment to US 
leadership, with the progressive dilution of the empire into the Common-
wealth of nations, enabled a peaceful co- optation of the elites of the 
British empire by dominant rich strata at the head of the American 
empire.
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 The decline of states (metropoles of empires or not) was not yet visible 
at the stage of postwar planned reconstruction; the economic and social 
sovereignty of states and empires had survived; the UN remained a society 
of nation- states. But later, during les trente glorieuses, with the dissolution 
of colonial empires, the growth of a deregulated market economy contin-
ued unabated with the development of business ‘transnationalization’. 
From then on, in the West, the neo- liberal dynamics have constantly 
pursued a single objective: the end of economic protectionism, and thus the 
end of political and social protection as a principle of state sovereignty. 
Hence, the United States has long prepared to create a world empire based 
on market domination rather than military conquest.
The spread of a deregulated market economy to the whole 
world puts an end to the neo- colonial American empire
The current demolition of the French model by neo- liberal modernism is 
an alignment that allows integration into the American empire. But this 
alignment arrives too late: France joins an empire that is actually weak, 
that is no longer purely American; with Obama’s election, the American 
state itself reaches a critique of the perverse consequences of 
globalization.
 The global neo- liberal shift launched by the Reagan–Thatcher duo in 
the 1980s set off from a strategic vision that was legitimized by the 
growing globalization of industrial and financial groups. A transnational 
class was formed that explicitly aimed at unifying the world market 
through the ending of national protections and which, in the space of a 
decade, managed to speed up globalization. However, the triumph of such 
process in the 1990s, with the alignment of the USSR and China to liberal 
capitalism, also put an end to the American phase of neo- liberal empire. 
With this historical re- alignment, almost all protections of socioeconomic 
sovereignty started to come under attack in the European Union and were 
forcibly dismantled in the former communist republics. The predatory 
process, based on the exploitation of non- renewable natural resources and 
the rise of new poverty and new wealth through financial speculation, then 
became truly global through profits certified by the delocalized accounting 
of transnational financial firms.
 The Soviet Union’s self- destruction and China’s alignment to the 
market economy were the initial macro- strategic conditions for a verit-
able economic globalization. The balkanization of the Soviet empire is 
formally reminiscent of the collapse of Spanish and Ottoman empires. (It 
could have well ended up under Washington’s control as final fulfilment 
of its triumph, with American empire collecting all its fallen pieces: 
popular democracies, Baltic republics, then the movement seemed to 
extend towards Ukraine, Georgia . . . .)
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America: a super- armed mercenary power in the global system
It is increasingly evident that there is no longer a purely American empire, 
but rather a complex system, perhaps Euro- American or Sino- American. 
Only the military supremacy of US armed forces is not in doubt; but, already 
after the first Gulf War, one could wonder whether the Americans were 
about to become the ‘mercenaries’ of the global system.3 The cost of that 
war was shouldered by Europe, and it also turned out to be ‘beneficial’. 
From that moment on, the US has become unable to finance its wars and 
weaponry, and to maintain internal consumption as driver for its growth 
without accumulating massive foreign debt. The Chinese and the Arab oil- 
producing kingdoms have accepted to accumulate US treasury bills to cover 
for US internal consumption and trade deficit. Without the economic alli-
ance with China, without the financial support of oil- producing fiefdoms 
and without the political alliance with the EU, what looks like American 
world leadership could be put into question. The American global empire is 
no more, but there is not yet a Global Federal Republic. And in the absence 
of a sovereign body that politically manages the current system on a global 
scale, there is no civilization, but rather global barbarism.
The barbarization of the means of global empire: hyper- 
modern imperial hubris and clandestinity of global policies
Barbarism is a strategic quality of the system: it is what reigns beyond the 
limits of the coordinated civilization of the cities, kingdoms and empires. 
Not having any limits or government any more, the universal empire of the 
market, a reflection of global speculative private interests, turns into bar-
barism due to its not being a republic. This barbarism manifests itself not 
only through the nullification of political aims, but also in the barbariza-
tion of military means and of the strategic definition of war. This strategic 
change has been a function of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
triggered by the application of electronics to military surveillance and pre-
cision targeting, as the communist empire met its demise. This shift heralds 
the cancellation of political goals and tactical pertinence and, to maintain-
ing order, the emergence of new types of weaponry suited for infantry 
combat and urban warfare. The seeming triumph of imperial America has 
led to the acephalous transnationalization of violent ‘governance’, whose 
promotion the US ensures through the continuous strategic modernization 
called RMA and, more recently, Military Transformation.
The barbarization of means: from RMA to transformation
Analysing the change in US arsenals from the 1990s to the 2000s, with the 
abandonment of unused arms systems inherited from the Cold War, it is 
possible to describe a barbarization of the representations of mortal combat 
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and of the virtual enemy that goes under the rubric of terrorism, which con-
stitutes a threat at a level that is far inferior to that of the Cold War. Anti- 
terrorist measures are actions that are considered legitimate by political 
classes that are, at the same time, purchasers both of arms in a techno- 
industrial sense and of weapon systems in a military sense. The grand impe-
rial strategy of the Republican right was best articulated through the 
electronic revolution, and this has led to two paradoxical results:
•	 The	 Right’s	 political	 and	 strategic	 thought	 continues	 to	 hegemonize	
the modernization of means, even under Democratic presidencies, pro-
viding continuity to the strategic definition of American wars as wars 
without end, ruling out any form of negotiation with the enemy, 
aiming at the destruction of the opponent and, eventually, at the weak-
ening of states through balkanization in the sense of ‘inter- 
communitarian strife’.
•	 This	implies	costly	expenses	and	military	failures,	and	leads	to	the	de-	
Americanization of war, as it can only continue thanks to the financial 
support coming from China, Arab oil- producing countries and the 
European Union.
At the outset, the evolution of means was launched by Democratic admin-
istrations, neo- liberal but not neo- con. These governments were the first 
that emphatically embarked upon a total reform of military means in the 
name of RMA and ‘cyberwar’. They did seek to keep in check the techno- 
strategic and policing drifts of the Republican right (the majority in Con-
gress since the end of Clinton’s first mandate). But they could not manage 
to do so entirely because, although they opposed the far right’s political 
representations, they were still unable to modify the Military Transforma-
tion in its techno- industrial development, and were hence unable to control 
the American military- industrial lobbies and to thus hold back its futuristic 
tactical culture of high- precision targeting on a world scale and in real 
time. It is futuristic modernization that leads to asymmetrical and apoliti-
cal strategies and that produces wars that may be considered experimental, 
with theirs massacres of civilian populations and other war crimes.4 In fact, 
the doctrines for the use of force depend on arsenal availability, and the 
modernization of arsenals is not immediate; but in the United States this 
process is re- launched every four years (Quadriennial Defense Review) 
within programmes that range for between ten and twenty years. The 
Transformation that was orchestrated by Republicans with Rumsfeld since 
2001 was conceived by neo- conservatives well before the attack against the 
Twin Towers, and it remains the hegemonic thought of the modernity we 
are living in. It has not brought the successes hoped for by its proponents, 
either in Afghanistan or in Iraq, but it has brought about the demise of the 
endless wars through which the Democrats had hoped to conquer suprem-
acy, thanks to RMA seen as a tool for imposing peace.
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 The peace processes initiated under Clinton in Somalia, Palestine and 
Colombia have all failed. The United States does not yet manage, not even 
under Obama, to put an end to the three ongoing experimental wars 
(Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan–Pakistan). Obama himself is tied to the string 
of military modernizations that go under the rubric of Transformation, 
and he announced as much in his speech on the AFPAK war held on 27 
April 2009. He just hopes to be able to transform this war – which risks to 
set Asia ablaze – into a great global conference, which would help him to 
get out of it. This is the de- Americanization of leadership.
De- Americanization of strategies
Following step by step the principles and means employed by American 
neo- conservatives to rearrange the world, we have noted that it is precisely 
them who have engendered a de- Americanization of global leadership 
because they have lost the means for economic leadership and only retain 
absolute military supremacy. How does this process advance?
•	 First,	 the	 decline	 into	which	 the	 neo-	conservatives	 have	 dragged	 the	
United States is inherent in the central strategic contradiction of this 
school of thought and its fanciful representation of the Universe. On 
the one hand, it is a militarist, albeit anti- statist, form of strategic 
thinking; on the other hand, it is liberal, although violent. This ideo-
logical cocktail has led to three military consequences: 
1 to the legitimization of the de- statization of violence and the sub-
contracting of the most questionable operations to private military 
companies or militias recruited among criminals, who effectively 
behave like out- of-control barbarian criminals; 
2 to the destruction of the socioeconomic sovereignty of democra-
cies and the promotion of neo- liberal democratization through 
violence in the areas of intervention. This is a far worse oxymoron 
than ‘nuclear peace’ because it brings about military defeat; 
3 to the reappraisal – due to their effectiveness and tactical intelli-
gence – of the successes obtained in the wars of decolonization by 
resorting to barbarian methods of territorial occupation in the 
context of urban warfare (like in the Battle of Algiers), omitting 
the fact that those wars were strategically lost as a result of such 
exactions (General Petraeus, 2008). 
Hence, the extreme neo- con vision is responsible, after Reagan, for all 
the successes of infra- nuclear neo- militarism up until the victory for 
abandonment over the USSR in 1991, and then for all the system’s 
failures in actual wars, down to the current financial crisis. This ideol-
ogy inevitably built up an evolution of the world out of the coherent 
control of states and hence, finally, out of the control of the United 
States itself as a sovereign state.
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•	 Second,	the Transformation has not simply been an application of neo-
 liberal thought with its absurdities; there has been a reciprocal influ-
ence between the neo- cons’ ideological representation and the tactical 
capacities for destruction of the new arsenals that have been conceiv-
able, proposed and produced thanks to the information revolution. 
The Transformation has been the locus of interaction between military 
software and hardware, driving the modernization of air–land combat 
towards a strategic change of war. Heading towards asymmetry leads 
to predation and implies the inevitable recourse to abuses in ‘commu-
nitarian’ wars that are without political recognition and social media-
tion: we reach the point of disguised interventions by ‘the rich against 
the poor’ in the globe’s urbanized zones.
This evolution had been envisaged since 1997 in neo- con military literature 
(for example, by Commander Peters in his ‘Constant conflict’ article of 
1997),5 except for the fact that it did not foresee the decline of US prepon-
derance, but rather its reinforcement in the barbarization of North–South 
global war, a priori described as inevitable and long- lasting.
Hyper- modern conformity and political disproportion of the 
doctrines for the use of military forces and financial forces
In this way, neo- conservative representations have lead to the quagmires in 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Today, their results are considered disap-
pointing, but President Obama believes that he must continue (in Afghani-
stan and in Pakistan, now bound together in the so- called AFPAK war) 
down the road of precision targeting and special operations. In other 
terms, he intends to continue with the electronic modernization pro-
gramme (real- time reconnaissance, targeting and surprise firing) to beat the 
Taliban enemy.6
 The qualities (tactical capabilities) of the weapons systems modernized 
by the electronic revolution continue to function as autonomous factors in 
the creation of new strategies, stronger than any kind of political and 
social reasoning, due to their unquestionable modernity. In this field, the 
logical contradictions stem from a logic of disproportion or hubris (γβρις) 
which, since ancient times, in the vocabulary of ancient Greek political 
science, has constituted the place in which the empire’s military logic (and 
the emperor himself ) becomes disrupted by the escalation of violence, due 
to the lack of common measure (asymmetry = α-συν-μετρια).7 The belief in 
one’s absolute superiority leads to a loss of proportion in the forces 
deployed against the enemy and in the knowledge one has of the enemy. 
This military modernity, which is a form of (military) religion just like 
market deregulation has become an economic religion, sits next to three 
other types of ‘disproportion’ that mark a regression towards pre- industrial 
political ideas.
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Disproportion of religiousness in global confrontation
The neo- conservative quagmire seems the negation of nineteenth- century 
liberal ideology that believed in the effectiveness of free trade to civilize 
mores; it is now construed as a stabilized trait of strategic modernity: a 
unilateralist, asymmetrical military strategy that autistically regulates viol-
ence, associated to an economic strategy founded on a religious faith in the 
self- regulating effectiveness of the Global Market. This is market funda-
mentalism, according to the expression used by George Soros.8
 For neo- liberal extremists, the market, freed from any constriction, is 
like an end in itself, a global good, the universality of the Holy Ghost, the 
realization of the Umma. It has turned into an extremist vision, the equiva-
lent of a Sharia that supposedly justifies the barbarian treatment of oppon-
ents when, under the framework of globalization, the articulation of 
political measuredness appears to have been cancelled. There is in fact a 
coherence, a conformity, a homomorphism, between the holistic treatment 
of asymmetrical wars for force projection and the economic deregulation 
of the global market as a religious end.
Disproportion of the crematistic economy
In the configuring of the Transformation left behind by Rumsfeld, the dis-
proportion of the relationship of dominance is not only military; it is asso-
ciated (evidently, with the current world financial crisis) to the certain 
support of global neo- liberalism for a disproportion in the economy. It is 
by noting the development of detailed and solid control of space–time 
through electronic targeting that one could already take stock, in 2004, of 
the extraordinary growth of everything that could be referred to, as Aris-
totle did, as crematistics, the art of speculating on species and beliefs that 
now prevails over the economy of stocks and flows of real goods. Œcono-
mia (οικο-νομια), the ‘regulation of the household’, is a natural activity, 
whereas Crematistics (χρηματιστικη) is deemed by Aristotle to be the 
source of ‘artificial’ profit, against nature – that is, without measure; 
deprived even of the moderation of the raider, whose preoccupation is ‘not 
to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs’.9 As I wrote six years ago:
Crematistics may constitute the means of temporary growth through 
the extreme acceleration of economic decisions and financial deriva-
tives; this prevents the globalized economy from tackling national and 
even regional problems, and has become globalized not only in space 
but also in terms of time, whose span is now too brief to correspond 
globally to an associated economic time- frame.
(Joxe, 2004)
Through the electronic time- frame that dominates its decisions, crematis-
tics, once ancillary to the economy, has become a factor of economic 
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destruction, and hence a cause of unpredictable and unmanageable disor-
ders and wars. Let us not forget that the speed in targeting and firing is a 
military quality that improves the capability for destruction. The electronic 
financial globalization is a sort of militarism that takes root on the time- 
frame of economists, not on the long production times, but on the short, 
impatient, time of destruction. ‘Why do you want to destroy my city if it 
will be yours tomorrow?’, said Croesus, King of Sardes, made prisoner by 
Alexander who was furious about the resistance of its inhabitants.10 But 
today who worries about taking over a city or a country and ensuring its 
prosperity? On the contrary, it is quick profits that are sought, without the 
concomitant costs deriving from taking charge of the conquered society.
The combined disproportion of technological modernity 
and the power of lobbies
The double, techno- military and techno- financial, disproportion that 
underlies the grand strategy, left as a legacy to the West and the world by 
President Bush, makes it difficult to return to a common measure of war 
and peace, which would enable the regulation of the end of wars.
 However, with Obama’s victory, something has changed. He has restored 
the right to pose all these questions, although he has not yet reached the point 
of answering them with concrete decisions. It can be shown that, in spite of 
the decline of states pursued by market forces, it is impossible to eliminate 
politics from the list of concepts required to conceive the start and the end of 
wars – that is, to think up peace. Nonetheless, in the United States, the 
Right’s ideological software (the need for repressive violence) and the Left’s 
(the need for liberal good governance) alternate to ensure the resilience (or 
adaptability) of a strategy of means, which drives a strategy of action that 
continues to pursue the total destruction of the enemy.
 The two American political parties are both vectors of the ‘continuity of 
modernity’ that leads to the barbarization of war/peace. It may be granted, in 
order to simplify matters, that this resilience is explained by ‘the power of the 
military- industrial lobbies’, so that one must look for its causes at the techno- 
military or techno- economic level. But it is more interesting to say that it is a 
global strategy, which, like in any war, must be linked to a kind of politics.
Maintenance of the Clausewitzian template in global policy- 
making, which is clandestine since it lacks institutions
At the point that we have reached, one wonders if the evanescence of what 
is the political is the state of today’s world and, hence, if wars will cease to 
be Clausewitzian. In effect, we also witness a temptation to turn Clause-
witz’s formula upside down (politics as continuation of war by other 
means) through formal sophistry that refers to British humour more 
than to Socratic irony and that, hence, is more an expression of perplexity 
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than an expression of an issue. Rather, I would say that we have simply 
reached a moment in globalization in which the political institutions of the 
global world have yet to emerge: there are global diplomatic institutions 
but there is no Global Political Constitution and thus political power 
remains informal, not to say imperceptible. It may also be the case that, in 
a crisis, world elites prefer to remain ‘clandestine’, concealed behind tech-
nical organizations that have remained ‘inter- national’, or behind the 
media commotions that national governments have become, whereas 
Grand Policies, when they exist, are clearly transnational.
 On the one hand, it has been clearly shown that with the Transforma-
tion the Clausewitzian articulation of war and politics transforms the latter 
through the intermediation of tactics channelled through arsenals and their 
capabilities. But in strategic terms, politics cannot disappear. On a theoret-
ical plane, the strategic approach mobilizes two disciplines. An anthropol-
ogy of combat and of combatants’ morale to lend value to the political aim 
of war (Zweck), based on representations of the long term and on the logic 
of quick (and informed) decision- making in the sphere of danger, in order 
to manage deadly threats and the military objectives of war (Ziele) in the 
urgency of combat. The second discipline, strategy, can and must stay 
Clausewitzian, in the sense that the relationship between these two disci-
plinary components bounding two distinct kinds of temporality is well 
included in his maxim. Clausewitz does not deny, but rather stresses, the 
importance of politics in the military definition of missions and notes its 
influence, also at the troops’ combat level, in defining the relationship 
between morale and the balance of moral forces, even when the state dis-
appears and the fighting goes on nevertheless, with the resistance of guer-
rillas acting for its rebirth. In this, Clausewitz remains valid, in spite of the 
transformation in strategic identities and arsenals over the last 175 years. 
The ‘anthropology of combat’ forced Clausewitz to understand combat-
ants; the ‘logic of decision’ in war induced him to explain the policies that 
structure war objectives and correct tactical and strategic mistakes.
 The failures and barbarism of behaviours must be attributed to mis-
taken strategies and to criminal policies. Without states that can be desig-
nated as the central authorities in war policy, it is not enough to say that 
the European Union and China and the corrupt presidencies of Africa are 
accomplices of the American empire. The debate on the Clausewitzian 
rationality of current military and financial strategies can remove from the 
debate any ‘indictment of the United States’, or ‘of the United States and 
the European Union’, or of ‘globalization’ in general, as politically respons-
ible for all evils. If there is not any political responsibility of states any 
longer, the critique of global deregulation policies is a critique directed at 
whom? Such criticism must deal not only with the technical characteristics 
of military and financial modernization, but also with the interests of the 
new dominant classes on a world scale. In other terms, the irresponsibility 
of states and interstate alliances, and the absence of a sovereign global 
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political institution does not rule out designating a new structure of the 
dominant classes as responsible for the forms taken by war. Simply said, 
war remains the continuation of politics by other means on the part of the 
ruling classes that have hegemonized globalization.
Barbarization of the dominant classes: a global ‘nobility’ 
without peoples or kings
The importance of Schmittian ideology and the ‘religion of the market’, 
faith in its self- regulating capabilities, this is what motivates the most influ-
ential experts of neo- liberalism,11 promoted by the rather limited but influ-
ential group of American neo- conservatives, the sarcastic remarks of many 
qualified economists notwithstanding. This is added to by the importance 
of the digital revolution as driver of the two space–time metamorphoses in 
military action and economic action. These concomitant metamorphoses 
tend to reduce military action to targeted police repression, and economic 
action to ‘spasmodic’ financial speculation.
 In effect, neither the sectarian action of a fundamentalist group, nor the 
dazzling progress of information technology alone can explain a phenome-
non that is as global and destructive as present- day globalization. It may 
be supposed that misfortune has seen to it that the different political- 
religious, techno- scientific and economic- financial developments have com-
bined in generating the complex randomness of such a revolution. 
However, for more than a decade, an array of critical diagnoses have more 
or less described the social, economic, political and military consequences 
of such configuration. The unease does not derive from the fact that ‘we 
cannot understand anything about it’, but from the fact that there is no 
democratic politics, neither on the global scale, nor at the level of the phe-
nomenon at hand. Dealing as we are with human phenomena, and not 
with the chaotic randomness of the physical world seen in the vortex of a 
typhoon or the fall of a comet, it makes sense to look for social causes 
having social consequences. These have been visible for years: everywhere, 
global deregulation has accompanied a drastic increase in social inequality. 
The job losses attributed to industrial automation have led to job creation 
in poorer countries; but the objective of corporations is not the creation of 
workplaces, it is the maintenance – thanks to productions swiftly offshored 
across the globalized market – of profit rates that, if possible, exceed 15 
per cent on the capital invested; it is akin to the usurious interest rate 
applied by loan sharks, the return derived from speculative financial prod-
ucts in the good years. A kind of luxurious rent.
A new nobility of income without peoples or kings?
It is well known that accumulated social injustice can lead to major out-
bursts. In fact, part of the new reflection on strategy concerns the alarm 
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resulting from the generalization of internal/external armed conflicts. It is a 
field of studies that is not about research for peace, but rather focuses on 
local conflicts and fixates on forms of attack. Today, war research does not 
just crowd out peace research, but it seems to take its place, with its over-
arching preoccupation of physically eliminating the enemies of the ruling 
order. Such enemies are supposedly identifiable through their activism in 
the midst of a supposedly passive population that merits no further socio-
economic or political definition than being the object of conquest or libera-
tion. It is a global population that after the 9/11 attack suffers from two 
terrorisms at war on its territory: Al Qaida and the US military rule of the 
world. This simplistic and reductive approach has not yet been fundament-
ally challenged by the Obama policy team.
 In fact, we observe how representations of war tend to become fixed in 
military training manuals as charitable ideologies worthy of science fiction. 
If an Afghan farmer states that he was happier during the times of the 
Taliban, in spite of their frenzied Islamism, because there was peace and at 
least foreigners did not bomb villages, killing people randomly, the imme-
diate reaction is that he does not understand the situation at all. The 
underlying hypothesis of this benevolent representation of the ‘other’ 
society is that, as a result of brutishness, the populace is not competent to 
understand the difference between submission and freedom, malaise and 
well- being, good deeds and misdeeds. This idea is not something new; on 
the contrary, it is quite archaic: its origin is aristocratic. Assumptions 
about the lack of humanity of those being excluded (slaves, servants, 
workers, colonized peoples, women, people who live in urban ghettos or 
are marginalized) seep out of an elitist managerial culture. At present, this 
culture does not seem to be tempered by any identifiable ethical source, 
apart from faith in market self- regulation and the logic of profit. It is a 
faith that is quite literally religious. There is also an additional belief in the 
attractiveness of policing, in the pacifying virtues of mass repression under-
stood as maintenance of law and order, an act of blind faith that refuses to 
draw lessons from the experience of colonial wars.
 By now, such beliefs and ‘new’ interests belong to a sort of transnational 
delocalized caste which, therefore, has no historical memory: an aristoc-
racy that is not ‘purely American’ – this goes without saying – and aims for 
an unlimited level of consumption, for a ‘princely’ standard of living. The 
trend is a convergence of the incomes of the rich towards the levels existing 
in dominant countries and the levelling down of the livelihood of the poor 
towards a lower level. In concrete terms, what follows is the explosion of a 
series of small, cruel wars of force projection almost everywhere, which 
meld into the local unrest resulting from the economic anarchy of corrup-
tion, and the various forms of depredation populations in ‘developing’ 
countries suffer from.
 But the web of the causes that lead to such wars is not taken into con-
sideration, neither by the states nor by empires, nor by social classes; 
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nobody takes responsibility. Disorder and violence, sometimes privatized, 
spread like a dominant trait of global imperial culture beyond its protected 
or even fortified perimeters, where state walls are no longer necessarily cot-
erminous with state borders. How can this apparently medieval regression 
be explained?
The crisis as revealer of actual powers
In the light of the comical revelations resulting from the crisis, we can 
observe the behaviours of this new Grand Nobility that threatens to take 
power on a world scale by claiming princely income. This class believes in 
the total deregulation of markets because this practice enables the unre-
strained globalization of the stocks of intensive profits by speculating on 
addictions – that is, on markets that are captive, not because of govern-
ment regulation, but because they are based on global, pent- up cross- 
border demand. Demand that has become compulsive makes it possible to 
set prices without any relation to production costs, and this generates 
‘excess’ profits. On the global scale, it may result from physiological addic-
tion as in the case of the markets for drugs and prostitution, but it can also 
be induced by advertising and maintained by the effects of fashion. Finally, 
markets may reach the point of abetting deadly speculations on vital needs 
such as water (milk), seeds, health or housing. Due to natural or induced 
scarcity, means of subsistence have become a source of intense profits, but 
also of violent conflicts and wars, as if eating or drinking had become, in 
times of speculative bubbles, mass addictions, thus determining prices that 
have no relation to the cost of production.
 In the context of states, hoarders who turned shortages into starvation 
were deemed criminals and convicted as factors of disorder. In globaliza-
tion, this simple definition of criminal economic behaviour disappears, as 
markets go ballistic with speculation, i.e. the temporary source of high 
returns.
 The so- called subprime crisis was preceded by a ballooning in real estate 
prices, as well as in lending offered to poor and insolvent citizens. It was the 
process of selling long usurious loans to poor citizens, driven by complex 
financial products, which were well graded by ratings agencies because they 
gave outrageous returns, that caused the financial crisis in the United States 
and the world. This particularly perverse bubble should have, or could have, 
called for an urgent control of the visible factors of imbalance engendered by 
what we may call crematistic criminal activity. The ostensible aim on the 
part of economic elites to ‘make a fortune’ through the predation of the 
reserves of profits accumulating out of speculation on a global deregulated 
plane, watched over by ingenious and lusciously paid traders, who match 
the compensation of top athletes enjoying international recognition.
 In order to move the bar in the direction of human progress, it is no 
longer needed to focus on the ‘national bourgeoisies’ of the recent past, 
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since nowadays they only comprise small entrepreneurs. This is why the 
concept of a global hegemonic social class dominating politics, and hence 
war, becomes relevant again.
Crimes of crisis and crimes of war
These institution- less classes subscribe to a generalization of the prosecu-
tion of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is unclear how such a 
case and the criminal indictment can be made, as this statement has no 
judicial value, but rather an anthropological and ethical meaning. The per-
petrators of such crimes are necessarily human beings. But the political 
anthropology of the new elites is yet to be established. There is only the 
admission that this is now more urgent and critical than refining the norm-
ative discourse about the ideal of good governance, recommended by phi-
losophers who still harbour a naive hope about an impending extension of 
the virtuous democratic institutions, when the exact opposite is prevailing: 
a corrupt delocalized authoritarianism, managing the rise of fascist viol-
ence and hijacking huge capital flows towards sumptuous spending and the 
destruction of non- renewable resources, relentlessly causing environmental 
catastrophes, poverty and wars. If there were an emperor, he would have 
no clothes. But there are neither kings nor emperors of the world. An 
imperial senate appears to be taking shape in the form of the G20: when 
the agenda concerns global regulation, the representatives of banks and 
corporations are invited by governments as experts. G20 meetings are not 
an imperium; governments appear as the deputies or tribunes of the people, 
untouchable and ready to legislate, but without any longer enjoying auton-
omy other than in repressive matters (lictores). Everything depends on the 
will of the Senate, which comprises the representatives of the truly global 
crematistic powers, which are the guarantors of growth (auctoritas) and 
priests of the free movement of the Spirit of the Global Market (Pontifex 
Maximus), and are present in the corridors.
 ‘Politicians’ in every country are now back in business, after the uproar 
caused by the behaviour of banks that were bailed out with government 
guarantees accorded in 2008 and reiterated in 2009. Once the banking 
crisis was avoided, in America and Europe alike, banks immediately 
returned to their speculative activities and the overcompensation of traders, 
those proletarians of intensive profit. The visibility of the ‘scandal’ is cause 
for concern: public opinion may end up questioning the totality of the glo-
balized system. To allay such fear, the hunt has been launched to catch tax 
evaders, whose delinquency, tolerated through the impunity accorded to 
‘tax havens’, has been a part of the system for thirty years. Swiss banking 
has been sacrificed in the media on the altar of fiscal virtue. However, the 
real winners in the globalized economy do not need to contravene laws. 
They can profit from favourable legislation. Small evaders are necessarily 
national entrepreneurs, petty industrialists who survive only through tax 
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fraud and/or by violating labour laws, i.e. through black or grey econo-
mies. The great speculators continue to skate on global financial markets, 
freed from any duty to protect the wage- earners of the real economy.
Some other considerations
Everything will depend on the evolution of Europe, United States and 
China as powers that have a major stake in stability, and as conglomerates 
liable to propose regulations carrying sufficient weight to enable the reform 
of the system without causing further panic.
Two non- democratic barbarisms: the European Union, the 
United States
Contrary to what we would like to believe here in the Old Continent, this 
shift towards ‘barbarism’, with the Res privata replacing the Res publica, 
is more advanced in Europe than in the United States. This can be argued 
on the basis of an analysis of the differences between the roles played by 
lobbies in Brussels and lobbies in Washington, in order to assess how the 
political sovereignty of states has been diminished. In Brussels, lobbies pen-
etrate into the executive bodies of the EU, which are in effect legislative 
bodies as well, when it comes to drafting new legislation. Lobbies influence 
and even organize the details of the Commission’s agenda, without having 
any legal status other than being ‘experts’. In the United States, lobbies are 
integrated into and monitored by the law and in the regulations of parlia-
mentary institutions, particularly insofar as the separation of powers – 
executive, legislative and judiciary – is concerned. It is well known that the 
states that make up the US have not been sovereign political entities since 
the Civil War, and they do not pretend to be. The US is a federal state; it is 
an imperial conglomeration on a world scale. In Europe, the states making 
up the Union continue in their mimicry of national sovereignty; a Euro-
pean federal state does not exist and the fledgling confederal state, in any 
case, is not a democracy yet. Hence, paradoxically, democracy is more at 
risk in the European Union, where all the real power is managed in the 
ambiguous shade of a sovereignty that has been spirited away towards 
bureaucracies and lobbies, rather than in the United States, where presi-
dential elections have the merit of shedding light on the great strategic 
debates. Although it is a mere rhetorical or moral jolt, in America the dis-
course of the refusal of the excesses of globalization has become legitimate 
once again.
 What still clouds prospects is the fact that the disappearance of state 
apparatuses is not on the agenda; they still have two irreplaceable technical 
capabilities: taxation and the repression of disorder – that is, the organiza-
tion of the maintenance of order amidst the growing social disorder gener-
ated by global deregulation. The political power of states disappears but 
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their policing powers have been strengthened. As for military power, once 
tied to the political definition of national interest, it is now invited to join 
policing operations in potentially escalating trend in the repression of dis-
orders titled ‘European security’ or, outside of Europe and under US 
command, in ‘external NATO operations’.
 But there is nothing left of what, in the national interest, called for 
popular unity and the equality of citizens as bastions of the defence function. 
The transnational interests of global elites cannot take them into account.
The United States, at a turning point before Obama?
In one of her articles, Mary Kaldor12 outlines two possible approaches for the 
definition of European security policy. As her prime concern is the protection 
of civilian populations from genocide, slavery and human rights violations, 
the author is certainly not complacent with a continuation of Bush’s imperial 
policy. Rightly, and with realism, she does not foresee that Obama’s election 
will, as such, lead to an abrupt change. Somewhat vaguely, Kaldor draws two 
branches of what is a trivium: the right branch is the – now failing – option 
of the American right. However, at the same time, what she defines as the 
‘alternative’ (she calls it even ‘perestroïka’) is based on the idea that the essen-
tial turn had already been taken at the military level in 2006, before the out-
break of the financial crisis. These are the options that Kaldor describes:
Option 1 (exit to the right). Continuing with Rumsfeld’s program of 
world domination through unilateral destructive action; thus contin-
uing to autistically dominate the world via external operations that 
are destined to force states to abandon any claim of regulating the 
economy.
Option 2 (exit to the left). Maintaining and perfecting the elements 
of the military dispositif; this way, the sophisticated know- how of 
pre- emptive control would advance further, and efforts would be 
made to create social and political consensus in the societies targeted 
by military expeditions; hence, the idea of a global configuration that 
seeks the securitarian pacification of deregulated societies.
This school of thought corresponds to a resurgence of critical thinking in 
the Army and the Marines and which is expressed rather clearly in military 
periodicals such as Small Wars Journal.13 These authors are entirely critical 
of Bush’s policy during the outbreak of the war, but they deem there is no 
alternative to moving forward, because there is no longer a strategic turn 
to take: it was taken after the surprising combination of the Hamilton–
Baker Report of December 2006 and the decision taken by Bush to proceed 
with the surge, announced on 10 January 2007.
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 According to this reading of the sequence of events, the surge is not just 
a 20,000-strong military escalation, but a radical change of strategy, con-
firmed and formalized by the publication on the 8 July 2008 of the new 
‘Counterinsurgency Guidance’ by General Petraeus. Appointed as the head 
of CENTCOM – that is, in charge of the two wars, Iraq and AFPAK – the 
author orders American troops to put themselves at the service of the 
population and ensure its security, but also to use money as a weapon, in 
other terms, to ensure allegiance and consent through corruption. This is 
what has been practised in Iraq. Rather than a strategic shift, this is a 
search for bearable barbarization. The Petraeus option is the choice of an 
intermediate military path, and those who believe it will suffice to put an 
end to the Iraq war and downscale the AFPAK war to a grand bargain run 
the risk of being disappointed.
Towards a political recomposition via regional 
subglobalizations?
The civilization of war or the barbarization of peace hang over our 
heads, signalling the deplorable state of world civilization. But it is a by- 
product of the power seized by the new financial aristocracies. By now, 
anxiety rules over the system itself and major actors through their strat-
egies seek to protect themselves by rearranging space on a sub- global 
scale: the European Union plus Russia; the United States of America and 
the oil- producing Middle East; China–Japan–Korea. Latin America and 
India are the weaker ones. They all propose the consolidation of their 
respective blocks, perhaps the sub- division of the global nobility into 
three neo- Westphalian confederations under three different monetary 
regimes, avoiding the constitution of a global confederated state that 
would force the ‘global nobles’ to expose themselves publicly and thus 
become subject to the political and judicial sanctions they currently 
escape.
 Eluding politics, to allow the maintenance of a global repressive strategy 
without an identifiable organizer, and without democratic accountability: 
this is what can be called the ‘civilization of war’, similar to sinister expres-
sions like ‘Nazi culture’ or the ‘peace of cemeteries’.
 I prefer to call it the barbarization of peace from the prospect of a 
radical overhaul of global politics that is still possible and necessary, at 
every level of democratic action. There is the need to put an end to the 
antisocial violence of financial elitism and fundamentalist religion. Only by 
placing under political tutelage the irresponsible classes of the ‘new rich’ 
(who are causes of disaster in all continents) will we be capable of prevent-
ing the multiplication of environmental crimes and financial offences per-
petrated by these ‘no land’s men’ ruling over no man’s land, and of 
triggering the process of reconstruction of a civilization of peace.
 Translation by Yasha Maccanico and Alex Foti.
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Notes
 1 His method is based on the epistemological principle of
detail due to the heuristic importance that the study of detail takes on in a situ-
ation in which we are as a result of a general political crisis, in the midst of the 
wholesale breakdown in the systems of strategic, ethical, social and military 
representation. Hence, what is required is a selection of detailed facts that may 
offer, provided that they are well chosen, the keys to the century that begins.
See the introduction by J.L. Fournel (1988: 18).
 2 Oikoumene is a term originally used in the Greek–Roman world to refer to the 
inhabited earth (or at least the known part of it). In more modern versions, it 
refers either to the projection of a unified Christian Church or to world civiliza-
tions (cf. infra) [editors’ note].
 3 See Alain Joxe (1992). Among the recent works of this leading author, see Joxe 
(2002), also published in French, Spanish and Italian [editors’ note].
 4 See some of the author’s articles, particularly those about the war in Gaza in 
‘Le débat stratégique’ (www.cirpes.net/) [editors’ note].
 5 Commander Ralph Peters (1997: 4–14): 
Those humans, in every country and region, who cannot understand the 
new world, or who cannot profit from its uncertainties, or who cannot rec-
oncile themselves to its dynamics, will become the violent enemies of their 
inadequate governments, of their more fortunate neighbors, and ultimately 
of the United States. We are entering a new American century, in which we 
will become still wealthier, culturally more lethal, and increasingly power-
ful [emphasis added]. We will excite hatreds without precedent. . . . There 
will be no peace. . . . The de facto role of the US armed forces will be to 
keep the world safe for our economy and open to our cultural assault. To 
those ends, we will do a fair amount of killing. We are building an 
information- based military to do that killing . . . but the relevant systems 
will not be the budget vampires, such as manned bombers and attack sub-
marines. . . . [Our] technologies will be those that support soldiers and 
Marines on the ground.
 6 See President Obama’s declaration about the Afghanistan war, 27 April 2009.
 7 Hýbris is a technical term drawn from Greek tragedy and literature; it literally 
means ‘arrogance’, ‘excess’, ‘haughtiness’, ‘pride’ or ‘abuse of position’ [editors’ 
note].
 8 There is a widespread assumption that democracy and capitalism go hand in 
hand. In fact the relationship is much more complicated. Capitalism needs 
democracy as a counterweight because the capitalist system by itself shows 
no tendency toward equilibrium. The owners of capital seek to maximize 
their profits. Left to their own devices, they would continue to accumulate 
capital until the situation becomes out of balance. Marx and Engels gave a 
very good analysis of the capitalist system 150 years ago, better in some 
ways, I must say, than the equilibrium theory of neoclassical economics. The 
remedy they prescribed – communism – was worse than the disease. Unfor-
tunately we are once again in danger of drawing the wrong conclusions 
from the lessons of history. This time the danger comes not from commun-
ism but from market fundamentalism.
(Soros, 1998: 19)
 9 For Aristotle, ‘crematistics’ is the art of accumulating wealth, but the latter is 
not limited to the former, as it happens in the modern context [editors’ note].
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10 Financial profit is disconnected from the way the economy is traditionally 
defined and measured (the production and logistics of the flows and stocks of 
consumer goods). The economy, as its name implies, is regulated by a concern 
for the good management of the needs of human inhabitants – oiko- nomia 
(οικο-νομια) = regulation of the household. The crematistic hubris, the 
unbounded accumulation of profits without relation to production, resonates 
with the militaristic hubris of weaponry that is dominant at all levels and for all 
types of risk, to legitimize the defence of the common good (the global market).
11 For example, Alain Minc (1997).
12 See Mary Kaldor (2008). Kaldor directs the ‘Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance’ based in the London School of Economics and advocates the 
concept of ‘human security’.
13 The question of whether we were right to invade Iraq is a fascinating debate 
for historians and politicians, and a valid issue for the American people to 
consider in an election year. As it happens, I think it was a mistake. But that 
is not my key concern. The issue for practitioners in the field is not to 
second- guess a decision from six years ago, but to get on with the job at 
hand which, I believe, is what both Americans and Iraqis expect of us. In 
that respect, the new strategy and tactics implemented in 2007, and which 
relied for their effectiveness on the extra troop numbers of the Surge, ARE 
succeeding and need to be supported. In 2006, a normal night in Baghdad 
involved 120 to 150 dead Iraqi civilians, and each month we lost dozens of 
Americans killed or maimed. This year, a bad night involves one or two 
dead civilians, U.S. losses are dramatically down, and security is restored. . . . 
We are now in a position to pursue a political strategy that will ultimately 
see Iraq stable, our forces withdrawn, and this whole sorry adventure tidied 
up to the maximum extent possible so that we can get on with the fight in 
other theatres – most pressingly, Afghanistan.
(Kilcullen, 2008)
3 Norm/exception
Exceptionalism and governmental 
prospects in the shadow of political 
theology
Roberto Ciccarelli
Two events have revived the philosophy of exceptionalism: the terrorist 
attacks on the Twin Towers in September 2001 planned by Al Qaida, a 
fundamentalist Islamic movement whose identity is not clear, and the sub-
sequent response of the ‘War on Terror’ waged by the US administration 
of George W. Bush, which culminated in the military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Within a short period of time, from 2001 to 2008, a 
philosophical common sense has become established according to which 
the war against global terrorism represents the most advanced point in the 
creation of a ‘permanent state of exception’. This state of exception, 
limited in time and delegated to specific subjects by its legal nature, has 
thus supposedly been extended indefinitely onto a global scale during the 
War on Terror and has assumed the form of a sovereign dictatorship.
 Exceptionalism is the political and theoretical narrative that has drawn 
attention to the crisis of US global hegemony that arose after the Second 
World War but which has lost coherence and legitimacy. The failure of 
‘exporting democracy’ to the ‘Great Middle East’ envisaged by a few 
American ideologues – the so- called neo- conservatives – demonstrates how 
this narrative has been more of an instrument in the ideological struggle 
than a useful theoretical framework for explaining the deep reasons for the 
current crisis. In the short term, the war against terrorism made it possible 
to believe that there was still space for the unilateral exercise of an uncon-
ditional sovereignty in the world, only to later discover that the political 
pretence in the narrative generates a real and very determined opposition. 
The idea that the theory of ‘pre- emptive war’ and the war against terror-
ism could neutralize the ‘enemy’ has proved to be an illusion. The enemies 
have multiplied, while the ‘world order’, if ever there was one, has dis-
solved. The ‘state of exception’, if this ever existed, is the result of legisla-
tion desired by a particular party (the US Republicans) and ideology 
(neo- conservativism), which unscrupulously used political and legal instru-
ments in relation to the constitutional prerogatives that regulate emergency 
situations.1
 In this chapter, I will not discuss the philosophical debates on excep-
tionalism (from Carl Schmitt to Walter Benjamin), its contemporary uses 
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(from Jacques Derrida to Antonio Negri and Giorgio Agamben) or the 
wide- ranging criticisms that these have received.2 I believe it is more inter-
esting to interpret the latter as the reflection of an underlying character of 
contemporary political culture: the crisis of sovereignty.3 Despite the denial 
of the existence of a sole sovereign who dominates the world and decides 
its order, and the rejection of the absolutist and theological collective imag-
ination that has nourished the project of pre- emptive war (to annihilate 
potential and individual and not just legal and state enemies), the theoret-
ical debate on exceptionalism has nonetheless been characterized by these 
theses, or by the shadow of political theology. In fact, once the hypothesis 
of the existence of an absolute sovereign was excluded, and hence with it 
the image of divine omnipotence that feeds the original theory of sover-
eignty as the ‘decision about the state of exception’ put forward by Carl 
Schmitt, the idea emerged that the state of exception was permanent. This 
permanence is supposedly due to an ontological mechanism, no longer 
political, according to which, at present, all political decisions are suppos-
edly not dictated by personality, but rather by the function of the person 
holding an absolute power.
 Thus, a paradox emerged. At the moment that the sovereign’s main 
function is exercised in an explicit and unilateral way – in other words, 
their decision on the state of emergency – it reveals a failure. Every decision 
on the state of exception has been shown to lack political effectiveness and 
to have produced opposite outcomes to those planned. The re- affirming of 
the prerogatives of an absolute power has demonstrated the impossibility 
of its presence in the world. The order produced in the world has merely 
threatened the sovereign that was supposed to enjoy its privilege. The sov-
ereign is dead, yet has never been so alive; and the part of it that lives on 
continues to re- produce its own death. Paradox is the style of the philo-
sophy of exceptionalism, but it also shows the disastrous outcome of its 
action in the world.
 Hence, while this represents the philosophical problem of exceptional-
ism, it cannot be denied that it has contributed to the denunciation of the 
transformation of the state governed by the rule of law (Rechtstaat) into a 
Power- State (Machtstaat)4 in which law, far from limiting power as a guar-
antor of rights, becomes its armed wing and the logic of political crime 
assumed by emergency legislation (the 2001 and 2002 Patriot Acts in the 
United States and analogous legislation adopted in Europe) to fight inter-
national terrorism and to justify armed interventions without the authori-
zation of international law (Ferrajoli, 1984).
 At the end of this political cycle, it is nonetheless clear that, having can-
celled the classical distinctions between military and civil war and between 
just and ideological war, it has not lent value to the permanent state of 
exception, but has been further proof of the definitive neutralization of 
sovereignty. This operation has not led to the exercise of an impersonal 
and unfounded absolute power, but rather to a regime of government 
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erected upon the state of emergency; that is, on the extra- legal status that 
governs the daily exercise of the production of political, administrative, 
productive and economic norms and practices – in other terms, of life in 
the time of global governance.
What exception does not say about the norm
The norm is what is removed by the philosophies of exception. The crisis 
of sovereignty is not so much due to the extreme difficulty of determining 
an essence of exception through decision as it is to the amphiboly that 
exists in the definition of the ‘norm’. The emphasis placed on the concept 
of exception infers that the norm is always understood in a legal and polit-
ical sense; that is, as a consolidated legal fact, a state of being that is 
defined forever – in other terms, a legal regularity that is the starting point 
from which the exceptional and unpredictable functions of power are exer-
cised. Only in this way can exception be understood, on the one hand, as 
what constitutes the norm and, on the other, as its continuous variation.
 The thesis of exceptionalism holds that there is a constitutive void at the 
centre of the law, and that the state of exception corresponds with this 
void. ‘Also the legal order, like any other order, rests on a decision and not 
on a norm’ (Schmitt, 2006). The decision is a repetition of the same act 
that does not have any foundation or justification. No decision can be reg-
ulated by a norm. Only the decision can lend normative substance to this 
‘void’, and it can do so by deciding about the state of exception. For 
Schmitt, it is possible to lead the void that is expressed as the state of 
exception’s pure and anomic violence back to the level of law. Sovereignty 
would thus be the place in which a decision turns violence into law, 
anomie into norm, chaos into order. Violence is the minimal condition of 
law.
 In contrast, Walter Benjamin argues that violence is an external power 
that transforms the law and has the strength to usher in a new world, and 
hence a new (form of ) law. The state of exception is initiated by a decision 
that does not have the goal of preserving the existing legal order, but 
rather to transform it radically. In Benjamin’s view, it is not possible to 
conceive the coexistence of exception and norm. The state of exception 
never keeps within the rule that one would seek to limit it. It remains 
outside of the order and strikes this order with a violence – such as a war 
or a revolutionary general strike – capable of bringing about its destruc-
tion. Linking violence and law, as Schmitt does, is hence a fictitious repre-
sentation that seeks to maintain the law in an infinite suspension. But 
thinking along the lines of Benjamin that an anomic condition exists 
beyond the law means to claim that the law is a monad, suspended in a 
void in which there are no norms (Benjamin, 1962: 10).
 What is removed in this debate (the inspiration for the philosophy of 
exceptionalism) is the area of indistinctness between norm and exception, 
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the void in which the law is supposedly suspended, and between the 
immanence of life and norm. Thinking that life is a normative void that 
must be alternately filled by a decision or by the invocation of pure or 
‘divine’ violence means reducing it to the consistency of a spectre, that of 
the sovereign, which is more real than the void that the decision seeks to 
‘suspend’ in the state of exception. We thus witness the creation of a spec-
tral world in which the sovereign’s life is suspended in an indecipherable 
zone that is not subject to politics or to law.
Internal enemy  unlawful enemy combatant
An example may be useful to illustrate this argument: that of the ‘special 
laws’ adopted by European states during the twentieth century, particu-
larly in the 1970s, to counter internal left- wing terrorism. If these laws are 
compared with the norms established by the Patriot Act and the Military 
Order of 13 November 2001 and the practice of ‘forcible abduction’, 
originally authorized by Bill Clinton to counter the growth of the Al Qaida 
network and later formalized by George W. Bush, we can see that, in both 
cases, the legislation grants governments powers to act above legality. In 
doing so, they deny recognition of the ‘political nature’ of their opponents, 
denying them the possibility of becoming ‘future governors’ and attribut-
ing them the identity of ‘perpetual dissidents’ – that is, of people in total 
disagreement with the system that they live in.
 However, while the first legislation punishes the right to dissent by 
organized groups at a national level in relation to the decisions taken by a 
government, the second legislation punishes membership of a non- state 
and global organization that counters a country’s sovereignty. The ‘internal 
enemy’ – the object of European special laws in the 1970s – is not the same 
political and legal figure as the ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ which is the 
object of the Patriot Act and attributed to the militant of a fundamentalist 
Islamic group but which is not recognized by the additional protocol to the 
1977 Geneva Conventions (article 37, point 1). This definition of an 
unlawful enemy combatant expresses two features that are absent in that 
of an internal enemy: extraterritoriality and acting contrary to the laws of 
war. Unlawful enemy combatants have never been arrested for political 
crimes, as did happen in the case of internal enemies, but for war crimes. 
The former have always been denied the possibility of declaring themselves 
‘at war’ against the state. Instead, the will to wage war against the state 
has been attributed to the latter.
 The nature of exception regarding the legal status of the internal enemy 
differs from that of the unlawful enemy combatant. The internal enemy was 
the result of a global process during the postwar period that widened the 
definition of ‘political crime’ to forms of conduct involving general dis-
agreement, generalized the pre- emptive repression of political dissent, trans-
lated political crime from one language to another, and reversed the burden 
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of proof by compelling incriminated subjects to show that they were not 
involved in ‘terrorist’ organizations.5 The unlawful enemy combatant was 
defined as a result of a process that was contiguous to the one described 
above, but was different in one essential way. The American Patriot Act 
represents the first legal definition of an enemy in the absence of a hostile 
state, which had been the case from the seventeenth century until the Cold 
War, in the absence of hostile political groups that can be identified on a 
territorial basis, and without a war undertaken by terrorists against a sover-
eign state being definable in legal terms. Not possessing the citizenship of 
the country whose sovereignty is under attack, and sometimes not even 
with the citizenship of an ‘enemy’ state, unlawful enemy combatants have 
been denied the status of internal enemies because they are ‘absolute 
enemies’. This means that they may be annihilated, without anyone being 
able to appeal to constitutional guarantees at a national and international 
level, in contrast to what was possible in the case of internal enemies.
 The scope for the implementation of norms and the nature of exception 
has changed. Exception is the point of arrival of a process caused by a 
series of behaviours, whose purpose imposes the adoption of measures that 
derogate from the codes. In the case of the fight against terrorism, the 
exceptionality of these norms also represents the political decision’s point 
of arrival, and not its starting point: that is, its adjustment to the conduct 
and, especially, to the presumed intentions expressed by such conduct in 
relation to the imperative of defending security. The brief and hapless 
period of the war against terrorism was, in other words, not characterized 
by a state of permanent exception, but rather by a permanent state of 
emergency. The state of emergency is the object of a political mechanism 
that governs the distinction between war and peace, between hostility and 
its legitimation, and sets a new primacy, that of security. The state of emer-
gency is an infinitely flexible and modifiable legal condition that enables 
the exercise of wartime law, like political hostility itself, in internal and 
international relations.
Politics of war
The centrality of the analysis of war is a crucial aspect of philosophies of 
exceptionalism. As an act of absolute hostility, war is the annihilation of 
any other being. Thus, it does not fall under a norm. It is the exception 
that allows the existence of a norm. The absolute hostility of war is a real 
possibility in any form of human coexistence and the precondition for the 
state’s political unity. As a possibility, or precondition, war does not trans-
late the essence of the state. Despite internally possessing a constant state 
of conflict, the state is the outcome of a regulation of war – in other words, 
of a hostility with another state. This regulation implies a decision on the 
norm in the name of exception. According to Schmitt, only the state can 
draw this distinction.
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 The distinction between friend and enemy shows that the political unity 
of a state is constructed upon enmity towards the exterior (Foucault, 
2001), namely, on opposition against an enemy that has no characteriza-
tion other than that of being ‘foreign’. Any conflict within the state – for 
instance, against migrants who are foreign individuals and do not repre-
sent any state bodies – thus loses any political meaning. An act is political 
when it is directed against another state and disposes of the life of its own 
and the other’s population. The daily governing of the population is an 
administrative act, not a political one, which involves policing and not 
warfare, and whose goal is to pacify the internal order. Administrative life 
is a ‘normal’ act, whereas war is an ‘exceptional’ act. War is a transcen-
dental condition of the legal order but does not concern the political and 
social conflict that takes place within this order. A political unit rests solely 
on external war, but there is no conflict inside this unit. Violence is at 
work beyond the state’s borders, but is silent within them.
 It is evident that this represents an imperfect transcendentality, whose 
functioning is not understood by Schmitt in the universal sense of the term. 
This portrayal is drawn from the notion that social life is intrinsically paci-
fied. The violence that the state normally exercises to attain such a ‘pacifi-
cation’ is not acknowledged. This removal alludes to a policing policy that 
uses instruments of war inappropriately. The political opponent is under-
stood as an internal enemy, assigned the identity of an enemy but without 
the recognition of equal dignity attributed to an enemy state. The pacifica-
tion of social life occurs at the price of an exceptional use of force by the 
state. Denying what is transcendental about war at an internal level, 
however, does not mean eliminating its effects. Victory in war against a 
state and the internal pacification of social and political conflicts exist on 
incommensurable scales. In other words, war is managed as an internal 
political problem, while internal political problems are managed like war, 
without a war actually ever being declared.
 However, it would be reductive to merely consider Schmitt’s exceptional-
ism the philosophy of a police state. When he wrote The Nomos of the 
Earth in 1950, the German jurist showed his understanding of the contra-
diction of what is transcendental about war. In this significant volume, he 
announced the end of jus publicum europaeum – that is, the Eurocentric dis-
tinction between internal and external, between national order and interna-
tional order (Schmitt, 2006). This representation of the world ended with 
the First World War and was abandoned definitely after the Second World 
War, when war became ‘total’ and state war turned into a global civil war. 
Under these new conditions, it became very difficult to distinguish between 
friend and enemy. The transcendental condition of what is ‘political’ comes 
into contradiction with the reality that it seeks to regulate. War remains a 
precondition of the order, but this does not mean that it manages to find a 
subject capable of leading it back to its previous state form. The prerogative 
of sovereignty to decide about the state of exception is seriously challenged.
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 In the mid- twentieth century, it was impossible to restore the sover-
eignty that Schmitt himself – through his theory of the state of exception – 
claimed had been lost forever. He acknowledged that this view is difficult 
to apply to a global scale where space is not placed in relation to the 
national or interstate level, but can be applied to a network of state and 
non- state subjects that interact in a continuous state of conflict. In the 
global space, it is impossible to imagine the existence of a sovereign pos-
sessing the necessary force to decide the fate of the entire system, or a pos-
sible technical mediation capable of resolving conflicts, even by resorting 
to the extreme resource of war. In this space, a clear division between the 
internal and foreign affairs of states can no longer be appreciated. More-
over, a stable hierarchical order between different levels of sovereignty and 
a clear definition of the enemy that is neither public nor political are both 
absent.
 This awareness led Schmitt to exclude the idea that the origin of the 
legal order is the normative void, as he had asserted in the 1920s. Unlike 
the present- day philosophies of exceptionalism that are inspired by his 
oeuvre, Schmitt discovered ‘concreteness’, namely, the normativity of con-
crete orders, which does not descend from other norms, but produces such 
norms. This concreteness lies in the ‘space’ that is not understood as a 
natural fact, but as nomos – that is, the determination of what is political. 
Hence, nomos is the new transcendental condition that, alongside excep-
tion and war, allows what is political to govern the world, to divide and 
take possession of the earth, to revolutionize the old geometry of state 
borders, producing new supranational political entities. However, Schmit-
tian exceptionalism recognizes the dialectics of the nomos that characterize 
the concreteness of any order. It is a new attempt to reconstruct the 
impossible order between norm and exception by following the same 
scheme: Schmitt moves away from the materiality of events and, by follow-
ing a transcendental dimension, identifies the pure and unconditioned 
origin of the decision to which he finally attributes the role of mediation 
between irreconcilable demands.
 The nomos is the new ‘foundation’ of the ‘Political’. Unlike the theo-
logical nexus between decision and law, this foundation expresses the 
transcendental nexus between space and law. The search for the origin 
thus reaches an essence that is even more uncontaminated than those of 
the state and that which is political. The goal is to identify, once and for 
all, the order that constitutes the world, the primary direction that creates 
laws, and the decision that does not obey a norm but creates the norm. In 
the global space in which everything is deterritorialized, where there is no 
single measure for events and the concreteness of orders is provided by 
the processes that constitute them, Schmitt re- proposes a foundation 
without principle, a measure without form, and transcendentality without 
universality. In reality, the nomos is a platonic idea: an uncontaminated 
‘outside’ that is expressed in the world through the primary violence of 
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the decision and the war that restructures the earth on the basis of a 
project that has always been given. The aporia is always the same: there is 
no absolute sovereign in the world, but this does not mean that one must 
do without a single foundation of things. The effect, as is well known, is 
neutralizing. The idea of nomos expresses the condition in which the 
world remains what it is: a passivity awaiting a decision, a sin awaiting 
redemption, a mistake awaiting the reason that will correct it. The world 
is indecipherable, motionless even when it moves quickly, a totality 
without totalization, a story that has never started. The final outcome of 
Schmittian exceptionalism is the product of the Kulturpessimismus of 
twentieth- century European philosophy. Its paralyzing effects descend 
from an ahistorical reading of a widespread narrative genre in human sci-
ences: that of ‘modernity’.
 The narrative solidity of the philosophical genre drawn up by Schmitt is 
in fact based on an option that is as convincing as it is illusory. When a 
system is in crisis, disorder appears to be permanent and any mediation 
useless; the only remaining option is technique. A neutrality is attributed 
to technique that is capable of resolving the problems of governing an 
epochal crisis. Politics thus re- conquers a prominent place in the narration 
of the contemporary world. No longer restricted to the loss of representa-
tiveness and legality, as the ‘modern’ tale would have it, politics resurfaces 
as the government of technique, and technique is the final foundation of 
politics that does not have any foundation. The optical illusion is evident. 
A crisis is ‘epochal’ because it excludes the possibility of a solution. Locat-
ing it in the neutrality of technique means indicating a solution that is part 
of the crisis. It is not possible to claim the end of sovereignty and recognize 
the ability to solve conflicts in technique. If the sovereign – who, by defini-
tion, occupies the place of neutrality – is dead, to what neutrality will tech-
nique have to resort to enact its politics?
Phenomenology of the kamikaze
‘Before having to defend ourselves, we must be certain of the need to 
defend ourselves.’ This is one of the comments heard shortly after an 
attack against Italian soldiers in Kabul in September 2009. This is how a 
general of the defence chief of staff summarized the extreme difficulty for a 
professional army to distinguish civilians from terrorists in contemporary 
wars. The time that normally passes between the idea of defence and the 
need for defence gives kamikaze warfare a strategic advantage. But this is 
not the only element that makes it devastating. Compared with the citizen- 
soldier, whose mission it is to safeguard theirs and other people’s lives, the 
kamikaze finds his/her purpose in the annihilation of the enemy and civil-
ians. Through suicide and the destruction of the other, including women 
and children, they sanctify their own bodies and the need to kill and be 
killed (Ciccarelli, 2009).
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 What is disturbing about kamikaze warfare for Western liberal demo-
cracy and for its military culture is the reversal of the value of life and 
death. The latter considers the possible death of an enemy a means to 
defend the sacredness of life in general. Conversely, suicide terrorists 
believe that life, their own and that of other people, may be sacrificed, but 
they cannot be killed because as ‘living martyrs’ they survive for eternity, 
while their victims are sentenced to death. Even in this situation, the con-
solidated relationship between the ‘normality’ of the protection of life and 
the ‘exception’ of killing in war is transformed. It is not a mere reversal of 
the biopolitical rule decreed by Michel Foucault at the start of the modern 
‘biopolitical’ era. Western liberal democracy has already been experiencing 
the overcoming of this rule for some time. There are many areas where it 
continues to be present, but it is precisely in the war against terrorism that 
its eclipse is by now evident.
 The reversal of the relationship between norm and exception has led to 
the cancellation, or at least the removal, of the tragic element of the so- 
called war against terrorism. Personal motivations should not be sought to 
explain what leads a man or a woman to die with the enemy. Psychoana-
lytical arguments, for instance the assertion that there exists ‘a culture of 
death’ in Islam in opposition to ‘liberal culture’, do not explain this phe-
nomenon either. The uniqueness of the suicide attack lies in the circum-
stances in which it takes place. When claiming that the kamikaze enjoys 
the social status of martyr and draws the symbolic gain of immortality 
from sacrificial self- destruction, one ignores the real interest in the use of 
this tragic resolution. The suicide attack is an instrument of war that has 
been adapted to the execution of a rational project of annihilation. Its 
motivations are military, not theological (Asad, 2007).
 The impossibility to distinguish the value of life from that of death during 
war is not a prerogative of kamikaze war. It also applies to war as practised 
by professional armies. Humanitarian law on conduct during war forces a 
democratic state to kill proportionately to the offence encountered. 
However, when it is no longer possible to distinguish ‘civilians’ from ‘terror-
ists’, it is obvious that this proportion loses meaning and fuels the difficulties 
that armies face in Afghanistan and Iraq. Terrorism and the war on terror-
ism are expressions of an antagonistic military logic that shares the same 
culture of war. It is not a matter of establishing a naive and moralistic equal-
ity between ‘democratic’ and terrorist violence. In spite of the contingent 
strategic advantage, the readiness to die by the kamikaze cannot in any case 
be compared to the firepower of a professional army. Another thesis 
emerges: democracy and terrorism defend the value of life of their respective 
communities. The first guarantees everyone’s freedom by trying to lawfully 
kill a terrorist enemy who cannot be further defined. The second sacrifices 
an individual to guarantee the lives of those similar to them.
 The definition of the value of life or death takes place on a shifting 
threshold. On this threshold, the struggling forces continue to negotiate the 
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criteria that make a behaviour normal or exceptional and the value that 
must be assigned to it. This is the biopolitical conflict that currently sets 
the two political rationales for war against each other. Hence, war is not a 
‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West, but is rather the perma-
nent exercise of the distinction between the life of the ‘civilized’ and the 
‘uncivilized’. Each of the parties in the struggle enacts this distinction 
against the other. Nonetheless, they share a common goal: to establish the 
value of one’s own life and to set it against the death practised by the 
‘other’, the ‘uncivilized’. It is a game of mirrors: Islamic fundamentalists 
cultivate a view of the West as a mechanized society lacking spiritual 
authenticity. The liberal- democratic West cultivates an opposite view 
inspired by Orientalism, according to which non- Western peoples are 
targets lacking humanity. Just as the former portrays the West as a corrupt 
zone of the planet, the latter portrays non- Westerners as an inferior 
species. These two political rationales share the same prejudice: the idea of 
the other as an inferior being that translates into the destruction of human 
beings.
 Islamic fundamentalists believe an essentialist portrayal of the West that 
can be very harmful and stereotyped. Thinking that the West is corrupted 
by a soulless materialism is a classical representation that Westerners have 
offered of themselves during the course of history. Thinking that 
‘Muslims’, as a large part of ‘non- Western’ peoples, are incapable of build-
ing a ‘decent state’ and hence a democracy that is worthy of liberal- 
democratic standards is a representation that is equally essentialist and 
harmful because it justifies armed interventions in the name of democracy. 
When the politicians of Islamic fundamentalism voice these discourses, 
they reproduce a mentality created by the Westerners who they believe 
they are fighting. When the politicians of liberal democracies dust off their 
Orientalist paraphernalia, they simply reproduce the conflict from which 
they should keep a distance.
 My thesis is that this ‘cultural’ conflict consists in the defence of life and 
its ‘civil’ value. Over the last ten years, this defence has imposed a new 
way of experiencing death. What liberal- democratic eyes find worrying 
about suicide bombers is the individuality of their death. Their access to a 
limited freedom draws no distinction between civilized and uncivilized life, 
or between crime and punishment as affirmed by modern law. It would 
nonetheless be a mistake to imagine that this worrying freedom is ‘natural’ 
for those practising kamikaze warfare. In certain circumstances, any 
culture could produce suicide terrorism. Over the last few years, we have 
understood that kamikaze warfare is a phenomenon that proceeds in 
waves and is reproduced in different societies for reasons that are also very 
different, from anger against oppressors to personal disappointment. On 
this matter, one may recall the case of a member of the Japanese Red 
Army, Ko-zo- Okamoto, who participated in the attack on Tel Aviv’s Loid 
airport in 1972 with George Habbash’s Popular Front for the Liberation 
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of Palestine. Okamoto was arrested, while his comrades blew themselves 
up. At the time, it was claimed that only the Japanese could have accepted 
to commit suicide, whereas Palestinians would have never done it because 
they were not courageous enough. As we know well, this is no longer true 
today. Suicide terrorism is hence not just a matter of courage, it is a cul-
tural practice that has changed over time and has been adopted through a 
long and dramatic cultural process by Jihadists in Palestine, Iraq or 
Afghanistan (Margalit, 2009).
 In the same way, one has to exclude any ‘naturalness’ in the relationship 
that liberal democracies entertain with the law. With the ‘exceptional’ leg-
islation against terrorism and, previously, through the so- called ‘humani-
tarian wars’, we have understood that a sovereign democratic state is 
ambiguously linked to humanitarian law. Namely, it must respect the cri-
teria of the legal order, but it must neutralize the scant, but terrifying, mili-
tary potential of the suicide terrorist through any available pre- emptive 
means. This is necessary to defend the ‘value’ of the lives of its own popu-
lation and its soldiers. The kamikaze’s willingness to die cannot be com-
pared with a professional army’s firepower, despite the contingent strategic 
advantage. The difference between a civilized and an uncivilized life is an 
effect of the destructive capacity of military technology and its economy. It 
is on this basis that the value of one life in relation to another is decided, 
over and above the strategic importance of a death in relation to gratuitous 
cruelty.
Norm/exception in current governmentality
It is interesting to note how the philosophical foundations of contemporary 
exceptionalism have been relativized in the work of the latest generation of 
academics through a rethinking of the Foucauldian analysis of governmen-
tality. The problem of norm and exception in global governmentality no 
longer exclusively concerns political–legal sovereignty at the nation- state 
level, but has crossed over into the analysis of power, with ethnographies of 
the conduct of those subjected to power, anthropological studies on the 
organization and operative systems of power, and a concern on the part of 
political science, economics, management and accounting, bio- medical and 
bio- economic research to concentrate on the autopoietic logic of governance 
(Ong and Collier, 2005; Ong, 2006; Murray Li, 2007).
 This is also proof that critical thought, which has underpinned the 
current philosophies of exceptionalism, from Derrida to Agamben, has 
been historicized in relation to its own constitutive limits: by keeping 
within sovereignty and the aporiae of governmental rationality. This re- 
problematization of the discursive field starts by questioning a key assump-
tion in the sociology of globalization: that the remainder of sovereignty in 
the global space must be considered one of the possible forms of 
governmentality. This has led to the definition of the global space as the 
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governing of different temporalities in which populations live, and not just 
in terms of the management of human, financial and administrative flows 
that territorialize and deterritorialize the state- controlled nomos.
 The global space overturns the traditional relationship between space 
and time. Governmentality is the mechanism that enacts this reversal, as it 
intervenes upon both forms of life and the division of territories. The crea-
tion of a mentality about the government of oneself and of others first 
modifies the way of living one’s temporality and hence of perceiving a 
space. This affects the shifting topography of territories and the construc-
tion of political identities, as well as the devices required to control global 
assemblages (Sassen, 2008).
 The testing of norms and institutions useful for the replanning of times 
and spaces, of the norm and exception, is the object of political experience 
in global governmentality. Starting from the idea that a life is the expression 
of the immanence of knowledge and power, of the norm and exception, the 
inevitable conclusion is that this process also runs through analyses that deal 
with this life. To be understood, governmentality requires a pragmatics of 
the present that is capable of questioning its own premises alongside its 
related conclusions. Hence, it must conceive the present both as history and 
as the updating of an infinite virtuality. This is how what is transcendental – 
the state of exception – can be radically historicized and its historical trans-
formation – the normative project – can be envisaged. Immanence translates 
this materialistic methodology and the analytics of power into a pragmatics 
of the present that marks the difference from modernity and from the philo-
sophical genre of sovereignty (Ciccarelli, 2008).
 The epistemological reversal that was already widely envisaged by 
Foucault in the late 1970s has now happened. The emergence of the global 
space has coincided with the spread of this model of government world-
wide. During the last thirty years of the twentieth century a monolithic 
power was not imposed, but a modality of government was spread in 
democracies and totalitarian regimes alike. The neo- liberal season of global 
governmentality has certainly been characterized by the attempt to impose 
the same political rationality, even if its implementation has depended on 
local cultures, political and religious traditions and individual histories.
 Governmentality does not just pass through armies that pursue strategic 
goals or NGOs that practise humanitarian ideals. It is promoted by local 
institutions, by the administrative know- how adopted to resolve daily 
problems, by the criteria adopted to promote an economic and social 
progress that is compatible with environmental, cultural or individual 
security. Obviously, it is not a peaceful process. Global governmentality 
does not cancel the difference between the norms of one’s own political 
rationality and individual forms of conduct, the stories and values of indi-
viduals and their communities. Rather, it may be said that this remains its 
problem that is impossible to overcome. Reducing multitudes of people to 
statelessness does not guarantee their consent.
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 In this situation, the ambivalence between order and conflict, peace and 
war, norm and exception, between the will to create a ‘democracy’ and the 
need to guarantee a multinational company’s interests has reached a point 
in which it is difficult to distinguish violence from authority, well- being 
from sacrifice, domination from freedom. This is the dilemma that govern-
mentality always leads to. ‘Peace’ and ‘war’ are not different moments of 
the same military conflict. Today, such a distinction should be conceived 
as an expression of the same policing policy. In the global space, security is 
no longer a task that states manage in an exclusive manner as an internal 
public order issue, but rather requires a series of military, humanitarian 
and policing policies to neutralize threats at a global level and, at the same 
time, to safeguard the living conditions of their own populations. These 
are the reasons why governmentality is an expression of a global policing 
policy (Dal Lago, 2003).
 Translation by Yasha Maccanico and Nick Dines.
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4 Reversing Clausewitz?
War and politics in Foucault, 
Deleuze–Guattari and Aron
Massimiliano Guareschi
When discussing war, it is almost compulsory to quote Clausewitz, or at 
least the maxim that ‘war is merely the continuation of politics by other 
means’. At the same time, the formulaic symmetry of this well- known 
adage exposes us to the temptation of reversing its meaning; in other 
words, it raises the question whether it is perhaps not politics that is the 
continuation of war with other means. This question has been directly con-
fronted by a range of authors, from Johan Huizinga to Ernst Jünger 
(Huizinga, 2004: 84–85; Gnoli and Volpi, 1997: 83). One of the earliest 
proponents of the need to reverse the formula was Erich Ludendorff who 
reflected upon the matter in the transformed conditions of Der Totale 
Krieg (Ludendorff, 1922: 23). One could mention countless other exam-
ples. This chapter, however, does not intend to systematically deal with 
how Clausewitz’s formula has been challenged or how, through the course 
of the twentieth century, its has occupied a special place in debates about 
the interconnections between war and politics, the military and the civilian 
population, national–international space and the global dimension. Rather, 
it limits itself to a particular geographical and historical context – France 
between the 1970s and 1980s – in order to examine the very different 
theoretical approaches of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and Aron.
Michel Foucault
In 1976, Foucault gave a course at the Collège de France entitled Society 
Must Be Defended in which a central aim was to reverse Clausewitz’s well- 
known assumption (Foucault, 2003). The point of departure for the 
Foucaultian discourse is the need to re- problematize the concept of ‘power’ 
by inverting both its sense and scale and, in doing so, break with the 
models that had been layered up over centuries of philosophical and legal 
thought (Foucault, 1995, 2000). In such a vision, the key to understanding 
power needs to be sought not at the level of sovereignty and law but at the 
molecular level of a ‘microphysics’, which is focused upon exploring the 
dynamics of power relations that underpin a relationship characterized by 
some form of asymmetry (Guareschi, 1999).
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 In his research, Foucault seeks to free himself from an economistic con-
ception of power relations, which, in varying ways, characterizes both 
liberal and Marxist perspectives. In the sphere of liberal thought, the 
dynamics of power are equated with the circulation of goods, as demon-
strated by the frequent articulation of private- law categories (such as the 
contract, the power of attorney or the mandate) within a public- law 
domain. In contrast, with Marxism, the syntax of power tends to trace 
itself in the structure of relations of production, which it serves to legiti-
mate and stabilize (Foucault, 1995: 13). In order to design an alternative 
to these ‘economistic’ paradigms, which instead posits power as an auton-
omous element of investigation, Foucault therefore identifies two viable 
analytical operators: repression and war (ibid.: 16).
 The use of war as an operator to analyse social peace immediately 
brings to mind the name of Thomas Hobbes, who commenced from the 
concept of war in order to work out how to construct an artificial order 
guaranteed by the Leviathan.1 Foucault rejects such an association 
because, in his opinion, war itself does not play any role in Hobbes’s 
theoretical proposition. This observation is based less on the hypothetical 
character of bellum omnium contra omnes than on the fact that, in the 
state of nature contemplated in The Leviathan, violence and the actual 
enactment of war would never take place. In effect, Hobbes does not 
discuss war but rather a ‘state of war’ to indicate the play of mimetic 
representations and ‘infinite diplomacy’ on the basis of which each indi-
vidual, even the strongest, comes to the conclusion that they are unable 
to guarantee their security from the attacks of others (Foucault, 1995: 
92). For Foucault, therefore, Hobbes is far from being the theoretician of 
the relationship between war and constitution of the political order, but 
instead assumes the guise of an author determined to eliminate war as 
the historical reality of the genesis of sovereignty. In this sense, his 
theoretical construction is understood by Foucault to be contrary to a 
historical discourse centred on war and invasion, which was used and 
appropriated in multifarious ways and had notable currency in revolu-
tionary England. Such a discourse refers to Angles, Saxons and the 
Norman invasion, which established a new sovereign in England, William 
the Conqueror, and a new aristocracy originating from across the 
Channel. Stressed in different terms, this account could also function as a 
discourse that both legitimises royal absolutism on the basis of the right 
to conquest, but also discloses the usurpatory origins of the royal and 
aristocratic order, thus evoking the right of resistance that would apper-
tain to the descendants of the oppressed Angles and Saxons. It is against 
such a ‘political use’ of history that, according to Foucault, the Hobbe-
sian attempt to neutralize real wars operates, and hence leads to the con-
ceptual antidote of the ‘state of war’ in order to delineate a condition 
characterized by the absence of winners and losers, and dominators and 
dominated.
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 For Foucault, identifying the polemical target of Hobbes coincides with 
underlining a typology of discourse, defined historical- political, which 
begins to assert itself from the seventeenth century onwards and in which 
he identifies an alternative to legal and philosophical models centred on 
sovereignty, representation and the contract. The theme of conflict between 
races plays a central role in this discourse and serves to stabilize a dichoto-
mous and discordant vision of society, permanently traversed by an irre-
ducible conflict induced by conquest and the asymmetry ushered in by the 
outcome of a historically situated battle. In such a perspective, therefore, 
war is neverending but continues as a permanent social condition under 
the semblance of peace. Or, put another way: peace as the continuation of 
war with other means.
 In short, the theoretical scenario in which Foucault sets the inversion of 
Clausewitz’s formula is marked by the need to elaborate a general frame in 
which to ensure coherency to an analysis of power removed from the 
burden of economistic and substantialist perspectives. War, as an analyti-
cal operator, is thus called upon to play an analogous role to that reserved 
to the contract in political philosophy (Duso, 1993). Reversing the 
formula, for Foucault, therefore means, first and foremost, asserting the 
fact that power relations are based on a relationship of force crystallized at 
a specific moment in time and from the outcome of a war. Therefore, the 
peace that follows is a condition that revolves not around overcoming but 
rather the institutionalization of the determining effects of the ‘last battle’. 
On the basis of this hypothesis, ‘the role of political power is perpetually 
to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force, and to 
reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, languages, and even the 
bodies of the individuals’ (Foucault, 1995: 15–16). The second significance 
of the reversal consists in the hermeneutic assumption according to which 
the conflict that permeates a political system, ‘these political struggles, 
these clashes over or with power’, should be interpreted as the continua-
tion of war during peace (ibid.: 16). The third implication, which in some 
ways closes the circle, underlines how, once such a logic is assumed, only 
the resumption of war can bring about a resolution to the conflictual 
tension that accompanies peace.
 Hereupon, Foucault invites a shift in perspective, proposing to read the 
famous maxim as itself the result of the reversal of a pre- existing formula. 
According to Foucault, Clausewitz had in fact simply inverted a pre- 
existing formula, according to which politics was none other than the con-
tinuation of war (ibid.: 48). The reference, obviously, is to the 
historical- political discourse that is developed in the 1975–1976 course. 
Special attention is paid to the constitutional context, and particularly to 
the military dimension, in which its genesis is located. Foucault concisely 
traces the changes during the medieval and early modern eras that gave 
rise to the monopolization of war by the monarchy. From an oligopolistic 
instrument wielded by a military aristocracy, and prone to be transversally 
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used by different ranks of power within the realm or empire (Brunner, 
1939), war would later transform into a function reserved to the sovereign. 
It is the sovereign who guarantees internal peace within the realm. At the 
same time, the violation of law becomes a criminal deed and consigned to 
the courts, while war finds itself projected outwards onto disputes between 
states, which in doing so establishes the jus ad bellum of international 
European society (Schmitt, 2003; Bull, 1977). Foucault stresses how the 
‘statalization’ of an act of war implies that ‘the immediate effect of this 
state monopoly was that what might be called day- to-day warfare, and 
what was actually called “private warfare”, was eradicated from the social 
body and from relations among men and relations among groups’ 
(Foucault, 1995: 48). It is in the context of the statalization of war and its 
exclusive projection over interstate competition that, according to 
Foucault, a contrary historical- political discourse arises, centred around 
the permanence of war and the establishment of peace within the borders 
of the royal state, which acts as the ‘ineradicable basis of all relations and 
institutions of power’ (ibid.: 49). Hence, in contrast to the monism of the 
theory of sovereignty, in which the dimension of war is displaced from the 
infrastate space only to re- emerge in the ‘state of nature’ of international 
anarchy, there instead exists a binary vision of social reality, marked by 
the incessant struggle, manifested in different forms, between two fronts 
for which war has never ended.
 Significantly, the Foucaultian genealogical inquiry interprets various 
nineteenth- and twentieth- century perspectives, especially Marxism and 
racism, as derivations of the historical- political discourse, which, in opposi-
tion to the liberal vision of the contract and the composition of individual 
and collective interests, propose a representation of social reality in terms of 
latent war, zero sum games, or, to use a concept of Clausewitz, ‘polarity’ 
between classes and races. As such, it is no coincidence that the temptation 
arises, explicitly or implicitly, to invert the formula. Take, for example, the 
rival positions of Ludendorff and Lenin. For the former, the dimension of 
total war ousts the primacy of politics and puts it at the service of war. For 
the latter, on the other hand, it is the exclusive positioning of war in the 
space of interstate relations that enters into crisis. Indeed, a far more radical 
fault line intersects the various fronts of the inter- imperialist war and cuts 
across the geography of state borders: that of class conflict.
 The reference to Marxism brings us back to one of the principal sub-
texts of the archaeological digressions in Society Must Be Defended. As 
confirmation of this reading, one could cite the various declarations con-
tained in ‘minor’ texts written around the year 1976, in which Foucault 
criticizes the traditional Marxist approach to the concept of ‘class strug-
gle’ for privileging ‘class’ and overlooking questions connected with strug-
gle. This, he argued, had led Marxism to seek solutions in the sociology of 
social class or to rely on the optimism of the philosophy of history and 
dialectics (Foucault, 1994: 268, 310–311). In this context, reversing 
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Clausewitz means, first of all, reacting to the neutralization of ‘internal’ 
conflict implicit in the projection of war over international space. Politics, 
over and above the adjectives that might be used to describe it, is the con-
tinuation of war with other means, to the extent that every relation of 
power rests on an agonal basis and on the exertion of a local power rela-
tionship. A study that might appear little more than an erudite exercise 
ultimately reveals a political intentio directly linked to the contemporary 
situation. This same dispute – more with Marxism than with Marx 
himself – resonates with the political and ideological climate of the 1970s, 
and the events and debates that directly involved Foucault as a militant, 
from the foundation of the university at Vincennes to the Prison Informa-
tion Group (GIP) (Eribon, 1991: 214–313). Set against such a backdrop, 
the re- problematization of the concept of power, then at the centre of 
Foucault’s theoretical engagement, acquires not only an intellectual but 
also a practical value, in the prospect of a renewal of the scenarios of 
political action. As a result, one returns to the question of the analysis of 
power. It is from here that Foucault had embarked to arrive at the theme 
of war, and the study of an ‘antecedent’ alternative to the contract as the 
cipher to an approach to power that is irreducible to models of 
sovereignty. Such a perspective was then abandoned. Over the following 
years, other questions, in particular the government of others and of the 
self, would become the privileged objects of research. A determining role 
in this shift was, without doubt, the new direction in Foucault’s militant 
politics. Remaining at a theoretical level, however, Vincenzo Sorrentino is 
right to point out how the assumption of the paradigm of war in the 
ana lysis of power relations actually leads to an impasse, about which 
Foucault appears to be clearly mindful (Sorrentino, 2008: 76–86). While 
connecting every kind of power relationship with war was surely sugges-
tive as a theoretical gesture, this was evidently exposed to the risk of sim-
plification, which was unable to fully comprehend the multiple ways in 
which power relations are manifested; subsequently compressing violent 
coercion and government, intersubjectivity and institutional relations, pol-
itics and war onto a single register.
Deleuze and Guattari
The underlying project that runs through Anti- Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus is to make world history delirious (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977, 
1987). Deleuze and Guattari’s discourse develops along a wide set of time 
scales, where the national–international order, the sole focus of the 
Foucaultian analysis, constitutes just one element among others. The places 
and times in which the reversal of Clausewitz’s formula is ‘set’ are con-
sequently very different. The ‘plot’ has two principal protagonists: the 
apparatus of capture (or state) and the nomadic war machine, two differ-
ent concatenations caught in the intrinsic instability of their relations.
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 For Deleuze and Guattari, the war machine – a composition of men, arms 
and animals – is an invention of nomads. The state, as such, does not possess 
war among its functions. This it must subtract from the nomads; capturing 
their machines and transforming them into something quite different: an 
army and a military function. The great kingdoms that had appeared to 
emerge from almost nowhere at the dawn of history in Egypt, Mesopotamia, 
Crete and India were overwhelmed by the sudden invasion of hordes armed 
with longbows and chariots – the Hyksos, Hurrians, Kassites, Hittites, 
Aryans, Mycenaeans and Scythians – against whom the kingdoms and 
empires proved powerless. Learning the lesson, they assimilated the nomads’ 
innovations so as to in turn equip themselves with a military potential.
 In Deleuze and Guattari, the capture of the war machine and its military 
institutionalization, however, did not proceed in a linear way or acquire a 
complete and definite form, but turned out to be an open and reversible 
process that was continually traversed by tensions. This was because the war 
machine and the apparatus of capture depended upon different sets of logic. 
The war machine was an invention of nomads: it was their way of occupy-
ing the space of the desert and did not necessarily have anything to do with 
war. Or better, it was correlated in exclusive terms to war only when it was 
appropriated by a state apparatus. The war machine is therefore not defined 
by war (which it instead encounters the moment its movement clashes with 
the striations that sedentary peoples have placed in its path), but by the 
means in which the nomads are distributed and structured in the smooth 
space of the desert (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 417). To understand the 
sense of the discourse developed by Deleuze and Guattari around this 
matter, it is perhaps useful to recall a well- known passage of Vom Kriege in 
which Clausewitz underlines, in rigid sequential order, how the decision of 
war rests with the defender and not the attacker because the latter would be 
more than glad not to meet with any resistance and sweep straight towards 
the realization of its goals (Clausewitz, 1976: 377).
 The incorporation of the war function by the state, which can take on 
different forms (the recourse to mercenaries or a territorial militia, con-
scription or a professional army), proceeds from a specific operation that 
denaturalizes the war machine – originally aimed at occupying the space of 
the desert and encountering combat only through chance contact with the 
striations that block its path – by making war its exclusive objective. In the 
words of Deleuze and Guattari:
It is precisely after the war machine has been appropriated by the state 
[. . .] that it tends to take war for its direct and primary objective, for 
its ‘analytic’ object (and that war tends to take battle for its objective). 
In short, it is at one and the same time that the state apparatus appro-
priates a war machine, that the war machine takes war as its objective, 
and war becomes subjugated to the purposes of the state.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 418)
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According to Clausewitz’s choice of language, this would be seen to be 
the subjugation of war to politics, which establishes the objectives and 
confides their accomplishment to military action. This introduces one of 
the most controversial themes of the Prussian general’s thought: namely 
the concept of absolute war, an act of force performed without a solution 
of continuity until the accomplishment of the objective that, according to 
the ‘logic of the concept’, should characterize the activity of war (Clause-
witz, 1976: 579–581). The critical literature has dwelt widely on this 
question, starting with the often inconsistent observations made by 
Clausewitz himself, which oscillate between depicting absolute war as a 
logical- theoretical hypothesis, whose practical realization is impeded by 
the pressure of material and political circumstances and seeing it as an 
extreme case that can nevertheless materialize, as his references to the 
Napoleonic campaign demonstrate. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, 
consider this problem in light of the structural differences between the 
war machine and the regulation of war according to the political objec-
tives of the state:
The distinction between absolute war as idea and real war seems to us 
to be of great importance, but only if a different criterion than that of 
Clausewitz is applied. The pure idea is not that of the abstract elimina-
tion of the adversary but that of a war machine that does not have war 
as its objective and that only entertains a potential or supplementary 
synthetic relation with war. Thus the nomad war machine does not 
appear to us to be one case of real war among others, as in Clausewitz, 
but on the contrary the content adequate to the idea.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 420)
Thus, the Clausewitzian maxim according to which ‘war is merely the con-
tinuation of politics by other means’ should be read less as a statement 
than as a normative assumption about the means by which the war 
machine is incorporated into the state apparatus, with politics forming the 
frame in which military action takes place. From a similar point of view, it 
is significant that Clausewitz should identify in the people’s war of Napo-
leon, and in an army that assumed the features of a machine able to sustain 
itself on the ‘fuel of nationalism’, the element of rupture that seemed to 
lead the logical- deductive scheme of ‘absolute war’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 
579–581) to its concrete realization (De Landa, 1991). War would, there-
fore, appear to represent a flow that states are only partially able to appro-
priate; subjugating its objectives and the destruction of the adversary to the 
aims of their political project.
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, ‘when total war becomes 
the objective of the appropriated war machine [. . .] the objective and the 
aim enter in new relations that can reach the point of contradiction’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 421). From here derives the ambivalent 
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attitude of the author of Vom Krieg towards absolute war and its possible 
realization during the Napoleonic wars:
This explains Clausewitz’s vacillations when he asserts at one point 
that total war remains a war conditioned by the political aim of state, 
and at another that it tends to effectuate the idea of unconditioned 
war. In effect, the aims remain essentially political and determined as 
such by the state, but the objective itself has become unlimited. We 
could say that the appropriation had changed direction, or rather that 
states tend to unleash, reconstitute, an immense war machine of which 
they are no longer anything more than the opposable or apposed 
parts.
(Ibid.)
And so the state, after having seized control of the war machine, finds 
itself facing a sort of return effect that sees it submit to the object which 
it had appropriated and which, exceeding the function assigned to it, 
takes on the form of total war, considered not simply as a war of annihi-
lation but as a conflict that transcends military decisions and the rules of 
the game to involve the whole of society. In order to identify the decisive 
shifts that mark the appropriation of the state by the war machine, 
Deleuze and Guattari focus their attention on historic forms of fascism 
and the Cold War. In the case of fascism, they underline how war, even 
when nominally subjugated to political purposes of an imperial nature, 
assumes ‘an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself ’ (ibid.). 
Another key moment is represented by the bipolar order of the Cold 
War, in which a planetary war machine pursues the peace of ‘survival’ 
and ‘terror’ as its objective. In considering the balance of mutual destruc-
tion, Deleuze and Guattari tend not to dramatize the contending ele-
ments between the two blocks so as to underline the functional 
convergence which leads to the seizure of a single war machine over the 
entire globe.
 To summarize, the state appropriates the war machine, to which it 
attributes the exclusive ends of war, subjugating this to its own political 
purposes. And so here we encounter Clausewitz’s formula: ‘War is merely 
the continuation of politics by other means.’ Napoleon and the people’s 
war through patriotic and nationalist mobilization remains within such a 
paradigm, even if the consistency with which the objective (Ziel) is pursued 
short- circuits the prescriptive and command function of the political aim 
(Zweck). Albeit with some hesitations, Clausewitz hence speaks of abso-
lute war. The increasing integration between war and economy, which in 
the following century leads to ‘materialized war’, marks a deep shift in the 
dimension of war. We are in the arena of total war and mobilization, 
which instigate an overall reorganization, starting from military needs, of 
social, political and economic relations:
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The various factors that tended to make a ‘total war’, most notably 
the fascist factor, marked the beginning of an inversion of the move-
ment: as though the states, through the war they waged against one 
another, had after a long period of appropriation reconstituted an 
autonomous war machine.
(Ibid.: 466–467)
Up to this point, however, the Clausewitzian maxim seems to conserve a 
minimum of descriptive capacity, because ‘fascist war still fell under 
Clausewitz’s formula “the continuation of politics by other means” even 
though those other means had become exclusive, in other words, the polit-
ical purpose had entered into contradiction with the ends’ (ibid.: 467). Out 
of this arises the concept of ‘suicide state’, coined by Paul Virilio in 
reference to the Nazi experience (Virilio, 2006). In contrast, it is possible 
to speak of a true inversion of the formula in the situation that arises fol-
lowing the end of the Second World War, with the balance between terror 
and deterrence. The objective of the war machine at this point is no longer 
war but peace, whereby it absorbs, in keeping with the terminology of the 
Prussian general, the aim (Zweck), or rather, the component of political 
command:
This is where the inversion of Clauewitz’s formula comes in: it is 
politics that becomes the continuation of war; it is peace that techno-
logically frees the unlimited material process of total war. War ceases 
to be the materialization of the war machine; the war machine itself 
becomes materialized war.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 645)
According to Deleuze and Guattari, in the bipolar world order the war 
machine is reorganized so as to assume, over and above the oppositions 
between the two sides, the entire globe as a smooth space. The flow of 
absolute war which had been appropriated by states and subjugated to 
political aims seeps out from the limits assigned to it as a military function 
– the subjugation of the objectives to the aims – and is reconstructed as a 
war machine:
The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, 
to surround the entire earth. Total war itself is surpassed, toward a 
form of peace more terrifying still. The war machine has taken charge 
of the aim, worldwide order, and the states are now no more than 
objects or means adapted to that machine. This is the point at which 
Clausewitz’s formula is effectively reversed; to be entitled to say that 
politics is the continuation of war by other means, it is not enough to 
invert the order of the words as if they could be spoken in either direc-
tion; it is necessary to follow the real movement at the conclusion of 
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which the states, having appropriated a war machine, and having 
adapted it to their aims, reimpart a war machine that takes charge of 
the aim, appropriated the states, and assumes increasingly wider polit-
ical functions.
(Ibid.: 421)
Evidently, many of these reflections not only appear to refer to the recent 
past but can in many ways also be extended to the unipolar context, in 
both its soft and hard phases, which characterizes the change in scenario 
that occurred following the end of the Cold War. What appears even more 
topical are the observations about the materialization of a system of 
organized insecurity and the figure of ‘the common enemy’ who, having 
emerged during the previous geopolitical configuration, seems today to 
establish its functionality with ever greater clarity (ibid.: 422).
Raymond Aron
In 1976, the same year in which Foucault gave his course Society Must Be 
Defended, Aron’s two volumes of Penser la guerre: Clausewitz (in English, 
Clausewitz: Philosopher of War) were published with the respective titles 
L’Âge éuropéenne and l’Âge planétaire. In them, Aron engages in a herme-
neutic bout with Clausewitz’s text and, in particular, with the interpreta-
tions of the Prussian general’s work over the subsequent course of history. 
This inevitably leads him to question the meaning of the ‘formula’ and, 
obviously, the possibility and/or necessity of reversing it. For his part, Aron 
is absolutely categorical in opposing any reversal. There are two reasons 
for this. To start with, if the Clausewitzian conceptual framework is faith-
fully followed and correctly understood, then there can be no room to 
attest the reversibility of the two terms of the formula. War is an instru-
ment of politics, which it uses to achieve its own aims. In contrast, politics 
can never be at the service of war in so much as the objective cannot in any 
way be subordinate to the means. The other reason why Aron is particu-
larly critical about the periodic practice of inverting the formula goes far 
beyond the realm of philology and links with the desire of arriving at an 
adequate understanding of current political events and the relations 
between states.
 Aron reiterates the need to clearly discriminate between war and peace, 
and particularly disputes those positions that would see the Cold War as 
representing a sort of intermediate situation between the two terms. 
However, despite his efforts, the formulation of clear and unequivocal cri-
teria to distinguish war from peace proves to be very problematic. The 
resort to violence organized through the armed forces against another state 
is identified as the distinction that, once crossed, makes it legitimate to talk 
about war. For such a principle to be confirmed, it is necessary first of all 
to take a position regarding the claim that violence cannot be limited to 
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the sphere of physical coercion. On this regard, Aron critically considers 
the concept of ‘symbolic violence’ proposed by Pierre Bourdieu, which he 
sums up as follows:
It consists of imposing conceptual frameworks and moral norms, arbi-
trary because they vary from society to society, on members of society 
and particularly on the very young. To impose ideas, beliefs, and ways 
of living and acting that are called habitus (‘ethos’ in Weber’s termi-
nology) is said to be violence.
(Aron, 1983: 393; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970)
Such a perspective is judged by Aron to be unacceptable in that it compro-
mises the possibility of distinguishing between socialization, which inevitably 
refers to the influence of the group upon the individual, ‘and the constraint, 
which presupposes conscious or other kinds of resistance by those in power’ 
(Aron, 1983: 393). In the same way, theories invariably defined as sociologi-
cal are criticized for their tendency to read all asymmetric relations, at both 
an infrastate and an international level and including those of an economic 
or cultural character, in terms of violence, so as to allow for a distinction 
between the dominated and the dominant. For Aron, such broad interpreta-
tions empty the concept of violence of any specificity, rendering it de facto 
applicable to any type of reality: ‘If we regard as “violent” any social order 
which we call inequitable or against which part of the dominated element 
revolts, violence cannot then be conceptually grasped by virtue of its ubiq-
uity’ (ibid.: 395). At this point, the ‘inversion of the Formula is thus made 
out to be self- evident’ (ibid.). Against this position, Aron leans decisively 
towards a definition of violence that refers solely to the dimension of 
physical coercion and, it could be added, to the organized form of its mili-
tary projection in an international dimension. As such, he emphasizes the 
need not to equate conflict with war, as tends to happen in the strategic 
thinking of the United States. Various dynamics of conflict can exist between 
states without this signifying the move to a situation of war. However, Aron 
does not say anything precise about the distinction that allows one to talk 
about war, besides recourse to stock phrases such as the ‘military use of 
force’ or the implicit reference to conventions that authorize the beginning 
and the end of hostilities. Rather, he limits himself to underlining how the 
boundary that distinguishes war and peace has demonstrated a degree of 
mobility over the course of time, as have the means through which states 
seek to exert pressure on one another also during times of peace (ibid.: 389). 
On the basis of such an approach, Aron cannot but assert that there is no 
war in progress between the United States and the Soviet Union. Certainly, 
conflict exists between the superpowers in a number of areas, although these 
are accompanied by convergences in other spheres – for example, the pre-
vention of nuclear conflict. Therefore, the resort to propaganda and covert 
actions as well as proxy wars fought in peripheral zones, besides represent-
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ing nothing new with respect, for example, to the forms of military 
command that have historically underpinned the European balance of 
power, also denies the very idea that the United States and the Soviet Union 
are at war or engaged in a condition that is ‘different from peace’.
 Aron contemplates the prospect of a possible restoration of international 
society and a system characterized by a threshold of homogeneity that, fol-
lowing the turmoil of the twentieth century, is able to guarantee the mutual 
recognition of the unanimity and effectiveness of distinctions between, for 
instance, inside and outside, war and peace, military and civilian. Over and 
above the philological approach to Clausewitz’s work or the critical observa-
tions regarding the broad use of the concept of violence and the equation 
between war and conflict, we need to understand Aron’s steadfast opposition 
to ‘reversing the formula’ as reflecting his insistence to safeguard a formal 
setting that establishes the possible conditions of differentiating between war 
and peace and between internal politics and foreign policy. The aim is cer-
tainly not to remove war from the relations between states but rather, at least 
at an implicit level, to suggest a possible restoration, under new conditions, of 
a jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The fact that war is monopolized by units 
(i.e. states) that mutually recognize each other and do not manifest any 
designs to annihilate one other, and which enter into conflict for limited 
political stakes against a background of a common interest of maintaining an 
international system of shared rules, is considered an element of order that 
not only provides the basis for clear and evident distinctions but also limits 
the ubiquitous distribution of violence through it being ‘turned into form’.
 Within the context of the Cold War, Aron strives, as we have seen, to 
reaffirm the irreversibility of the relationship between politics and war. 
This presupposes a clear distinction between internal and external dimen-
sions, the delimitation of subjects entitled to jus ad bellum, and the possi-
bility of establishing a parallel between ‘war as action’ and ‘war as state’ 
(to draw on the concepts of Carl Schmitt); that is, on the one hand, 
between the materiality of the forms of combat and the distribution of 
violence and, on the other, the normative framework that fixes war spa-
tially and temporally and defines the means of establishing peace (Schmitt, 
2007: 195–203). This is what is at stake when we reverse the formula. Do 
new weapons (in particular nuclear arsenal), the spread of irregular forms 
of combat, the dissemination of ideological fault lines beyond the borders 
of the nation- state and the development of supranational organizations 
generate a ‘war as action’ that can be brought within the parameters of a 
‘war as state’? Aron is convinced that this is the case, demonstrated by the 
resoluteness with which he opposes all attempts to reverse the ‘formula’. 
However, when it comes to delineating the features that distinguish war 
from other forms of violence, Aron’s discourse becomes uncertain, and his 
reference to the evident state of things, far from fulfilling this objective, 
indicates the inevitable problems of projecting pre- twentieth-century 
models of international society onto a changed historical context.
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Reversing Clausewitz?
In answer to the question whether it is legitimate, or opportune, to reverse 
the formula of Clausewitz, which sees war to be the continuation of 
politics by other means, the positions of the thinkers examined here can be 
swiftly summarized as follows: Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari both 
respond affirmatively, while Aron is adamantly opposed.
 Foucault confronts the formula in a research project that aims to identify, 
within the tradition of modernity, a means of thinking about political order 
that provides an alternative to the one centred on the neutralization of con-
flict, which Foucault considers typical of traditional ‘legal- philosophical’ solu-
tions. Reversing Clausewitz, in this context, implies insisting on the warlike 
character of power relations, seeing in the watermark of peace the signs of a 
war that has never ended, and recognizing that politics operates according to 
other means by affixing the real dynamics of submission and subjugation in 
the apparent neutrality of institutions and procedures. In such a perspective, 
inverting Clausewitz means first and foremost shifting the Prussian general’s 
maxim from the interstate context in which it was originally situated to an 
internal dimension, and to locate the basis of power relations and the centre 
of gravity of political action in conflict and not in its neutralization.
 In contrast, for Deleuze and Guattari, Clausewitz is not a pretext but a 
privileged interlocutor. The explicit and implicit references to Vom Kriege 
signal counterpoints to the parts of Thousand Plateaus dedicated to the war 
machine and the apparatus of capture. Inverting Clausewitz means projecting 
the models of the Prussian general, obviously reinterpreted in the light of their 
‘radical’ theoretical hypotheses, onto world history up until the political, 
social and technological developments of the twentieth century. In this 
perspective, the war machine appears to take on the form of a concatenation 
which passes through centuries and millennia, becoming interconnected in 
different and instable forms with the state apparatuses. Such a formulation 
proves to be decidedly less conditioned by references to the forms, spatiality 
and oppositions (internal–external, military–civil, etc.) of political modernity 
than the one adopted by Foucault. This is the ‘prophetic’ character of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis with respect to the contemporary era: for 
while it is calibrated to the preceding context of the Cold War, it is neverthe-
less able to capture, beneath the continuity of old forms, the effectiveness of 
powerful processes of integration, the redesign of planetary orders and new 
combinations of smooth and striated spaces.
 Aron, for his part, tackles the formula in an extensive study that is specifi-
cally dedicated to Clausewitz. The assertion that politics is the continuation 
of war with other means is a theoretical move that is deemed by Aron to be 
both philologically incorrect and politically dangerous. In his opinion, enter-
taining such a proposition means jeopardizing a whole regulatory spatiality – 
that of an international society centred on states – to which he sees no 
possible alternative or, at least, one that is desirable. If the formula is reversed 
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according to the position of Lenin, thus following a path in many ways 
analogous to the one sketched out by Foucault, and the root of infrastate pol-
itics is to be found in war itself and not in the overcoming of war, then it is 
‘the national unity’ that disappears (Aron, 1983: 270), or better, the idea of a 
pacified space within specific borders characterized by the sovereign authori-
ty’s monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence. The relations between 
different states, in contrast, are specifically characterized by the fact that – to 
adopt a formula from Peace and War. A Theory of International Relations – 
‘they take place within the shadow of war’ (Aron, 1966: 6). However, Aron 
adds immediately afterwards that ‘to use a most rigorous expression, rela-
tions among states involve, in essence, the alternative of war and peace’ 
(ibid.), as demonstrated by the fact that at international level the figure of the 
soldier is flanked by that of the diplomat. It is here that Aron guards us 
against a second approach to reversing the formula; namely, the elimination 
of every distinction between war and peace whereby the latter is merely seen 
to be ‘war conducted by other means’ and interstate relations are represented 
exclusively in agonistic terms. This method of ‘reversal’ possesses various 
inflections. For example, in the position that leads from Ludendorff to Hitler, 
‘the relationship between states is defined by hostility even when it is not 
expressed through the taking up of arms’ (Aron, 1983: 278). In a different 
register, the theoreticians of the United States’ policy of deterrence are also 
accused of dissolving the distinction between war and peace by the way in 
which their complex theoretical dispositives lead to a proliferation of inter-
mediate grades between the two terms.
 Aron’s categorical opposition to any reversal of the formula therefore 
brings the discussion back to the need to preserve some key distinctions – 
internal–external, peace–war, political–military – considered fundamental 
to contain and rationalize the distribution of violence, through the restora-
tion of an international society. Such an endeavour could be accused of 
indulging in nostalgia. It is easy to recognize the theoretical difficulties that 
it comes up against, the moment that it has to pass from criticism to posi-
tively setting forth the parameters in which to establish, for example, the 
distinction between war and peace. The developments that have occurred 
in the decades following Aron’s work only seem to further accentuate the 
anachronistic nature of his formulations. This said, it is striking how many 
attempts are still made to rekindle categories and distinctions that have 
long been considered unable to account for the dynamics of the present; as 
if it were impossible to do away with them, even if this perhaps means 
reframing them in negative terms.
 Translation by Nick Dines.
Note
1 For a discussion of war in Hobbes, see Y.C. Zarka (2001: 127–145).
5 Global war and technoscience
Luca Guzzetti
In this chapter that reviews the relations between technoscientific research 
and the military after the Second World War, I will mainly focus on the 
United States. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the US has 
been one of the two military superpowers in the postwar period and is now 
the only superpower left. According to Defense News (9 February 2009), 
the overall Department of Defense budget for 2008 was equal to US$676 
billion, while China, the second highest spender in defence, spent US$85 
billion a year. The current US Department of Defense budget is 20 per cent 
higher in constant dollars than its top budget during the Cold War, for an 
army with a third fewer soldiers. That larger budget with fewer soldiers is 
mostly justified by the costs of research, development and procurement of 
new high- technology armaments. The second reason for focusing on the 
US is that, with the possible exception of the years just after the launch of 
Sputnik by the Soviet Union, it has always led the technological race, both 
in the civil and in the military sector. Today, the United States alone invests 
more than half of what is spent by all countries worldwide on military 
research (James, 2009).
The military–industrial–academic complex
The Second World War radically transformed the research system by fos-
tering ‘big science’, especially in physics, with its large machines and huge 
economic investments, and marrying science and technology, creating what 
is now known as technoscience. The Manhattan project was the best 
example of what the military wanted: mission- directed research, where the 
disciplinary boundaries are of no interest at all. A series of very abstract 
physical ideas were very quickly transformed – by an ‘army’ of mathemati-
cians, physicists, chemists, material scientists, engineers, technicians and 
whoever else could be needed – into the atomic bomb, a very innovative 
military device and the most powerful and destructive instrument of war 
of all times. The new great prestige assumed by science in the second half 
of the twentieth century clearly depended on the development of the 
atomic bomb. Politicians, military men and common people alike had to 
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admit that scientists were really able to control and transform the world – 
making the dream of the natural philosophers come true – since they had 
invented an instrument capable of blowing it up. Granted that wars have 
always accelerated the development of new technologies, this was espe-
cially the case during the Second World War, which gave a major impulse 
to the development of three ‘families’ of technologies: destructive devices, 
such as the atomic bomb; means of transporting such devices, such as mis-
siles (V2s), bombers and navigational devices; and information technolo-
gies – first and foremost, the radar. Although the radical destructivity of 
the bomb prevented its use in a direct, ‘hot’ war between the two super-
powers, both nuclear technologies and missile technologies continued to 
develop, orienting themselves towards mostly civil uses: nuclear energy and 
space technologies. Of course, satellites have later been used for military 
surveillance as well and the superpowers have tried to use space for further 
military applications (Sebesta and Pigliacelli, 2008).
 In his often quoted 17 January 1961 ‘Farewell Address’, American Pres-
ident Dwight D. Eisenhower warned his countrymen of the risks arising 
from what he called the military- industrial complex: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large 
arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – 
economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State 
house, every office of the Federal government. [. . .] In the councils of 
government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military- industrial 
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power 
exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combina-
tion endanger our liberties or democratic processes.
(Quoted in Lens, 1970)
This part of the discourse is very well known but, immediately afterwards, 
Eisenhower continued, citing a third component of the ‘complex’, what we 
now call technoscience: 
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our 
industrial- military posture, has been the technological revolution 
during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; 
it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily 
increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal 
government. [. . .] Partly because of the huge costs involved, a govern-
ment contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. 
[. . .] The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal 
employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever 
present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research 
and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the 
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equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the 
captive of a scientific- technological elite.
(Quoted in Greenberg, 1967)
Responding to the shocked reactions of scientists who were not expecting 
such accusations from a pro- business Republican president and five- star 
general, Eisenhower explained – through his Special Assistant for Science 
and Technology, George B. Kistiakowsky, who had worked on the Man-
hattan project – that he was not talking about science in general, but only 
about scientists who took part in military projects (Price, 1965). But 
already in 1961 it was not easy to distinguish between scientists working 
for military purposes, from scientists who thought they weren’t contribut-
ing to war technologies. Such a melange between science and the military 
had been joyfully recognized and favoured by many in the United States 
at the end of the Second World War. For instance, the secretary of war in 
October 1945 had said: ‘Since the laboratories of America have now 
become our first line of defence, I cannot make too strong or too 
emphatic, the interest of the War Department in the promotion of scient-
ific research and development for new weapons’ (quoted in Forman, 1987: 
156). And Eisenhower himself as the army’s chief of staff had written in 
1946:
Scientists and businessmen contributed techniques and weapons which 
enabled us to outwit and overwhelm the enemy. [. . .] Scientists and 
industrialists must be given the greatest possible freedom to carry out 
their research. [. . .] Scientists and industrialists are more likely to make 
new and unsuspected contributions to the development of the Army if 
detailed instructions are held to a minimum.
(Quoted in Greenberg, 1967)
The Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) was closed up 
right after the war by its director, Vannevar Bush, who considered it an 
emergency instrument, but major Federal research centres were created 
that were mostly run by academic institutions. This is the case of the MIT’s 
Lincoln Laboratory for the development of aircrafts, founded in 1951, of 
the Stanford Research Institute for research on electronic communication, 
founded in 1946, and of Berkeley’s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for 
R&D on nuclear weapons, founded in 1952.1 In general, the Federal gov-
ernment decided to ‘outsource’ military research to universities and busi-
ness firms under contractual arrangements. Academic institutions seemed 
quite ready to continue to participate in the war effort, although the war 
had become of a different genre, the Cold War having started. Besides the 
patriotic declarations about the need for academic institutions to contrib-
ute to the new war effort, what must be considered is that the most reliable 
supporter of science and technology was the defence establishment. While 
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the appropriations for civil R&D in Congress found a lot of obstacles and 
the allocation of a few thousand dollars needed long debates, the military 
would not hesitate to divert substantial sums to help research in universi-
ties. In fact, through the 1950s, for instance, the only significant sources of 
funds for academic physical research in the US were the Department of 
Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, whose mission was mostly 
military.
 At the beginning of his presidency, Eisenhower tried to reduce defence 
spending, but the launch by the Soviet Union of the Sputnik in 1957 made 
the demand curve go upward again and, when his second mandate ended, 
the expenditure for research and development had become four times 
higher (Price, 1965). Big investments by the Federal governments were 
made through a new agency called ARPA (Advanced Research Project 
Agency), which would later be more precisely renamed DARPA, with 
‘Defense’ at the beginning of the name: 
The agency was started in 1957 after the Soviets stunned and embar-
rassed the United States by launching the Sputnik satellite. President 
Eisenhower worried that America was loosing the science arms race 
and set up an agency so that the United States would never again be 
surprised by the technology of foreign powers.
(Singer, 2009: 140)
The point was that the launch of the satellite demonstrated that the Soviets 
possessed the rockets and the guidance devices for intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, capable of delivering atomic bombs over the US territory – while 
America continued to rely on bombers. 
The chief military advantage of the ballistic missile is its speed and the 
consequent extreme difficulty of defending against it. From launch 
point in the United States to target in the Soviet Union, or vice versa, 
takes thirty minutes or less, as distinct from several hours for even the 
fastest bomber or cruise missile. The final plunge of a ballistic missile 
warhead back from space through the atmosphere to its target – the 
period when defence of the target might seem most plausible – takes 
on the order of a couple of minutes.
 (Mackenzie, 1990: 15)
Also as a result of the Cold War and the launch of Sputnik, Congress 
passed the National Defence Education Act, to support the graduate educa-
tion of increasingly larger numbers of scientists and engineers, particularly 
in the physical sciences. The effects of that legislation were unmistakable; 
in the seven years between 1960 and 1967, the number of doctorates 
granted by American universities in science and engineering more than 
doubled, from 6,000 to 13,000. The historian Daniel J. Kevles has esti-
mated that, in 1969, one third of the 132,000 science and engineering 
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graduate students in the United States were being funded by the federal 
government. Fostering competition in certain scientific and technical 
domains – particle physics, aeronautical engineering, rocketry, microelec-
tronics – became part of the nation’s international and defence strategy 
(Kevles, 1978). And preservation of tacit knowledge, of scientific and 
technological know- how for future military uses, was one of the objectives 
of the huge public investment in education in the United States: ‘Their 
interest in “basic” research was primarily as a means for creating new tech-
niques, and secondarily as a means for maintaining contact with persons 
possessing intellectual abilities that could be turned to the advantage of the 
military services’ (Forman, 1987: 220).
 Furthermore, it is important to remember that military research and 
development were not carried out only in universities and public research 
centres, but in corporate enterprises as well. The state ‘conscripted’ both 
industry and the universities: 
Overall, DOD accounted for about a third of all industrial R&D 
spending in those years, but in defence- dependent sectors such as elec-
tronics and aerospace it was closer to three- quarters. Similarly, defence 
contractors employed (and continue to employ) something like a 
quarter of the nation’s electrical engineers and a third of the physicists 
and mathematicians.
 (Leslie, 1993: 2) 
Many companies, seeing the money flooding into some sectors of R&D, 
began opening research facilities, precisely to attract government funds. 
And people who had been consultants to the Pentagon formed their own 
companies for the purpose of conducting federally public- funded research. 
This is the case, for instance, of the RAND Corporation, originally estab-
lished under the auspices of the Federal government to provide new 
systems of arms and strategic studies to the Air Force.
 During the Cold War, secret military weapons development and well- 
publicized engineering feats that enhanced national prestige were strictly 
intermingled; and if the ballistic missiles, for instance, had been created to 
deliver nuclear weapons, they were later transformed into space rockets in 
the ‘pacific’ technological race with the USSR, and then the satellites put in 
orbit by the rockets were used for military ends. ‘Military satellites have 
come to perform functions as varied as early warning against missile 
attack, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorology, and geodesy. 
They proved to be major factors in maintaining nuclear stability during the 
Cold War’ (Hacker, 2006: 156–157). This mix of military and civil pur-
poses, the dual uses of most new technologies, was recognized when the 
first statistics regarding research and development were devised in the 
1960s: 
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The OECD statistics group together military, space and nuclear expen-
ditures under the heading ‘national security and prestige’. These cat-
egories are also often referred to as ‘big science’ and ‘big technology’. 
[. . .] There is an important sense in which the grouping together of 
military, nuclear and space programmes, at any rate in the 1950s and 
1960s, may be justified. All of them depended almost exclusively on 
public funds during this period; all of them were heavily if not exclu-
sively influenced by considerations of national security and prestige; 
and all of them involved special institutions to control and operate the 
programmes, usually of the ‘big’ variety.
(Freeman, 1974: 289, 291) 
The military- industrial-academic complex, both in the US and in the USSR, 
worked on the development of new military technologies, but the incapac-
ity by the USSR to have dual uses of such technologies has probably been 
an important factor in its collapse.
 Senator J. William Fulbright – who added the term ‘academic’ to the 
‘military- industrial complex’ expression – once said: 
When the university turns away from its central purpose and makes 
itself an appendage to the Government, concerning itself with tech-
niques rather than purposes, with expedients rather than ideas, dis-
pensing conventional orthodoxy rather than new ideas, it is not only 
failing to meet its responsibilities to its students; it is betraying a public 
trust.
(Quoted in Leslie, 1993: 13) 
Nonetheless, after the public discussions among the physicists, especially in 
the 1950s and 1960s, on the opportunity of participating in military 
research, further developing the nuclear weapons (Steinberger, 2005), and 
after the contrasts in the 1980s on the space defence initiative, better 
known as Star Wars, and on the necessity of continuing the nuclear 
weapons tests (Hill, 1995; Gusterson, 1996), in more recent years only few 
individual researchers in the United States seem to have decided not to 
participate in military- funded research. Opposition to military funding has 
not even emerged in the community of computer programmers and 
hackers, who espouse a new- age philosophy based on free flow of informa-
tion, decentralization and computer democracy: 
Almost everyone else, even people who opposed the war, recognized 
that ARPA money was the lifeblood of the hacking way of life. When 
someone pointed out the obvious – that the Defense Department 
might not have asked for specific military applications for the Artifi-
cial Intelligence and systems work being done, but still expected a 
bonanza of military applications to come from the work (who was to 
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say that all that ‘interesting’ work in vision and robotics would not 
result in more efficient bombing raids?) – [the hackers would deny the 
‘obvious’].
(Levy, 1984: 131)
Benjamin Kuipers, a computer scientist, explained how the involvement 
with the military may evolve among researchers who may have never 
thought to collaborate in military projects: 
However there is a slippery slope that I have seen in the careers of a 
number of colleagues. You start work on a project that is completely 
fine. Then, when renewal time comes, and you have students depend-
ing on you for support, your program officer says that they can con-
tinue to fund the same work, but now you need to phrase the 
proposal using an example in a military setting. Same research, but 
just use different language to talk about it. OK. Then, when the time 
comes for the next renewal, the pure research money is running a bit 
low, but they can still support your lab, if you can work on some 
applications that are really needed by the military application. OK. 
Then, for the next round, you need to make regular visits to the mili-
tary commanders, convincing them that your innovation will really 
help them in the field. And so on. By the end of a decade or two, you 
have become a different person from the one you were previously. 
You look back at your younger self, shake your head, and think, 
‘How naive’. 
(Quoted in Singer, 2009: 172)
Summing up, we may say that, in the US since the Second World War, civil 
and military research has come to be part of a unified system, largely 
directed and financed by the Federal government: in other words, the 
research system has been fundamentally militarized. 
Indeed, any reasonable foreign observer would be obliged to conclude 
that we have socialized our science, at best in a fit of absence of mind, 
and at worst with the purpose of subordinating it to the purposes of 
military power.
 (Price, 1965: 5)
And the needs of the military, financing research in the first place, have 
inevitably influenced the whole technoscientific research system, orienting 
it towards some objectives rather than others: nuclear energy is probably 
the best example at hand of an economically and environmentally unsus-
tainable technological system that was developed as a military spin- off, 
simply because the technology was available.
Global war and technoscience  91
Information and communication technologies for war
Between 1943 and 1945, one of the very first computers – another had 
been built in Germany in 1940 by Konrad Zuse and a third was being 
developed by Alan Turing in Great Britain – was built at the University of 
Pennsylvania, thanks to a military contract: it was called ENIAC 
(Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) and it was used by the 
physicists at Los Alamos for the last calculations on the atomic bomb (but 
most of the work had already been done by pen). After the war, the army 
made the major contribution to the development of electronics in the US: 
‘Between 1950 and 1960 annual factory sales of consumer electronics 
products showed no growth at all, while sales of electronic products to the 
military services increased 650% – in constant, uninflated dollars’ 
(Forman, 1987: 160). The military bought all the integrated circuits pro-
duced in the United States in 1962, and by 1965 were still buying over 70 
per cent of them (Mackenzie, 1990). As we have seen, as a reaction to the 
Soviet Sputnik, the Pentagon created its own high- technology office, at first 
called ARPA, then DARPA, which has become probably the most active 
funding institution of new research in electronics – the most important 
generic technology in the contemporary economy, finding applications in 
all sectors of industry and of the military apparatus – information technol-
ogies, computers, artificial intelligence and robotics. DARPA was the first 
to finance innovations like the Saturn V rockets that took man to the 
Moon, weather satellites, lasers, the Internet, cellular phones, military 
robots and drones. 
[DARPA] works by investing money in research ideas years before any 
other agency, university, or venture capitalist on Wall Street think they 
are fruitful enough to fund. DARPA doesn’t focus on running its own 
secret labs, but instead spends 90 percent of its (official) budget of 
USD 3.1 billion on university and industry researchers
 (Singer, 2009: 140)
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, history 
has not ended but we have definitively entered a new phase in world 
history. Globalization has become the keyword to address the major 
changes that have occurred in the last two decades, where information tech-
nologies have played a major role. Most likely, the technological revolution, 
the information- driven transformation of industrialized societies, the fact 
that we now live in a networked, information- based society, a society where 
the greatest wealth is knowledge; all this implies that contemporary wars as 
well are going to be based on information technologies: 
The way any society engages in conflict reflects the way it does a lot of 
other things – especially the way its economy is organized. And just as 
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the industrial revolution industrialized warfare, and mass production 
led to mass destruction, with Clausewitz as the theoretical genius of 
the era, so today the entire society is going beyond the industrial age – 
and taking the military with it.
 (Toffler, 1997) 
The economic and technological transformation of contemporary societies 
would therefore lead to a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), with 
information and communication technologies at its centre.
 With what has become known as ‘netwar’ or ‘network- centric warfare’ 
(NCW), there is a shift to the new information technologies of computers, 
the web, fibre optics, allowing higher levels of communication and 
information sharing. Network- centric warfare is:
an information superiority- enabled concept of operations that gener-
ates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, 
and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of 
command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased sur-
vivability, and a degree of self- synchronization. In essence, NCW 
translate information superiority into combat power by effectively 
linking knowledgeable entities in the battle space.
 (Cebrowski and Garstka, 1998)
Wal- Mart was the model that Cebrowski and Garstka, two of the most 
important theorists of the NCW, had in mind when they applied the new 
technological means of information and communication to the battlefield, 
or battlespace as they preferred to call it, since ‘nations make war the same 
way they make wealth’. Wal- Mart was one of the first large companies to 
network every aspect of its business: every time a product was sold, auto-
matically a new one was ordered from the warehouse, with each single 
cash register connected to the internal network. The supporters of the 
informational revolution in military affairs thought that the same should 
happen in the army, thanks to a real- time communications network con-
necting all the operators in the battlespace.
 According to theorists of this revolution in military affairs, it is only the 
software and not the hardware of war that really matters, and information 
is going to take the place of weapons as the central feature of any future 
war. The near perfect clarity assured by the perfect and complete informa-
tion about the situation on the battlefield (something reminding one of the 
illusory premises of contemporary economic theory) would lift what 
Clausewitz had called the ‘fog of war’ and would remove all the uncertain-
ties of the battlefield, or ‘friction’, that is, the reality that military actions 
are planned but their execution on the battlefield takes inevitably a differ-
ent course (Helmuth von Moltke used to say that ‘no plan survives first 
contact with the enemy’): the information dominance would assure victory 
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in any theatre of war. In the Network Centric Warfare, the United States 
should gain a total information superiority over its enemies: 
we view Information Superiority in military operations as a state that 
is achieved when competitive advantage (e.g. full- spectrum dominance) 
is derived from the ability to exploit a superior information position. 
In military operations this superior information position is, in part, 
gained from information operations that protect our ability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting and/or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
(Alberts et al., 1999: 53)
For a good knowledge of the situation on the battlefield, the Pentagon 
already uses several types of unmanned aerial vehicles or drones and is devel-
oping micro- unmanned aerial vehicles – that is, insect- like drones, which 
should become the perfect instruments for spying activities – integrating thus 
the information gathered by satellites and higher- altitude spy planes. The 
objective of the armed forces on the battlespace of denying information to 
the enemy is obtained by the development of ‘invisible’ arms: 
‘stealth’ has now become the shorthand term for a variety of techniques 
intended to render aircraft, missiles, and ships harder to detect by sight, 
sound, and heat as well as radar, the heart of the effort was defeating 
radar. [. . .] The first operational aircraft to include significant stealth 
features, the Lockheed SR- 71 Blackbird, became operational in 1964.
(Hacker, 2006: 161)
In future netwars, the Internet is going to become the major medium for 
communicating in real time within the army, and the blinding of enemy’s 
means of communication has become a clear objective of cyberwars.2 But 
the control of information is very important also outside the armed con-
flict, towards the general public: 
a characteristic of the battlespace of the future is that it will no longer 
be private or remote. The Vietnam War was an early example of this. 
It was fought as much, if not more, in the living rooms of America as 
in the living jungles of Southeast Asia. More recently we experienced a 
similar visible ‘defeat’ in Somalia. The battlespace for these operations 
was no longer confined to the battlefield. The Information Age has 
changed the access that combatants and non- combatants alike have to 
information.
 (Alberts et al., 1999: 63)
The solution chosen by the US Army during the Iraqi war in 2003 was that 
of embedding hundreds of reporters with coalition forces for providing ‘a 
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sympathetic view on the invasion’ (Boot, 2006). ‘Reliable and nearly 
instantaneous global telecommunications have transformed the military 
chain of command [. . .] Accuracy measured in millimetres allow command-
ers to see the exact location of their units at any moment, removing much 
of the fog of war’ (Hacker, 2006: 156–157). 
 The big innovation in the first Gulf War was the so- called ‘smart bombs’ 
– laser- guided bombs and cruise missiles, whose higher precision was made 
possible by the massive use of improved, very powerful computers. But 
unfortunately ‘only 7 percent of all the bombs dropped were guided, the 
rest were “dumb” ’ (Singer, 2009: 58). In the years immediately after the 
first Gulf War, the precision of bombs was further increased by the devel-
opment of the military Global Positioning System (GPS), capable of giving 
the position of a receiver anywhere on the Earth.3 In 2003, during the 
second Gulf War, the amount of smart bombs rose to 70 per cent.
 In the previous paragraphs, we have seen how the American defence 
and military research budgets have always being growing – and in some 
periods exponentially growing – since the end of the Second World War. 
After the sharp fall in the 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, the budgets 
for defence expenditures and military R&D have both gone up again after 
9/11; from 2003 to 2008, the annual national defence budget rose by 74 
per cent. Research and development and new weapons procurement costs 
grew at least as much over the same period. 
In addition, there is the ‘black budget’, the Pentagon’s classified 
budget for buying and researching what it wants to keep secret. For 
obvious reasons, the black budget is not released to the public, but it 
is estimated by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments to 
be around USD 34 billion in 2009, up roughly 78 percent since 9/11. 
A core part of this massive post- 9/11 research and buying spree has 
been new technologies, with a particular focus on anything 
unmanned.
(Singer, 2009: 61) 
A list of expensive technological gadgets for future wars, at present under 
development by DARPA, NASA and other public and private high- tech 
organizations, may include: several types of different micromachines, pri-
marily for spying and reconnaissance; battlefield robots; wetware devices 
for the mind to directly control machines; scramjets, hypersonic aircrafts 
exceeding Mach 6; helmet- mounted cameras; night- vision contact lenses; 
wearable computers to fit in combat suits; and exoskeletons, kind of high- 
technology armours (White, 2005). Many of these arms have already been 
developed and produced, some are on the market, and some are presently 
being used by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 In robotics for military uses, innovation comes from a classical ‘triple 
helix’ research system – based on the interplay of government, university, 
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and industry – quite similar to the one we have seen at work during the 
Cold War, but possibly with a more independent role played by the private 
sector: 
One estimate of applied research spending in the unmanned field was 
that 40 percent was flowing through private industry, 29 percent via 
military centers and labs, and 23 percent through university programs. 
At the center of it all is the National Center for Defense Robotics, a 
congressionally funded consortium of 160 companies, universities, and 
government labs. Work on military robotics isn’t so much top- secret 
labs fuelled by UFO power sources as it is a simple synergy of military 
money, business organization, and academic researchers.
(Singer, 2009: 138)
One serious problem of these new unmanned arms and devices is their cost: 
for instance, the Global Hawk, which was originally conceived as the replace-
ment for the U- 2 spy plane, ‘costs some US$35 million, but the overall 
support system runs over US$123 million each. Even so, the U.S. Air Force 
plans to spend another US$6 billion to build up the fleet to fifty- one drones 
by 2012’ (Singer, 2009: 36). It seems unlikely that a single country may, at 
the same time, invest such sums in high- tech devices, on the one hand, and 
maintain an efficient ground army, capable of intervening anywhere in the 
world and of military controlling large territories, on the other; the United 
States as well will have to make some choices and find an equilibrium 
between the two types of military investment (Desportes, 2009).
 The development of drones and other unmanned war devices is connected 
to the perspective of arriving at a ‘zero- casualties’ conflict, where no Ameri-
can or Western soldier would be killed in action. Although not very realistic 
for the moment,4 such a perspective introduces further problems in warfare, 
virtualizing the conduct of war. Already now, the US drones flying over 
Afghanistan – responsible not only for intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance duties but also for missile attacks – have their command centre in 
Nevada. A missile strike commanded from thousands of kilometres away by 
‘soldiers’ who go home for dinner clearly introduces a ‘video- game effect’, 
where the responsibility for the war action and its casualties is further dis-
placed by technology. In Afghanistan, lately the US has responded to asym-
metric attacks by the Taliban with periodic spasms of ‘shock and awe’, 
executed mostly by unmanned drones, in which its devastating firepower – 
engendered by its advanced technologies – is impressed upon the world by 
the instantaneous broadcasting through modern information networks. But 
such a display of force has often negative consequences on the ground, since 
it is not always easy to individuate the correct target from far away, and it 
has therefore alienated the consensus of the local civilian population – whose 
heart should be conquered to win the war – who is frequently victim of these 
air bombings, coming apparently from ‘nowhere’.
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The myth of Prometheus
In Homer’s Odyssey, a fortune teller announces to the giant Polyphemus the 
arrival of an enemy who will blind him. In his imagination, Polyphemus 
looks forward to the coming of another giant of invincible force. Instead, it 
is a small Greek who blinds him while he sleeps under the effects of the wine 
offered to him. Polyphemus has not lost his force, but such force has become 
almost useless (Galli, 2008). Mere force may be not usable, like in the case 
of the hydrogen bomb, or useless, as demonstrated by the defeat of the 
Americans in Vietnam. This is a lesson that Americans have probably 
learned, but their confidence in technology has, on the contrary, been 
growing. The myth of Prometheus has taken the place of the myth of 
Polyphemus: information and communication technologies are expected to 
restore Polyphemus’ sight.
The constant military problem has always been how to prevail in the 
field against comparably equipped armies. During the modern period, 
perhaps especially in the United States, one way out of the impasse 
often seemed to be technological innovation – that is, striking ‘compa-
rably equipped’ from the equation. This was the dream of decisive 
secret weapons that the Manhattan Project and development of the 
atomic bomb seemed to confirm. Directed research and development 
promised a constant edge to the nation able to sustain so costly an 
effort. The United States adopted what was, in effect, a policy of per-
manent technological revolution’ 
(Hacker, 2006: ix)
As far as the nuclear weapons were concerned, American technological 
edge did not last long, since in 1949 the Soviet Union tested its first 
A- Bomb. In the subsequent decades, the situation was of a virtual techno-
logical stalemate between the two superpowers, but the incredible destruc-
tiveness of the nuclear arsenals impeded the direct confrontation between 
the two ‘comparably equipped armies’. As we have seen, in the course of 
the Cold War, innovative research progressively shifted from destructive 
arms (nuclear weapons) and launching instruments (missiles) towards 
information technologies, with the United States constantly trying to 
mantain a technological edge over the USSR. With the end of the Cold 
War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the United States became 
convinced that their technological superiority would go unchallenged for 
many decades ahead.
 George W. Bush was a strong supporter of the network- centric warfare; 
as a presidential candidate, he said that the revolution in the information 
and communication technologies would have permitted the US to ‘redefine 
war in our terms’. The question is: why should America’s enemies accept 
such a redefinition? 
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True believers in technology see warfare as being reduced to a one- 
sided contest where the technologically superior side dictates all action. 
They never discuss what happens if the enemy selects a strategy where 
time is not essential. How can battle time be critical in a war that lasts 
decades? Or what do we do if the enemy works hard not to produce 
any collectible signals?
(Hammes, 2006: 191)
It is clear that the militarily and/or technologically weaker side will adopt 
all kinds of asymmetric tactics and strategies to fight its opponent. 
And since popular resistance à la Vietnamese is very costly for lives 
(one million and a half dead Vietnamese people, against 58,000 dead 
Americans), it is sensible to imagine – independently from any moral 
consideration – that ‘terrorism’ has come to be a normalized form to 
be assumed by any resistance to hyper- technologically armed enemies. 
What we now call ‘terrorism’ has permitted the success of the clandes-
tine Jewish groups against the British in Palestine, and the victory of 
the Algerian national liberation front against the French paratroopers. 
(Dal Lago, 2006c: 5)
In October 1989, as the Soviet Union collapsed, a group of American mili-
tary experts described the future form of war: 
In broad terms, [. . .] warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and 
largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be 
blurred to the vanishing point. It will be non- linear, possibly to the 
point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction 
between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear. Actions will occur 
concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society 
as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.
(Lind et al., 1989: 23) 
They named it Fourth Generation Warfare, and Colonel Thomas X. 
Hammes defined it:
Fourth- Generation Warfare (4GW) uses all available networks – polit-
ical, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political 
decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too 
costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.
(Hammes, 2006: 2)
The theoretical antecedents may in effect be found in the works of Mao 
Tse- Tung, Ho Chi Minh and V.N. Giap, and in their guerrilla warfare 
strategies.
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 This is also suggested in Unrestricted Warfare, a book first published in 
1999 by two Chinese senior colonels of the People’s Liberation Army, 
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. In their opinion, future wars are going to 
be a mix of different kinds of warfare, where the superiority of one side in 
a specific field – like American superiority in technology – will not be deci-
sive for the final result of the conflict. They suggest that warfare is going 
to be characterized by military, trans- military and non- military activities. 
Military initiatives include the use of nuclear and conventional arms, but 
also guerrilla tactics and terrorism, as well as biological, environmental, 
space and electronic warfare. But in the future unrestricted battlefields, 
other old and new quasi- arms are going to be used too: diplomacy, intelli-
gence, netwar, cyberwar, psychological and virtual warfare, drugs dealing, 
etc. All these different styles of warfare will be accompanied by non- 
military instruments, like financial and commercial wars, ideological and 
normative competitions, the use of economic sanctions, media and 
information wars. For winning in such a complex environment, nations 
and groups will have to find the right combination of all these different 
approaches. Nobody – not even the American hyperpower – may assume 
that it possesses the win- all strategy, since its adversary may not gently 
accept the definition of warfare proposed (Henrotin, 2009).
 If we may assume that the opinions expressed in Unrestricted Warfare 
have some official backing in Beijing, contrary to the Soviet Union, which 
had been confronting and finally chasing the United States in a symmetric 
competition, then the Chinese seem to prefer a complementary, asymmet-
ric approach. They consider technology an important military instrument 
but definitively not the only one. From a strictly defensive point of view, 
they still possess a numerous ground army, capable of conducting a long- 
duration war of resistance, and may employ the Mao Tse- Tung strategy 
of ‘circling the cities by the countryside’, if needed. In 1946, Mao Tse- 
Tung said that the nuclear bomb was a ‘paper tiger’, created by the capi-
talists to scare the people, which looks terrible but is not. All the same, 
when they could, the Chinese constructed nuclear weapons and they still 
have a small but efficient nuclear arsenal. In the same spirit, if new tech-
nologies seem potentially useful, the Chinese try to develop them using 
the means at hand. When, in 2001, they captured an American EP- 3E spy 
plane, they completely disassembled it, studying it through a technique of 
inverse engineering, and then they shipped it back to the United States. 
Drones appear an important instrument of contemporary warfare but they 
are extremely expensive to build; the Chinese army has thus transformed 
a great number of old planes into unmanned drones, spending very little 
in the operation. When the Bush administration developed a new space 
defence shield, militarizing the space, the Chinese responded by shooting 
down one of their own old satellites. The message was quite clear: if the 
United States thinks it is going to use the space for military purposes, it is 
not going to be alone. The Chinese are aware of their military weaknesses, 
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compared with the United States, but they do not seem to suffer from any 
inferiority complex in front of the only superpower to survive the Cold 
War.
 The United States runs the risk of thinking that their military and 
technological superiority is enough to confront any potential adversary. 
Information and communication technologies are important military 
tools – however, on the one hand, they cannot take the place of strategy 
and politics and, on the other, it is necessary to learn how best to use 
them. 
Our advanced information systems are still tied to an outdated, hierar-
chical organization, that slows the dissemination of information. 
Although specific high- priority commands receive near real- time intel-
ligence, most commanders must submit their intelligence requirements 
up the chain of command. Each level validates, consolidates, and pri-
oritizes the requests, which are then fed through the centralized staff 
system to task the assets that will actually collect against the requests. 
[. . .] Thus, the premier benefit of the Information Age – immediate 
access to current intelligence – is nullified by the way we route it 
through our vertical bureaucracy.
(Hammes, 2006: 192–193)
In contrast, America’s adversaries in Iraq, for instance, took advantage of 
the new information and communication technologies thanks to their 
network organizational model, where all components had a high level of 
autonomy and could act in real time. The US military as well may adopt a 
network organization if it wants to successfully face its enemies who have 
asymmetric warfare strategies. It may emphasize a system that increases 
flexibility rather than centralization; it may leave the decisions and initi-
ative to the correct level: the lowest possible on the field. In other words, it 
may adapt the ‘subsidiarity principle’ to warfare decision- making and war 
action: the information disseminated horizontally should be used by all 
combatants in the battlespace to act on their own initiative, as insurgents 
learned to do long ago.
 Lately it seems that the American military thinking has been strongly 
influenced by the availability of the new technical devices that the military- 
industrial-academic complex offers at an increasingly faster rate. It is this 
cornucopia of high- tech gadgets, promising ever new opportunities of 
victory over the adversaries thanks to a constant technological superiority, 
that seems to orient military strategies. 
Unrestrained pursuit of technical perfection has produced a baroque 
arsenal, possessed of extraordinary capabilities at astronomical 
expense. [. . .] Although they could dominate the battlefield, they could 
not win the war. The widespread assumption that better technology 
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meant victory had made military- technological innovation, to a signi-
ficant degree, an end in itself.
(Hacker, 2006: 165)
There is a real fascination for technology in American culture, and this is 
true for American military culture as well. Such an idea that technology 
may resolve any problem has put technology in military affairs in a clearly 
predominant position, over strategy and politics. But American military 
problems in Iraq and in Afghanistan show that not only technology counts: 
in long- term operations, where it is necessary to counter an insurgent 
enemy using asymmetric forms of fighting, the cultural and political 
element becomes crucial. ‘The technology emphasis must shift from speed 
of targeting to supplementing the human skills essential in understanding 
the fourth generation warfare enemy: language, area studies, social 
network analysis, history, and so on’ (Hammes, 2006: 266).5 As it is now 
clear, the US armed forces in 2003 won only the battle of Baghdad, not the 
Iraqi war. Even the most sophisticated military technology alone may win 
some battles but it won’t win wars.
Notes
1 Referring to the University of California at Berkeley, operating the Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratories and the Los Alamos Laboratory for the Atomic Energy 
Commission, Robert Oppenheimer said it was ‘a great, liberal university that is 
the only place in the world [. . .] that manufactures, under contract with the 
United States government, atomic bombs’ (quoted in Cowan, 1997: 261).
2 According to the New York Times (11 December 2009), in November 2009, 
there was in Washington the first high- level meeting between American and 
Russian military experts on the use of the Internet for military purposes.
3 The civil applications of GPS have now reached a larger public, but the ultimate 
control of GPS by the Pentagon has convinced other countries, NATO allies 
included, to develop their own independent system of satellites; the EU’s posi-
tioning system is called Galileo.
4 Between 19 March 2003 and 16 December 2009, 4,371 American soldiers and 
318 Allied soldiers were killed in Iraq – not to speak of the c.100,000 Iraqi cit-
izens who were killed during the same period (source: www.iraqbodycount.net).
5 The lack of language skills on the part of analysts and military personnel, and 
the scarce number of intelligence agents on the ground abroad in ‘enemy’ coun-
tries, has been indicated as one of the major causes of the unpreparedness of the 
US to the attacks by terrorists on 9/11 (Clarke, 2004).
Part II
Securization

6 14 September 2001
The regression to the habitus
Didier Bigo
No, you read it well. 14 September is maybe more important than 11 Sep-
tember 2001 because the world we live in is more affected by the counter- 
terrorist policies of the US and their allies than by Al Qaida bombings. 
But we are now prisoners of so many encrusted narratives about 11 Sep-
tember that we tend not to rediscuss what happened. We believe the 
‘epitome’, the short bible of what happened and what will happen; and 
even when we try to be critics we borrow the counter- arguments from this 
epitome of a global insecurity and a regime of exception. I want, in this 
short paper, to discuss these narratives and to explain differently what 
happened by insisting on the most banal and most important factor: the 
regression to the habitus in the face of unknown events on the part of the 
professionals of politics and the professionals of security of the Western 
world.
11 September 2001: the epitome of the fall of the state 
system?
11 September 2001 has been the epitome of the belief that the state was 
no longer in control of its territory. It has been the momentum of a con-
densed version of the long story of globalization of violence and insecu-
rity, which began in the mid- 1970s and took off after the end of the 
Cold War. The concise version has been encapsulated into an ‘event’. 
The evocation of this event, reduced to a series of images of the Twin 
Towers falling, is then supposed to act as the full story. It is the image of 
a ‘fall’.
 This epitome is working well as it connects the personal memories of 
what each individual was doing that day – at what time he or she heard 
about or watched the images on the TV of the fall of the Twin Towers – 
with the collective narrative of the end of a traditional understanding of 
what security means. By evoking it, it is not necessary to argue, to 
comment, but just to remember the feelings of that day. The images are 
fuelling the sense of disaster, of insecurity, and produce as such insecuri-
tization, at least for a large part of the Western audience.1
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Brute facts, impressions and interpretations: 11 September 
2001 as a global event of violence
In the minutes following the fall of the second tower, the attackers were 
qualified as terrorists, even as hyperterrorists (Heisbourg, 2001). It was not 
an accident, but the will of someone to do evil, to destroy. The scale of the 
tragedy, of so many people dying ‘during’ a post- synchronized TV show, 
was a shock. Even worse, the sense of déjà vu was overwhelming and the 
realisation that it was an actual event and not a movie was horrifying 
(Virilio, 2002; Žižek, 2002a). It created what Yves Michaud has called 
‘pornography of violence’, pornography which was so strong that even the 
most sensationalist media chose not to show the blood of people dying and 
instead concentrated on the fall of the buildings as ‘symbols’ (Michaud, 
1978). Many observers have recollected how fascinated they were and the 
difficulty for them to admit it was real, that it was material, with real 
victims, and not a virtual effect in a catastrophe movie (Holland, 2009).
 The overwhelming light on these events in New York partly overshad-
owed the other targeted attacks: on the Pentagon in Washington DC, and 
the failed attempt against the US presidential base in Pennsylvania where, 
in theory, the president flies in times of danger.2 The epitome concentrated 
the eyes of the public on the planes crashing into the Twin Towers of the 
World Trade Center, giving a sense that the ‘consumer and developed 
world’ and ‘the cosmopolitan city of New York’ were the central targets, 
not the military- industrial complex or the government. Jacques Derrida, in 
his discussion with Giovanna Borradori, immediately understood this dif-
ference of meaning in the public spheres and the differentiation of effects, 
as well as their diffraction when it will be a question rather than an 
answer. As he explained, the reduction of the event to the Twin Towers 
and the nomination of 9/11 as a date in its specific US format are symbols 
of the incapacity to accept a concept of terrorism, and even to give a 
meaning to the violence, except by creating a date, the idea of an ‘event’, 
of an ‘unprecedented thing which happened that day’.3 Only the conjura-
tion by a date, and by a journalistic litany repeating the date again and 
again, can explain why the fear connected with Al Qaida’s actions has 
been transformed into a more ontological fear, accusing the ‘unknown’, 
the ‘unspeakable’, of attacking the American way of life (Habermas et al., 
2004).
 To name it, it was nevertheless necessary to have a formula, in order to 
convert into words the images. This was done immediately by the qualifi-
cation of these events as hyper, mega or giga terrorism, changing the pat-
terns of what was terrorism, war and crime, and creating a radically new 
frame of the enemy, challenging the very foundation of the pact between 
the state and the citizen concerning their personal security, by calling for a 
global and world interpretation of any local form of violence.4 ‘The tradi-
tional understanding of what it means to speak of war, of crime, of state 
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security, of sovereignty has collapsed in the same second as the towers’, 
said one of the senior intelligent analysts in charge in 2002.5 ‘We have dust 
all around. Political science is at ground zero. Then we have to rebuild eve-
rything and to adapt to a new world, global and profoundly insecure’. This 
belief was also shared by major sociologists, such as Ulrich Beck, who 
wrote, ‘The difference between war and peace, the military and police, war 
and crime, and national and international security are, from within and 
without, completely annulled’ (Beck, 2003: 257).
11 September 2001: a turning point for a radically new era?
From the narrative of a very long list of experts emerges a new ‘doxa’, a 
new common sense, taking for granted the rise of a global insecurity at the 
world level, transforming the humanity of the planet into a single ‘survi-
vor’, struggling in front of the imminence of Armageddon. As we will see 
later, the competition for a meaningful interpretation of 11 September 
2001 and the Bali, Madrid and London bombings will be very tough, but 
the implicit understanding is that the attacks in New York and Washing-
ton were the certificates of birth and proof of the globalization of violence. 
A radically new era was born that day.
 Hyperterrorism, terrorism from below, or asymmetric terrorist warfare, 
as analysts said, has the capacity and the will to destroy sovereign states, 
even the most powerful of them. The danger now comes from a handful of 
individuals, who may be religious fanatics and may have been provided 
with arms of mass destruction. This combination is fatal. Furthermore, this 
terrorism from below is now global and hidden. Networks have taken 
precedence over territorial borders. The threat no longer originates from a 
specific place and a specific enemy that can be watched.
 The attacks and their framing as global terror have, therefore, activated 
a different form of fear, not directly linked to Al Qaida or other violent 
political clandestine organizations, but more to the ontological fear of a 
chaotic world where weapons of mass destruction are managed not only 
by rational state actors but also by a handful of fanatics, leading inevitably 
to the apocalypse. It looks like a revival of the fear of the first years after 
Hiroshima and the Cold War, despite the desegregation of the reassurance 
given by politicians and part of the academic community, such as Mor-
genthau, Aron, Gamson or Poirier, that the atomic bomb, once in the 
hands of irrational and ideological actors like the USSR or smaller actors, 
will nevertheless give them a sense of responsibility and that they will act 
rationally.6 It is a move from rationality to irrationality of agents’ behav-
iours, claim the US leaders and some analysts. And it changes the structure 
of the international (dis)order. The meaning of anarchy is reframed as pos-
sible death any time, for no good reason, of any states, even the most 
powerful. It is not a form of survival in a time of neither war, nor peace. 
The suicide terrorists as fanatically religious have created a new ‘paradigm’ 
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where the cost–benefit of the proposed action of destruction cannot be 
deterred by reciprocity of death, by retaliation, because de facto retaliation 
is too late. The conundrum of deterrence to play on the will of the enemy 
to prevent him launching a first attack is coming back. What if they don’t 
listen? How do you calculate rationally an interaction with a supposedly 
irrational actor? Does it justify a first strike? How can you anticipate or 
predict an attack?
 The number of people killed in the Twin Towers (more than 3,000, but 
estimated at 7,000 in the initial days after the attack), the reference to 
Pearl Harbor and the Second World War and the ashes and smoke coming 
from the burning towers all immediately created an emotional link between 
two different connotations of mass destruction and apocalypse: mass 
destruction by traditional means of killing, such as the use of civil aero-
planes as missiles against targets, causing many casualties; and mass 
destruction by the use of new technologies, such as nuclear, radiological, 
biological and chemical (NRBC) weapons. This played a crucial role in the 
belief that something radically new was at stake. It is also important to 
remember the role of the fear of anthrax letters in this association.7 
Anthrax has been even more important than the Twin Towers in leading 
people to believe in the narrative that links NRBC weapons, indiscriminate 
targets and the actions of clandestine organizations.8 It gave grounds to the 
idea that violence was expressed through massive attacks that can seriously 
put the survival of the nation at stake. The anthrax letters created anxiety 
for weeks and complexified the situation by perpetuating fear of the 
unknown and a sense of a doomed future (seen so often in science fiction 
movies that deal with the extermination of humanity and with the lives of 
the survivors of biological warfare).9 Some members of the public adhere 
strongly to these feelings and they seem to continue to do so beyond ter-
rorism. They are under the impression of a global insecurity.
11 September 2001: the birth of a fear of the  
future – Armageddon
The attacks have embodied a profound fear of the future, driven by a 
worst- case scenario, beyond the modus operandi of Al Qaida attacks, 
focusing on a widely used image in movies: a mushroom cloud burgeoning 
over a US city. It has been repeated over and over again that ‘the world is 
no longer safe, nor will it ever be again’ and ‘the question is not if, but 
when’. As George Bush said after the attacks, ‘It is my responsibility not to 
wait for the next bombing which could have the form of a mushroom 
cloud.’10 And Donald Rumsfeld added, ‘Next time it will not be 3,000 
innocent civilians killed, but 30,000, 300,000 or even 3 million.’ This view 
of the future has given to the neo- conservative discourse a sort of ambigu-
ous appeal coming from their tragic argument. The scenario is voluntarist, 
but the fate is there. Nothing can be done against nuclear terrorism coming 
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from the fanatically religious, who are impossible to deter. It is possible to 
save time, to ‘give the future a chance’, and the only solution is to eradi-
cate all of them (terrorists and supporters) in a combat of good against 
evil. The born- again right interpretation of the future of the world has cer-
tainly shaped, in part, this vision of the highest civil servants in the US and 
has helped to convince part of the electorate. Armageddon is coming.11 We 
are at the edge of the world. The future is known; it ends up with mass 
destruction of humanity or eradication of all evildoers.
 These impressions, structured by the brute facts of destruction of the 
Twin Towers and the feelings and memories of Pearl Harbor and the first 
years of the Cold War, as well as the generation of catastrophic movie 
viewers, have been at the core of the construction of a meaning of the 
‘events of 9/11’ as the foreshadowing of future wars or catastrophes.12 The 
‘impression’ is fed by the attacks and all the previous movies and novels 
that have dealt with this ‘rape’ by violence of the territorial- political body 
of the USA. So, the Armageddon metaphor is not just a reminder of the 
religious feeling of the new born- again groups and their idea that the end 
of time is coming soon; it is perhaps a more profound secular and post- 
modern trend, which explains the success of this discourse about the global 
threat and its imminence. It is as if some people were pleased that some-
thing was happening in their lives and may happen again, as if they were 
finally actors (and not viewers) of their history (even as victims), as if this 
event of 11 September was creating some ‘reality’ or ‘hyper reality’ in rela-
tion to all these TV shows which are only for the ‘others’, as if now every 
American was really part of the spectacle of real life.
 11 September 2001 is, then, to be seen as something radically new 
because it pre- figures the future.13 It is significant that most of the analysis 
and interpretations of 11 September are not oriented towards the past or 
even the present, but towards the future. It is less about what happened 
than about what next? The newness of 11 September is located in an 
explanation seeing it as the future of conflict and war, and as something 
that will happen again at an even more important scale. So, even if the pre-
diction that the next bombing after 11 September would have many more 
casualties has not transpired, with Bali, Madrid or London, it suffices for 
the believers of this doxa to add ‘not yet, not yet’, with the disillusioned 
smile of the one who has the wisdom to know the future and who speaks 
to a novice.
 In this doxa, no lesson from the past can be learnt. On the contrary, 
they are misleading. Previous experiences of terrorism are not useful. It is 
by checking the future and not the past that the understanding will come. 
Anticipation is the key word. The world goes global. The world goes with 
increasing possibilities of catastrophes (terrorism, global warming, nuclear 
accident, new viruses and, above all, a combination of these risks in a 
worst- case scenario). But what if one refuses the implicit consensus on the 
end of the state – and interstate – control, on the globalization of violence, 
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on the vision of the future as a catastrophe? What if ones try to historicize 
and differentiate along different audiences the main narrative which leads 
to this idea of the merging of war and crime into a new hyperterror(ism)?
Global terror or local event? Different audiences, different 
interpretations
The US perspective: a self- centred global perspective?
From a US perspective, but from this perspective only, angst is there and 
destruction is projected as a fate. We can understand why they consider 11 
September as a turning point. It was the first time since the war with 
English Canada and the so- called invasion of Pancho Villa of the city of El 
Paso for a couple of days in March 1916 that the territory of the US, part 
of the American continent, was under attack. Pearl Harbor was a shock 
but was remote from the country, and it is not surprising that the compari-
son that emerged spontaneously in journalists’ comments was about this 
attack, thus creating a parallel with war. The transnational media ‘Blitz-
krieg’, arguing the case that the attacks were not an odious crime but an 
act of war, was incredibly powerful and may have influenced the leaders. 
Furthermore, even if it was not the first time that US territory had been 
bombed by clandestine organizations, this time the scale was unprece-
dented. The idea that US territory was a ‘sanctuary’ was deep in the belief 
of the population, and even the military forces thought that only high- tech 
missiles or cyber threats disrupting critical infrastructures could seriously 
hurt the country. The artisanal work of the hijackers, combining three 
types of actions – hijack and destruction of a plane, vehicle hurtling into a 
place selected for maximum casualties, and voluntary death of the perpe-
trators – into one range, was below their ‘radar’. For this military intelli-
gence framed by the Revolution in Military Affairs, it was difficult to 
imagine that vulnerability was not related to a differential in technology 
and that their simulations of attacks were oblivious to the real practices of 
the clandestine organizations and were mimicking only their own vision of 
how to attack another country if necessary (Hermant and Duclos, 2006). 
The commission set up to understand how it had happened spoke of a 
‘lack of imagination’, but proposed (paradoxically) to enhance technolo-
gical intelligence, not to place it in doubt. So, the ‘accreditation’ by the 
highest level of state officials of the ‘impression’ of a radical transforma-
tion of the use of violence born that day, diffused by the mass media, has 
completely ‘saturated’, for at least six years, the sphere of communication 
at the interpersonal level and has blocked the possibility for other narra-
tives to emerge.
 Somehow, the gap between the idea of an absolutely new phenomenon 
and the very traditional response to go to an international war (without 
naming it that way) and reactions of anger, revenge and partly hate has 
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been huge. As we will see, it has not created innovation but, on the con-
trary, regression to the most traditional habitus: hyperpatriotism especially 
(Heisler, 2001).
 Nevertheless, US officials have a strong counter- argument. If, as they 
think, the situation of 11 September is radically new, if we live in a world 
under the threat of a global terror, we have to be aware not to judge it 
from an obsolete theory of political violence, and to adapt our knowledge 
to the event. They borrow the idea of Ulrich Beck, saying that the events of 
11 September were not only the destruction of life but also the destruction 
of words and meanings (Beck, 2002a, 2002b). In a state of terror, the logic 
of survival obliges to revisit all together the ten commandments or the ten 
relations between the following: rationality and irrationality of the enemy; 
‘justified’ fear and timing of the response; prevention as first strike and 
effective protection against a ‘stealth’ enemy; needs for emergency meas-
ures and long democratic debate; exception and rule of law; speed, secret 
and role of the presidency or of the administration and role of check and 
balance, control of proportionality of the parliament and courts; balance 
between security and freedom; national sovereignty and global coopera-
tion; international law and efficient leadership at the world level; US 
citizenship and equality of human rights.14 The European specialists who 
try to compare 11 September with previous bombings are wrong. They do 
not understand the radical change and are ‘old’ Europe. They insist too 
much on continuity and, behind that, they want to give lessons to the US. 
Even if, before, the terminology of terrorism for clandestine organizations 
of minority groups using political violence was perhaps exaggerated, now 
the terminology of hyperterrorism, or at least of terrorism, makes sense to 
describe not all the previous actions of clandestine organizations, but this 
specific form of violence initiated by Al Qaida. The materiality of violence 
and the capacity of Al Qaida for mass killing is the proof of the future 
threat. War and crime have fusioned into hyperterrorism. Al Qaida did not 
hesitate to transform civilian planes into missiles and tried to kill the 
maximum number of people by mixing major crimes of innocents and 
techniques of war to impress and emulate other clandestine groups.15 By 
doing so, they knew they could not win a war, but they wanted to show 
the weakness of democracy concerned with the lives of innocents, to push 
the government to overreact through fear of mass destruction attacks, and 
to pursue their jihad locally by recruiting fanatical Muslims all over the 
world, but with two main targets – the US and Israel; Europe being 
marginal.16
 This vision of a radically new event, merging war, terror and crime and 
destabilizing the old categories of what is war and what is crime, has also 
been largely developed in academic journals on terrorism and international 
relations. It seems that a cottage industry of self- proclaimed experts on Al 
Qaida and on terrorism in general (as they say) has used fear (and 
curiosity, a will to understand from the public) to develop a book market, 
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filling the fear with even more fear to come and giving no explanation, 
except the propaganda of intelligence services and discourses which, in the 
name of protection, are playing with anxiety. More serious accounts of 
justification of this position ‘to look forward and not backward’ have been 
given. They have been often encapsulated into the idea of an exceptional 
period, justifying exceptional measures, and breaking from the rule of law 
and the traditional bureaucratic routines.
 The question of the radical novelty of the materiality of violence is just, 
in my opinion, a convenient way to forget history and sociology of the 
clandestine organizations and their structural, strategic and logistical con-
straints, or do these experts, insisting on the unprecedented event of 11 
September, have a point? Cornelius Castoriadis, has tried at the philosoph-
ical level, to address the question of the radically new and the possibility of 
a radical jump of the imaginary social significations, not derived from the 
past. But he was well aware that such an event is rare in history and he 
finds only one in Western history: the invention of democracy in Pericles’ 
time. So, even if he considered that creation and novelty is a human specifi-
city, he warned that, very often, this argument is de facto a strategy of 
power in order to declare that everything is new and then to impose new 
rules of the games derived from past interests. The global and the new are 
often there to cover the local and the old game of power, by a rhetoric 
trying to negate the historical context. Nevertheless, the debate about 
radical novelty is quite impossible to settle. Once open, it depends on spe-
cific ontology and sociohistorical framing of public culture.
A non US- centred understanding of 11 September: localizing the 
relation of violence in space and time
Even if I agree with the possibility of a certain form of novelty, as a Euro-
pean myself, I consider that the problem is nevertheless that these events 
were geographically and culturally localized, that to present them as global 
is a problem and that to present them as the birth of a doomed world, as a 
future of the world which cannot escape his fate, except by consenting to 
obey and to collaborate, is even more problematic. The attacks of 11 Sep-
tember spoke more to that place than to other places. The audiences were 
different and, if emotion was huge, it was not the same for the New 
Yorkers, the Californians, the Europeans, the Middle Easterners. Empathy 
has limits; suffering at a distance and compassion too (Boltanski, 1993). 
The four plane crashes were not ‘global’ and as such ‘universally’ subject 
to the same set of impressions and interpretations. Clearly these feelings 
have existed through the world coverage of the events. Messages of 
support came from broad swathes of governments and civil societies from 
other countries, including not only the future allies, but also the ones who 
resisted the Bush policy later on: France, Germany, Russia, Canada and 
many Arab countries. If the notion of ‘new global threat’ is still deep in the 
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heart of the US citizen years on, it is not necessarily the case that it is in the 
heart of the European and even less for the Middle Eastern audience. They 
have a different sense of history and a different sense of place and dura-
tion. In their own trajectory, actions of clandestine organizations and of 
enemy states invading them are still strong in their memory. So, if the fear 
of the killing of millions of American citizens is anticipated and is repeated 
again and again by the neo- conservatives (but also by the democrats) and 
by some of the media (especially, but not only, Fox TV), this fear is quasi 
absent from Europe, even after Madrid and London. The narratives have 
diverged and, even when alliances have been set up to have the same 
policy, it is rare that the argumentation is the same. It is as true for those 
who were in favour of the Bush administration as for those who resisted it. 
It goes beyond ideology and policy or a so- called national culture. It has to 
do with this pre- crime attitude, with this belief in prediction and preven-
tion, more accepted on one side of the Atlantic than on the other.
 Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, as well as the other European leaders, 
have not developed such a relation with fear and prevention, even if they 
used the arguments. They understood how continuity in history was the 
way the mood of their population was framed. After the 11 March 2004 
bombings in Madrid and 7 July 2005 attacks in London, life as usual was 
clearly the response of the population; less afraid, it seems, than their 
‘elites’. For Londoners, Madrilènes or Parisians, the idea of living with the 
possibility of being targeted by a hazardous bombing, killing ‘at random’, 
was not new at all. The Provisional IRA in London, especially in its fights 
against Margaret Thatcher, ETA Militar in Madrid, and the Ali Fouad 
Saleh network linked with Hezbollah and a faction of the Iranian govern-
ment in Paris have set up a mind frame that includes the risk of this kind 
of violence. It is also the case in Italy, with the actions of left (BR), foreign 
(anti Jews) and especially far- right organizations (Ordine Nero, actions of 
Piazza Fontana and Bologna).17
 The effects of the bombings of Madrid and London were not a ‘new 
wave of terror’, or ‘of panic’, as the media stated over- systematically. It 
was a will to resist to terror, to find the criminals and to understand their 
behaviour.18 These different attitudes are relevant of something more pro-
found than a debate on terminology about novelty and globalization; it is 
the orientation of the response which is at stake. Is the response an effort 
to explain what happened or to anticipate the next case of violence in the 
future? And, if so, is it not a split between a criminal police and judicial 
approach on one side and monitoring the future through intelligence and 
proactive policing by military means on the other side?
 In that regard, to see 11 September as the birth of a new era is then very 
specific to a certain strategic culture of a military elite and dependent of 
the historical trajectory of the US. The idea of novelty is related to previ-
ous experiences, and to a state of mind which is oriented either towards 
the past or towards the future. It is banal to state the obvious, but it is not 
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so banal when, looking at political statements and academic works, so 
many of them just ignore or avoid discussing this point and jump to the 
conclusion that the destruction of the Twin Towers was a global event, 
with a global resonance and a common interpretation.
 It was only a state of local fear in New York and Washington, extended 
through media empathy to the Western world. This state of local fear, 
experienced by the professionals of politics, explains better than the so- 
called global terror, the will of revenge, the ‘wild, wild West’ retaliation 
and the calling for a war (against evil).
 Eventually, the governments were not paralyzed by terror, by the 
actions of Al Qaida. On the contrary, we saw a burst of anger, rage, pride 
and patriotism, far from the so- called interpretation of the psychological 
effects of terrorism, especially at that scale. The feelings on which George 
Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, and afterwards John Howard, Jose Aznar and 
Tony Blair, have played with or/and shared were not the paralysis of 
terror, but anger, even wrath, as if they were the fighting angels against the 
evildoers. In conclusion, the choice of a global war on terror on 14 Sep-
tember 2001 was not a necessity, or even a manufacture of fear, but a 
regression to the habitus of a certain group of political leaders.
 The argument of global violence would not be the cause for a global 
counter- terrorism strategy but would be a consequence, a justification of 
it. The will to revenge and punish explains the argumentation, pretending 
that the 11 September attacks were unprecedented events for the US and 
the world and the date of birth of a new era.
 The legacy of George Bush is suspended to the possibility of a new 
major attack on US soil. It may change with time. After years of success, or 
at least of convincing a majority of US citizens of his policy, now he is con-
sidered as one of the worst presidents ever. Assessing the relation between 
global violence and global ‘response’, global ‘coercion’ is certainly not 
straightforward. It looks too easy, either to accept any justification of 
policy by the argument of necessity to respond on the same scale as the 
violence and to reframe rule of law and habeas corpus for this reason – as 
well as to reframe, in an imperial way, the relations with the other states – 
or to pretend that from the very beginning the professionals of politics in 
the US (and elsewhere?) were planning to extend their power and were 
driven by a politics of exception, as if they knew, from the beginning, the 
future and had the capacity to read it.
 So, the discussion about the shape of the post- 11 September world 
moves from a discussion about the attacks and their effects to the policy to 
counter them, to prevent new ones, seen as unavoidable, and to the effects 
of this policy of revenge, of punishment, of fear of the dominant actors of 
losing their position. Maybe the key date for an historian is, then, not 11 
September, but three days later, 14 September 2001, when Congress 
authorized the president ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
[. . .] those organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
14 September 2001  113
committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11’.19 
It is from this date, from the choice of this form of ‘response’, that the 
world we live in has been reframed by the dominant leaders and the pro-
fessionals of security as a world under threat, as a world facing catastro-
phes, as a world where responsibility goes hand in hand with speedy 
actions, emergency powers, special powers, war powers covering the prac-
tices of both coercion and surveillance inside and outside the country. And 
the legacy of this period of policing insecurity by prevention is more deter-
mined by that day of 14 September than by the attacks of 11 September.
 The relevant questions are then less related with the specific story of Al 
Qaida and its followers – their capacity or not to create an alliance all over 
the planet of the different clandestine organizations struggling against the 
governments in place and their capacity to build a nuclear bomb or to 
sneak one – than they are related with the framing process of this violence 
as global and justifying a policy of prevention by the most powerful actors 
of the world. The two faces of the problem are important, but the con-
temporary impact in our lives of the changes of policies – or the justifica-
tions of previous policies demanding harsher coercive measures – is as 
much dependent on the second face as the first one.
 The logics of suspicion and exception or emergency have not been 
plotted by the agents in charge of security, contrary to some continuous 
narratives about the faking of 11 September, but these logics have emerged 
from a certain way of understanding the relations between war, violence, 
security, protection rooted in a certain vision of a world order, and a spe-
cific history of the global disorder or global insecurity largely pre- dating 
11 September. The instrumentalization by some players of the opportunity 
to advance in the agenda some reforms has certainly been there from the 
beginning, and it will be demonstrated throughout this book, but it is 
politics as usual. So the manufacture of a politics of fear has to be 
distinguished from a plot or a manipulation theory. What is central is to 
understand if 14 September has been a great sovereign moment chosen 
by the Bush administration to declare a form of exception, supposedly 
reframing the rules of liberal democracy under emergency, as many critical 
authors have assessed, or if it has been, in a more mundane manner, a 
regression to a habitus of control and coercion of agents, who cannot 
accept the very idea of having to cope with hazard, violence, ambiguity of 
meanings, and destabilization of the images of themselves as ‘rulers’ that it 
implies.
 What did the president do with these powers once they were given to 
him? Why did Congress delegate so much of its own power? How was it 
possible for the administration to read this declaration as an unconditional 
agreement to go to war, to detain persons internally, and later on to mock 
the protest of the segments of the population (or experts) that were in 
favour of coercive actions against Al Qaida but not in favour of a war in 
Afghanistan and a plan to extend it to Iraq? The rare pieces of research of 
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these first days and months, now that we have more access to information 
that was kept secret during the first mandate of George Bush, converge 
towards the idea that the policy was not a result of discussing rationally 
different options, and even less a great decisionist moment, balancing the 
advantages and inconveniences of declaring a state of exception. The 
policy was simply lead by the overwhelming fear of new attacks on that 
scale, by a certain vision of the future as the coming end of the civilized 
world, generating such angst that no response other than war was seriously 
discussed by the administration. As put brutally by one of the people 
involved in these meetings, ‘It was more thinking with guts than with 
brain, and the brain came after to justify the initial mistakes.’20 A habitus 
of being the dominant political actor, a strategic culture of dominance in 
war, a long- standing idea that violence at least from the end of the Cold 
War has evolved and is coming from transnational networks of individuals 
potentially within, the idea that technologies of surveillance exist but have 
been under- exploited, and the strong beliefs in both the worst- case sce-
nario of nuclear terrorism and the solution to prevent it by anticipating 
and simulating this future in order to know it, if perfect information of the 
present is provided: these have all been played out, even without thinking 
about them.
 Remember how the first discourses were ‘Texan’ and patriotic. They 
exalted patriotism and this patriotism was converted into a thirst for 
revenge to erase the shame of having been attacked in the homeland; a yen 
to fight which spread across the world as something not only understanda-
ble, but legitimate. The interpretations of the attacks were framed by a 
military spirit in search of a target against which reciprocal violence would 
be justified. The only possible response to such a violent deed was allegedly 
another act of violence to appease the suffering of the victims and the 
shame of the military apparatus, plus the desire to punish immediately by 
killing those who ordered and plotted destruction on such a level, clearly 
targeting civilians and third parties not directly responsible for any crucial 
US foreign policy- making.21 Launching immediately a territorial war 
against Afghanistan was a way to show the strength of the country and to 
restore the image of power, playing also with the feeling of taking revenge 
and of deterring a new attack. It was not a discussion about emergency 
powers, about the necessity of a Roman dictature, about a reframing of the 
constitution. It was about mobilising energies.
 Unanimity was the response to atrocity. And unanimity was used to 
mobilize the country against an enemy that the military could tackle. An 
enemy had to be given shape beyond the bodies of the suicide bombers. It 
took the form of a list of ‘rogue states’ that sponsor terrorist networks and 
that are designated as enemies of the US, a list which was redrawn up in 
forty- eight hours to include, for the first time in twenty years, Taliban- ruled 
Afghanistan. But it was not so much instrumental. The great questions of 
the moment of decision, of the ‘why’ such a decision was taken, disappear as 
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virtualities not realized. They were not asked. So, the philosophical question-
ing is at pains to give a serious account of what has been done. It is more 
often a pretext to reconstruct a great narrative and a shared sense with the 
actors of the novelty of the moment than an accurate description of their 
practices. If we look at these practices, it was not a choice to engage into this 
path of an unconventional war against an unconventional enemy; it was just 
evidence shared by everybody. The questions for analysts are not when, why 
and how a Schmittian moment of decision concerning the state of exception 
was taken by the Bush administration, and the possible instrumentalization 
of the attacks by an initial group of actors; instead, they concern the com-
plete lack of questioning and the strength of the doxa of these groups of pro-
fessionals of politics, of military, of intelligence services, of police services, of 
customs and immigrations services, whose differences are so striking and 
struggles for distinction so important, yet who shared this normality to go to 
war and to put large segments of the US population under surveillance and 
interrogations in order to prevent new attacks from happening.
 That such a war and such a surveillance emerged as a solution to put an 
end to the transnational political violence of this so- called new age of hyper-
terrorism and that, initially, nobody countered this evidence by saying that it 
would be a way to create more problems and more violence, in these elite 
circles, is certainly a question which creates more unease than the one of the 
moment of exception; it obliges to think about consent, about the ‘chains’ of 
complicity of large segments of the population, about democracy, and 
cannot be restricted to a manufacture of fear by a group of neo- 
conservatives, pushing an agenda of exception and restriction of freedom or, 
in a more subtle way, as a structural tendency of the contemporary demo-
cracies to decide about bare life. The question of the doxa created by the 
regression to habitus is also a broader question than the one on the state of 
exception, especially now, after the end of the Bush period and the policy of 
Obama to limit the exception, but to continue with the necessity of war (in 
Afghanistan) and of surveillance (apology of CIA) against terrorism. So, let 
us be clear: the choice of war has not been seen as a choice, or even as an 
exceptional moment driven by terror, but as the only way, as a ‘necessity’. 
War, in that situation, has been evaluated as the ‘normal’ response, not as 
an exceptional one. The discussion set up by critical security studies as a cri-
tique of the exception certainly has to be revised.
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7 Revolution in police affairs1
Salvatore Palidda
Introduction
Over the last twenty- five years, research on the police conducted in the 
world’s richest nations has focused on important changes to the institution 
and its practices.2 Among these various changes, the three most significant 
regard the consequences of technological innovations (and in particular so- 
called ‘postmodern’ controls), the development of the privatization of 
security, and the hybridization between police and military matters, which 
reaches the point of implicating or absorbing social prevention and assist-
ance, in a not dissimilar way to humanitarian wars (see other chapters). 
However, there has yet to be an in- depth, coherent analysis of such 
changes at the same level as, for instance, the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). On the premise that changes always take place through 
continuity and adjustments and rarely through true breaks, in this text I 
propose to examine the Revolution in Police Affairs (RPA) by first discuss-
ing the main theoretical and methodological aspects indispensable for an 
analysis of the police forces during the transition from the democratic lib-
eralism of the New Deal and the ‘thirty glorious years’ of the post- war 
period to the management of the neo- liberal/neo- conservative disorder of 
the current era. This can also be seen as the shift from the ‘first’ to the 
‘second great transformation’, or from paternalist/pastoralist governmen-
tality to a form of management that is merely interested in the hic et nunc 
(the here and now), the prosperity of the strongest and not in posterity – in 
other words, the future of society. It is in this general context that it may 
be possible to better understand the rise of the violent management of dis-
order and the concomitant weakening of a negotiated and peaceful govern-
mentality. However, the police’s apparent inability to readily adapt to the 
dynamics triggered by the exacerbation of fears and insecurity hinders the 
triumph of a ‘zero tolerance’ that excessively reduces the spaces for peace-
ful negotiation and establishes a level of security that is ultimately too 
unstable. Having always been accustomed to switching between the carrot 
and the stick, and between violence and mediation, the police are unable 
to abandon informal and sometimes unlawful relations with the various 
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members of local society because it cannot assume the form of a military 
force at permanent war with a particular social group. This tendency also 
appears to heighten cases of violence, misconduct and corruption. This 
leads to disorder within the police itself that is reflected in the distance 
between a component that places its faith entirely in new technologies, the 
postmodern panopticon, and violent methods that even include torture, 
and hence in the myth of the asymmetry of power and strength, and 
another, currently minority and marginalized component that, instead, 
would prefer to modernize the traditional management of disorder. As I 
shall seek to illustrate, the apparent victory of the neo- conservative revolu-
tion in police affairs appears entirely ephemeral precisely because – unlike 
military forces – it is an institution that is embedded in society and cannot 
survive according to a logic of permanent war.
The management of disorder
During the 1960s and 1970s, various authors, including Egon Bittner 
(1990), who is widely regarded as the father of the sociology of the police, 
were convinced that social peace had been achieved and that, in the future, 
there would no longer be a need for the police as an armed wing of the 
state, and hence the holder of a legitimate monopoly of violence (see 
Brodeur, 2001). Moving beyond the evolutionist approach of Norbert 
Elias, Bittner’s thesis was drawn from an interpretation of Max Weber’s 
theory of the state as a supra- ordered, absolute and distinct entity from 
society. 
 This interpretation did not differ greatly from Foucault’s analysis (espe-
cially in Discipline and Punish) where the idea of a rational, perfect power 
– the panopticon – is intertwined with that of biopolitics as the capability 
of total dominion over everyone and everything (Valverde, 2008a, 2008b). 
In contrast, and adopting an interpretative interactionist perspective,3 it 
would appear more helpful to think of the state as the political organiza-
tion of society, which is the result of the interplay between a number of 
social institutions that cooperate, compete or are in conflict with each 
other. As well as private organizations (like businesses or Mafia- type asso-
ciations), public institutions and others regulated by codified norms (such 
as the family, health service, schools, transport, justice, police and prisons) 
are constantly shaped by the interactions between their constituent 
members, the leaders of each social part and the particular social frame in 
which they are situated. While it is true that some institutions or certain 
parts of them (for example, high- ranking officials in ministries or in the 
administration of justice) might appear ‘autonomous’ or unconditioned by 
the interactions between the ‘top’ and the ‘bottom’, at the same time 
society cannot function (in other words, be governed) well or badly 
without the continuous experimenting and adjusting that members of each 
institution are forced to perform on the basis of their exchanges (peaceful 
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or otherwise) and the necessary mediations with the most influential social 
subjects. Obviously, the latter are the strongest actors in dominant social 
circles that are more numerous in democratic countries. Thus, even judges, 
who in theory should be less influenced by interactions with the local 
population, remain subordinate to the game of circular interactions with 
politicians, moral entrepreneurs, police officers, the media, opinion leaders, 
representatives of professional categories as well as ‘citizen’ associations 
that are able to make themselves heard in public space (such as those that 
campaign around the issue of urban security). 
 This situation is even more evident in the case of the police, and has in 
fact been described by some authors as a form of street- level bureaucracy 
(Lipsky, 1971, 1980; Evans and Harris, 2004). While such an expression 
appears to distance itself from the notion of the ‘armed wing of the state’ 
with its rigid (if not dogmatic) invocation of the ‘legitimate monopoly of 
violence’, it still confirms the thesis of the structuring of a state (which is at 
a superior level) as something useful to penetrate society. This leads one to 
think of the police as synonymous with the order that characterizes a state 
governed by the rule of law (regardless of whether this is reactionary or 
democratic), and hence as an organization assigned to carry out surveil-
lance and punishment in accordance with norms that, formally, everyone 
must respect. However, this idea of policing has never been effectively 
translated into concrete reality. This idea recalls the traditional paradigm 
in human sciences that, from Plato and Aristotle to Durkheim and con-
temporary theorists, has considered the history of society as just a series of 
successive phases of order and disorder. According to this model, the 
opposite of order is nothing more than a temporary and almost ephemeral 
state, for order is always destined to prevail thanks to the will, strength 
and ability of dominant actors, including the police, the administration of 
justice and, if necessary, the army. 
 Contrary to this linear and mechanistic vision, the history of societies 
reveals that there has always been a coexistence of disorder and order, war 
and peace, conflicts and mediations (Dal Lago, 2005). Thus, if one adopts 
this interpretative approach, it can be established that the survival of 
society depends on actors or social institutions which seek to govern the 
continuous coexistence of these two trends. To be more precise, this con-
sists in repeated attempts to govern in ‘the best’ or ‘least bad’ way possible 
(Gleizal, 1985) through specific and continuous experimentation, even if 
this often meets with more failure than success, especially due to the fact 
that it is not undertaken with much practical sense or the utmost effort to 
adapt without prejudice to different situations. This is the art of governing 
the disorder that society never ceases to reproduce, both because human 
beings are all different at the same time as being characterized by irration-
ality and rationality (as Max Weber has shown us) and because they are 
always inevitably in conflict as a result of the unequal distribution of 
power and wealth. In reality, the government of society is not that elected 
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by parliament, which seeks to administrate through the various ministries 
to which different institutions (schools, health service, transport, police, 
justice and so on) are attached. 
 Actual government is shaped by the outcome (successful or otherwise) 
of the game of interactions between these institutions and those expressed 
by each sector of society when such an outcome allows for the concrete 
government of disorder. Hence, in certain cases, the institution that 
appears best able to govern may in fact be the police and, on some occa-
sions, even Mafia organizations, rather than other institutions. 
 A social institution’s ability to participate in the concrete government of 
society (and, more importantly, to appear to be the key element in that 
activity) does not only rest upon a delegation from a higher authority or its 
own physical strength, but primarily on its ability to be recognized by a 
sizeable part of the society it governs. As Foucault argues (2004a: 
341–370), power is not solely surveillance and punishment, but also pater-
nalist or ‘pastoral’, in the sense that it takes care (in its own way) of 
people, and may even seek to provide happiness (as various theorists of 
police science, such as von Justi, Turquet de la Mayenne and Delamare, 
suggested). Thanks to Foucault (but also Garfinkel, Goffman and H. 
Becker), it can be better understood how, particularly for the police, this 
consensus translates into a sort of ‘everyday plebiscite’ that exists in every 
moment and every situation. It is as such that the need prevails on the part 
of the police to be recognized by a substantial part of the population as the 
social institution that best governs the permanent disorder produced and 
reproduced by society, not through the simple translation or adaptation of 
codified norms, but thanks to case- by-case experimentation. In doing so, 
police officials (who are inevitably informed by ‘practical knowledge’) con-
tinually re- evoke the classical theory of their institution, even though the 
vast majority will have never heard the names of Guillauté, Delamare, von 
Justi, Turquet de la Mayenne or other contemporary experts on the police. 
On the contrary, officers learn their trade primarily, if not solely, on the 
job or by partnering their elders, and continue to be subordinate to input 
from above: the government, the ministry, and the hierarchy in general. 
But it is especially the relationship with the local population that is deci-
sive, insofar as it acts as the source of a real everyday plebiscite, which is 
obviously implicit, but nevertheless at times highly visible in the local and 
national media and in ‘popularity’ polls. 
 This is not just because the media has become powerful in democratic 
countries (thanks, in part, to the impact of opinion polls, the transmission 
of perceptions of insecurity and victimization surveys4), nor because the 
politics of fear, the exarcerbation of insecurity and the ‘securitarian frenzy’ 
has exerted considerable pressure on police forces. The ‘everyday plebi-
scite’ consists in the possibility of being able to remain on the street amidst 
its multiple social relations, as the social institution that is recognized by 
influential social actors, and as the main holder of responsibility for the 
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management of disorder. This means that members of the police force are 
necessarily obliged to turn a blind eye, let certain things pass, contravene 
norms, tolerate or even commit offences to guard over and punish those 
who cannot or do not intend to respect the rules of the management of dis-
order (‘undesirables’, those condemned by the majority of the included sec-
tions of society or subversives). In this sense, Foucault’s pithy phrase ‘la 
police est un coup d’Etat permanent’ (2004a: 347) has to be understood in 
terms of a sort of continuous redefinition of the state, whereby the man-
agement of permanent disorder is indispensable for its own survival and 
that of the police. Hence, we are not looking at an institution structured 
from above (the state) that descends towards the bottom (society), but 
rather an institution that is situated in society and needs to continuously 
invent forms of mediation between this level and the higher level of the 
political organization of society.
 As I argue below, the ‘neo- conservative revolution’ tends to destroy pre-
cisely the form of management that seeks a balance between the stick and 
the carrot, exemplary punishment and tacit mediation (letting things pass), 
and between tightening and loosening the web. The neo- conservative 
breaking of this balance arises out of the three innovations mentioned at 
the beginning: new technologies, the hybridization between the police and 
the military and the asymmetry of power, and thus the illusion of a violent 
method of management.
The proliferation of panopticons
In his famous article ‘Postscriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle’ (1990: 
240–247), Giles Deleuze provides some important insights about the future 
of social control and sets himself the task of updating Foucault’s work. 
This brief text has become a sort of faitiche (Latour, 1996) for those many 
researchers drawn to mythicizing the ‘postmodern panopticon’.5 In effect, 
rather than developing Deleuze’s valuable insights, they exalt its more 
questionable part. In the text,6 Deleuze recalls Foucault’s vision of the 
history of power that, unfortunately, is quite linear and schematic:
Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries; they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. 
[. . .] But what Foucault recognized as well was the transience of this 
model [a rather questionable term, I would argue!]: it succeeded that 
of the societies of sovereignty [. . .] But in their turn the disciplines 
underwent a crisis to the benefit of new forces that were gradually 
instituted and which accelerated after World War II: a disciplinary 
society was what we already no longer were, what we had ceased to 
be. [. . .] These are the societies of control, which are in the process of 
replacing disciplinary societies.
(Deleuze, 1992: 3)
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And this is how he described the controls:
A common language for all these places [of enclosure] exists, [but] it is 
analogical. One the other hand, the different control mechanisms [have 
a numerical] language. [. . .] Enclosures are moulds, distinct castings, 
but controls are a modulation, like a self- deforming cast that will con-
tinuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve [unfor-
tunately, this too is a term that leads to believe in the ‘postmodern 
panopticon’] whose mesh will transmute from point to point.
(Ibid.: 4)
Deleuze continued by providing some concrete examples that corresponded 
to the new controls of the present (although the new technologies have 
since developed much further, they have yet to extend to generalized social 
control, at least not in all European countries).
 As some authors have clearly illustrated (see Heilmann), the idea of a 
single ‘big brother’ – in other words, a solitary panopticon (or Leviathan 
or empire) – would appear false. On the contrary, there are many ‘big 
brothers’ that correspond to different parts of the political organization of 
society. The enormous deployment of ‘postmodern’ controls can also be 
seen to lead to an implosion, that is, to their obstruction or might enable 
new forms of resistance or opposition. In other words, the idea of the dis-
ciplinarian society as a ‘universal’ concept does not exist (and it would 
seem scarcely useful to conceive any research subject in such terms).7 The 
changes in the various powers, controls, police practices and their con-
sequences can be more satisfactorily understood if one thinks in terms of 
the interiorization of the discourse of power by the dominated parties.8 Let 
us therefore seek to comprehend better the changes brought about by the 
neo- conservative revolution in police affairs.
The neo- conservative transformation of the police
The neo- liberal/neo- conservative developments that commenced in the 
1970s9 led to a destruction (or disorganization or de- structuring) of the 
social set- up that was not as creative as Schumpeter and other liberal 
democrats, such as Keynes, Polanyi, Galbraith and Mills, imagined.10 The 
dominant neo- liberal trend that neo- conservatives have managed to impose 
does not, in fact, aim at creating a new order such as the one envisaged 
(but only partly pursued) during the New Deal and, above all, the ‘glorious 
thirty years’ of the postwar period. The ‘neo- conservative revolution’ from 
the mid- 1970s onwards exalted the asymmetry of power and strength 
between the dominant and non- dominant. This nurtured the illusion of 
being able to impose almost anything at any (human and social) price, 
without the fear of popular revolts or revolutions because the erosion of 
public action by non- dominant elements appeared to have been achieved.11 
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Thus, the powers did not pursue the creation of a new stable and peaceful 
order that had been augured in the past by liberal democrats. In fact, the 
tendency was towards a sort of dominion of permanent disorder through 
force, postmodern controls and the active participation of ‘zealous citizens’ 
who identified with this mode of domination. The rule of law was eroded 
and dismantled, as were the rights acquired by workers and welfare in 
general, while privatization tended to triumph everywhere in the name of 
the maximization of profits. Obviously, the state did not disappear, but 
state institutions tended to have the same status as private ones.12 Today’s 
state has become an actor that functions according to the same logic as any 
other private actor. This means seeking profit at any cost and avoiding all 
spending that does not procure financial benefits for the future of society. 
The approach to running public services (health care, transport, schools, 
and even the police and justice system) tends to reflect the logic underpin-
ning the market and that of profit at any cost and above everything else. 
The confusion between public and private that occurred during the Bush 
administration (but also in almost all other so- called democratic countries) 
and the subordination of the public to the private sector in security matters 
are just some of the most striking recent examples.13
 It is important to observe in the field of security management how a 
part of society, often a minority even if represented by the media as an 
unquestionable majority, has interiorized the discourse of neo- conservative 
power, just as the majority of judges, police officers, doctors, psychologists 
and teachers had always done in the past. In other terms, zealous citizens – 
the ‘included’ – actively participate alongside public and private operators 
in the management of disorder that above all aims at a violent social 
surgery, to the point of turning those excluded into a sort of ‘surplus 
humanity’ (Bauman, 2004; see Rahola, 2003), which, like toxic waste, is 
difficult to dispose of.14 The irredeemable and rejects are those who repre-
sent the human surplus for which nobody is prepared to pay assistance and 
which dominant opinion asks to get rid of as far away from one’s home as 
possible, as if they were rubbish or toxic waste. This trend is marked by a 
break in the balance between (public) social prevention, police prevention, 
repression, penal treatment, and social rehabilitation and reintegration.
 One of the most flagrant examples of this is the substitution of the street 
educator with video- surveillance, which mirrors the more general attempt 
to replace social prevention with so- called police proactiveness, often by 
resorting to different types of police auxiliaries. All of this is accompanied 
by a discourse about the development of prevention that aims to reduce 
the ‘perception of insecurity’, even though what is actually produced is a 
continuous increase in repression and incarceration, in spite of a decrease 
in all forms of criminal offences (Palidda, 2009). The upshot of it all is that 
this does not reduce fears and insecurities, but ensures the permanent 
reproduction of the short circuit between fears, insecurity and securitarism 
that ultimately produces an erosion of political action that bolsters consent 
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for zero tolerance. The reduction, elimination or subordination of social 
workers to police activity thus destroys the division between social preven-
tion and police prevention with the resulting pressure for an increase in the 
repression of any behaviour or presence that is deemed deviant by zealous 
citizens.
 Another example of how the neo- conservative management of street dis-
order leads to the creation of an imbalance between social prevention and 
repression/punishment that in turn favours the violent management of dis-
order by the police is the case of drug addicts. Social and health services 
that deal with addicts have been partly dismantled or reduced to a mere 
presence, while their staff is chiefly made up of temporary workers on mis-
erable contracts, who are therefore forced to work predominantly for 
private centres that obviously only take care of addicts from families with 
medium- high incomes. As a result, poor drug addicts are thrown back onto 
the street, where the police will often ignore them, only to end up organ-
izing periodic round- ups to try to placate the protests of zealous citizens. 
Meanwhile, social and health workers or street educators appear ever more 
compelled to become embedded – that is, to work as police auxiliaries. 
This gives rise to a number of social groups organized around the question 
of security which comprise zealous citizens, embedded social workers, 
officers from police forces, magistrates and journalists who are convinced 
that they will work their way up the professional ladder thanks to zero tol-
erance. These are flanked by pollsters who exacerbate the so- called ‘per-
ception of insecurity’, insurance companies that sponsor them, 
entrepreneurs from the security business sector, private police agencies 
and, finally, political entrepreneurs (and various aspirants) in the govern-
ment of fear who reap and nurture the consensus that is subsequently pro-
duced. The permanent social surgery and ethnic cleansing through the 
racist criminalization of immigrants and gypsies (or, as it is usually known, 
‘racial profiling’, cf. Harcourt, 2008) produce a continuous overcrowding 
of prisons. Despite a fall in all types of offence, there has nevertheless been 
an increase in the number of arrests and prisoners, and in the amount of 
public and private spending for security and insurance policies, which 
further exacerbates fears and, in turn, the demands for zero tolerance 
(Palidda, 2009). At this point, the frame dubbed by Simon (2007) as the 
crime deal begins to take shape; a frame in which the enemies are not polit-
ical opponents, but a sort of new ‘biological threat’, and which appears to 
justify racism as the ‘condition of acceptability of putting someone to 
death’, not ‘in a society of normalization’ as Foucault (1997) once argued, 
but rather, within the frame of permanent wars (against terrorism, rogue 
states, the Mafia, ‘illegal’ migration, insecurity and acts of urban incivility) 
that alternate with ephemeral truces.
 The neo- conservative success has thus led to a transition from the New 
Deal to a management of society that tends to use violent methods them-
selves as a source of profit.15 There is no interest in stability, social peace, 
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progress and democratic development – in other words, in posterity, 
which, as in the case of the youths from the French banlieues or English 
inner cities, appears inconvenient and consigned to the impossibility of a 
secure future. The exacerbation of fears and insecurities, the falsification of 
the escalation of crime and acts of incivility, particularly by minors and 
youths, serves the ‘tautology of fear’ (and thus the consensus), and hence 
the (provisional) social cohesion against the enemy of the moment (Dal 
Lago, 1999a). The intensification of intolerance towards youths (not just 
in England) is perhaps the aspect that most clearly illustrates how the neo- 
conservative management of disorder despises posterity and reveals its 
inability to effectively govern society, as is the case of parents and adults 
in general who have difficulty in their relationships with minors and 
adolescents and resort to violent dominion. Greater repression and penal 
treatment, more resources for the ‘postmodern Leviathan’, a greater 
sacrifice of liberties and rights in the name of security, for the sake of pro-
tecting the real or imagined privileges of included citizens in dominant 
countries: these are the recipes that are imposed, which for police forces 
translate into a rise in violent repressive activity (the continuous persecu-
tion of gypsies, immigrants, marginalized people, demonstrators, football 
fans and even gatherings of youths).
 Within this frame, a constant slippage occurs from the discretionary 
powers of the police towards discrimination and free will, and hence the 
racialization of the targets of much of public and private, local and national 
police activity. It is in this context that there has also been a noticeable 
increase in the number of violent acts by the police bordering on abuses of 
power, corruption as well as tolerance for the same sort of violence against 
the excluded that is inflicted by zealous citizens, racists and neo- fascists.
 The continuous reproduction of numerous unlawful conducts by police 
officers across Europe has been documented for several years by human 
rights organizations and research (among others, see the Amnesty Interna-
tional annual reports, Statewatch and Liste de diffusion- Etat pénal). At the 
same time, it should be noted that those responsible for such events often 
enjoy impunity or even promotion, similar to the treatment granted to per-
petrators of torture in different theatres of war or police operations.16 
Moreover, it is emblematic that victimization surveys never record violent 
crimes committed by police officers, just as there are no statistics about 
such offences (Palidda, 2009).
 Another consequence of this shift towards the violent persecution of the 
excluded is that the police are removed from many of their institutional 
assignments and responsibilities: the fight against tax evasion and unau-
thorized building, checks on different economic and commercial activities, 
controls on waste disposal, safety in workplaces, safeness of products, and 
the compliance with environmental norms, as well as the fight against 
organized crime.17 The result is an increase in underground economies, tax 
evasion, work- related injuries and diseases, pollution and the production 
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of dangerous goods. As such, even more real insecurity is created, only to 
be concealed by a dominant discourse about insecurity and fear, which is 
blamed on the excluded who therefore must be persecuted.
Conclusions
The strong pressures on police forces to adopt a violent approach to the 
management of disorder risk upsetting the role that they should exercise in 
the government of society. This role cannot be characterized by the logic 
of a permanent war, but rather by the necessary search for a social peace 
that is indispensable for posterity. The police’s hybridization with military 
logic and practices, the privilege afforded to new technologies alongside 
the loss of traditional savoir faire, the priority for an affinity with the post-
modern controls industry and the advancement of careers that are closely 
bound to the escalation of zero tolerance are all aspects that appear to be 
destined to lead the police to a serious crisis and to perhaps provoke con-
flicts between postmodern police officers (who are merged with soldiers 
and security contractors) and others who simply limit themselves to mod-
ernizing, moderately and in peaceful ways, the traditional government of 
disorder. The majority of officers ‘drag their feet’, following those in 
command, just as they have always done. The neo- conservative phase is 
probably destined at some point to end, but the repercussions will be felt 
for a long time. It also seems rather illusory that we may be heading 
towards a new New Deal (as Obama’s victory seems to have led some to 
believe), but it likewise seems impossible that different types of power at a 
local, national and worldwide level can claim to govern without a search 
for a balance, and hence for mediation.
 Translation by Yasha Maccanico and Nick Dines.
Notes
 1 This text reflects and develops on the findings of research that I have carried out 
from the 1990s to date, particularly in the context of the Italian research and 
European projects (Migrinf, Elise, Challenge, Crimprev and Ramses2).
 2 Among the first authors to study these changes were G.T. Marx (1984), Birn-
baum (1985) and Christie (1993), as well as contributions to the magazines 
Cultures & Conflits, Surveillance & Society, Déviance et Société, Conflitti 
globali (see Bibliography).
 3 The main theoretical and methodological references of this interpretative and 
analytical perspective are Foucault’s work, a number of propositions by Max 
Weber, as well as those put forward by Garfinkel, Cicourel, Goffman and 
Howard Becker.
 4 Victimization surveys almost always ignore the people who are most liable to 
be victims of abuse, violence and offences (for example, Roma people, irregular 
immigrants and, in general, victims of crimes committed by members of the 
police force). As such, the surveyed victims are only ‘included’ citizens, while 
those identified or alleged to be ‘perpetrators’ are primarily the ‘others’ (see 
Palidda, (ed.) 2009, 2010).
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 5 This myth seems to correspond with that of the ‘pensée unique’, the ‘empire’ 
and the ‘multitudes’.
 6 This chapter, which first appeared in L’Autre Journal, no. 1 (May, 1990), is 
included in the forthcoming translation of Pourparlers (Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1990), to be published by Columbia University Press.
 7 Resorting to ‘universals’ is obviously more reassuring than agnosticism, namely, 
the idea that all interpretations are subjective. For the Foucauldian critique of 
the use of ‘universaux’, see Veyne (2008) and Harcourt (2008).
 8 I do not intend to misrepresent the reference to Foucault and particularly his 
theory of biopolitics that, obviously, must not be mistaken with psychologizing 
approaches.
 9 Obviously, this is not the same neo- liberalism that Foucault (2004a) writes 
about in relation to Gary Becker and others.
10 This must be distinguished from those who can be termed the grandchildren of 
Tocqueville, who advocated the massacre of Algerians resisting French coloni-
zation, namely, the theorists of ‘postmodern’ oxymorons such as ‘humanitarian 
war’ or the justification of torture. This aspect of Tocqueville is still not well 
known among the European mainstream, with the exception of Todorov (1988) 
and, more recently, Le Cour Grandmaison (2005).
11 This is in spite of the dreams of the antagonistic multitudes, ‘global civil wars’ 
or other (tragic) pleasantries espoused by a few anti- globalization activists.
12 The strength of this trend depends on the country and circumstances, and is 
also accompanied by counter- trends, as was visible after the financial crisis in 
2008 that caused some people to shout about the return of the state and even 
Marx.
13 On this matter, the Italian case risks going down in history not only due to 
matters concerning Berlusconi (the richest man in Italy, thanks to a rather shady 
financial past), but particularly because of a proliferation of cases of abuse of 
office by private interests in the public sphere (the scandals of Banca d’Italia, 
Parmalat, Cirio, etc.). Among others, the most revealing is the case of Telecom’s 
secret services that went so far as to subjugate part of the state’s secret services 
(see Giannuli, 2007; Bigo et al. (eds), 2008). Moreover, Italy is configured as an 
exemplary case of ‘anamorphosis rule of law’, namely, the continuous trans-
ition from the legal to the illegal until the criminal and vice versa (as a picture 
that is moving on a distorting mirror) (see Palidda, 1992). This aspect is 
perhaps better understood. There is always the coexistence of war and peace, 
conflict and mediation, corruption and the pursuit of law.
14 Here the reference is to people who have not adapted or do not comply with 
the profile required by the dominant representation of neo- liberal society, to 
those who do not passively yield to subservience to any sort of super (and some-
times violent) exploitation, and even to those who are too worn out or wrecked 
(such as drug addicts or vagrants who are deemed absolutely ‘irredeemable’).
15 No estimate exists for security business (in terms of public and private spend-
ing), but it would not be too exaggerated to think that the figure compares with 
that of military expenditure. The increase of fears is also now repeatedly 
exploited by pharmaceutical lobbies (notoriously exemplified in the cases of 
avian flu and now H1N1).
16 The most striking case is that of the senior police officials and officers respons-
ible for the serious violence and torture against demonstrators during the G8 
summit in Genoa in 2001 (see Palidda, 2007a, 2008).
17 For example, the Central Directorate of the Italian police invited all the prefec-
tures to economize on the costs of investigations, while the prefect of Palermo 
has set the cap for monthly expenses for Mafia investigations at 33,000 euros 
(Custodero, in La Repubblica, 7 March 2009).
8 Surveillance
From resistance to support
Eric Heilmann
In a totalitarian society, the government would ideally like to see a police-
man behind every individual – in other words, to turn each citizen into a 
policeman. In a democratic society, while this kind of total surveillance is 
inconceivable, the government is still expected to maintain public order 
and to also protect itself. Modern states have set up and organized profes-
sional police forces to act under their authority and do these jobs for them. 
Professionalization of the police in France only really began in the nine-
teenth century, when it was, and still is, inseparably linked with data- 
gathering techniques, tantamount to a police science, that allowed them to 
amass specific knowledge on the population (Fijnaut, 1980; Heilmann, 
1990). What is really striking about these techniques is the extraordinary 
economy of resources involved, especially human ones.
 These written records (records, files, archives, etc.) contained detailed 
entries on the actions, opinions and physical characteristics of any indi-
vidual considered to be a threat to social peace. The web was drawn tighter 
by a series of what appeared to be innocuous measures, but which had a 
cumulative effect on the state’s relationship with its citizens. The indi-
vidual’s name, for example, the main way in which he/she was identified, 
was no longer decided by usage, as was previously the case, but by the 
authorities with the establishment of birth records.1 The next logical step 
was to oblige every individual to have a single domicile, the details of 
which would be entered on identity documents, such as the person’s iden-
tity card, passport, livret ouvrier (work book) and others. To facilitate the 
process, official names were given to roads, streets and squares and their 
houses numbered. A wide- ranging set of regulations ensured that this 
meticulous organization would be applied across the whole of urban 
France by the end of the eighteenth century.
 This economy of resources was the correlate of a new ‘economy of visi-
bility’, as it was described by Michel Foucault in 1977, which became the 
basis for disciplinary technology: there is no need for a massive police pres-
ence to keep order in the country as they can keep watch on people 
through individual police records, files and archives. This gave rise to a 
new organization, whereby police attention focused not so much on the 
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individual as on the written information which objectivized them. It was 
now the police archives that provided the ears and eyes for surveillance.
 This being said, does the theoretical paradigm elaborated by Foucault 
for analysing the birth and expansion of disciplinary societies provide a 
relevant platform for understanding the current methods used for public 
order management? The development of CCTV in public areas has led, 
over the last few years, to considerable debate over whether Foucault’s 
conceptual framework – in reference to Bentham’s panopticon – needs to 
be considered within a fresh perspective to address the new ways in which 
social control is being exercised. A number of highly instructive papers 
have been published, where the authors use a variety of metaphors to 
describe these methods – synopticon (Mathiesen, 1997), omnicon (Groom-
bridge, 2002), neo- panopticon (Mann et al., 2003).2 All these publications 
do, however, have a weakness, inasmuch as they fail to factor in public 
support for the deployment of CCTV and suchlike in public spaces, and 
this is a change of considerable significance. This chapter sets out to 
analyse the situation and its underlying causes.
Resistance to registration
To get a proper handle on this change, it is worth going back in time, where 
it is possible to see that all these regulations that set out to establish records 
on the population as a whole and to facilitate the identification or domicile 
of the individual were met with considerable resistance. Three examples 
show the extent of this resistance at three separate periods in French history.
 In his Tableaux de Paris (1782–1788), a detailed chronicle of the morals 
of the period, Louis- Sébastien Mercier described how, when workmen 
carved road names on the sides of buildings and gave individual numbers to 
each house, in accordance with precisely worded regulations, they would be 
insulted, threatened and even struck by the local population and were there-
fore obliged to do their work at night. What is the explanation for this reac-
tion? Nobody was in any doubt that, although there were certain advantages 
in having street names and house numbers, the main idea was to help police 
to more easily find people in the crowded urban sprawls.3
 In the late nineteenth century, Gustave Macé, an ex- high-ranking police 
officer, published a book written for the general public, which contained a 
collection of mugshots, along with observations and stories about police 
work. Some of the photographs showed subjects who had had to be held 
down by force to have their pictures taken: some were held by the body, 
others by the beard or by the hair and one of the men, whose face was so 
contorted as to make him unrecognizable, was being forcibly restrained. 
Macé accused Bertillon, the initiator of mugshots in France, of using force 
for taking his photographs and of packing anyone who made a show of 
resistance away into solitary confinement. ‘There was no point in doing 
away with the straitjacket for murderers who had been sentenced to death 
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only to bring it back for a striking coachman or for individuals who were 
only being held in custody.’ (Macé, 1890: 297). The resistance that some 
of the subjects put up clearly illustrates the power wielded during any kind 
of registration procedure. They are obliged to comply with the instructions 
that go with taking the photograph and they are denied, by force if neces-
sary, any ownership of their own image.
 In the twentieth century, the French law on ‘informatics and liberty’ 
illustrates another phase in people’s resistance to their personal data being 
recorded. In an article published in Le Monde in March 1974, a journalist 
voiced his concerns over police intentions with regards to information 
technology.4 In his article, he said that the French interior ministry had just 
taken delivery of one of the most powerful computers on the market and 
he also revealed that INSEE (the French national statistics institute) was 
planning to set up an ‘automated system for administrative files and indi-
vidual records’ (Safari – Système Automatisé pour les Fichiers Administrat-
ifs et le Répertoire des Individus), which would be able to link up all the 
files within a public administration through the use of a unique identifier. 
The journalist went on to say that the ministry of the interior, now that it 
had the technical resources it needed, ‘intended to play a leading role’. The 
article produced an outcry, with unions, associations and political parties 
coming out against the government’s intentions and the government was 
forced to set up a commission of enquiry (Vitalis, 1981), which com-
menced in November 1974. The commission’s remit was to make recom-
mendations to the government on actions to be taken to ensure that 
information technology would develop while respecting the right to privacy 
and public liberties.
 The commission published its findings the following year and these pro-
vided the basis for the ensuing parliamentary debates, which culminated in 
January 1978 in a law relating to ‘informatics, files and liberties’.
 What is the situation today? Did anyone ever see local inhabitants 
insulting or threatening people installing CCTV cameras in their road? Has 
there been any kind of mass movement protesting against a local or 
national authority’s plans to set up video- surveillance systems? The only 
possible answer is ‘no’. With a few isolated and well- informed exceptions, 
such as the French human rights league and the national anarchists collect-
ive and their ‘smile, you’re being filmed’ catchline, there has been virtually 
no opposition to the installation of CCTV cameras. The deployment of the 
cameras either has the support of the local population or meets with the 
indifference typified by the famous line ‘I’ve done nothing wrong, so I’ve 
got nothing to be afraid of.’
The growth in CCTV
Opposition to the development of video- surveillance technologies, or at 
least an appeal for them to be used in a reasonable way, could have been 
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organized along political lines, but this has never happened. The split 
between left and right, which divided political thinking on security issues 
right up to the end of the 1980s, has progressively disappeared. The fear of 
a massive influx of immigrants from eastern Europe after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, followed by the war on terror after the events of 11 Septem-
ber, brought all the prevailing currents of thinking into the same camp. 
There are now few mayors in France who dare take a stand against having 
CCTV in their town5 and video surveillance has experienced substantial 
growth over the last few years. By 2007, 1,522 local authorities had 
installed CCTV in their streets and public areas, a 25 per cent increase on 
the 1,142 in 2006 and nearly 50 per cent compared with 2005 (812 local 
authorities). For the record, there were only sixty towns with CCTV at the 
end of the 1990s.
 Much of the enthusiasm shown by local authorities for CCTV can be put 
down to the political drive of the interior ministry (Jouanneau, 2009), 
which, since summer 2007, has continually reiterated its desire to ‘triple the 
number of cameras on public highways’. The ministry sought to boost the 
growth in CCTV by giving grants for local authorities, borrowing from the 
British Home Office’s CCTV Challenge Competition system introduced in 
the 1990s (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). The interministerial fund for the 
prevention of delinquency (IFPD) gave handouts to towns that opted to 
install new CCTV systems or renew existing ones, although the running and 
maintenance charges would be paid for by the local authorities themselves. 
The IFPD provided funding for 314 operations in 2007 (for a total cost of 
€13.4 million) and 304 in 2008 (amounting to €10.2 million).
 With crime prevention and urban security at a low ebb, the French inte-
rior ministry also set out a qualitative objective, which was to give the 
French national police and gendarmerie easy access to the images filmed by 
municipal police and other public operators, such as transport companies. 
To this end, the ministry encouraged the creation of networks between exist-
ing public CCTV systems by offering subventions to operators who were 
willing to renew their system to connect it up to the national police network. 
This policy has already had material results, with some fifty surveillance 
centres connected up by the end of 2007 and 120 by the end of 2008.
 Some thirty years after the outcry provoked by the Safari project, it has 
to be said that the government’s plan for expanding CCTV coverage and 
encouraging public video- surveillance systems to connect up to each other 
has met with absolutely no reaction, either from political organizations 
(parties, unions and others) or from the general public. We could go 
further and suggest that the absence of any reaction by political organiza-
tions is due, at least in part, to the support given by the public to the instal-
lation of CCTV in urban areas.
 There are only two opinion surveys known to have been conducted to 
find out French people’s thoughts on the subject, both carried out by a 
survey company.6 The first one, commissioned by the French interior 
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ministry, was conducted in November 2007 on a sample population of 
948 people, while the second, at the behest of the national informatics and 
liberties commission (CNIL), involved 972 people and was carried out in 
March 2008.
 In the 2007 survey, 78 per cent of the people questioned declared they 
were in favour of CCTV in public areas (13 per cent fairly unfavourable, 8 
per cent very unfavourable). When the political affiliations of the subjects 
were taken into account, 88 per cent of people on the right were in favour, 
and 70 per cent of those on the left. The same question in the 2008 survey 
produced fairly similar responses, with 71 per cent of those questioned in 
favour of CCTV in public areas (15 per cent fairly unfavourable, 13 per 
cent very unfavourable). The data provided with the survey gave a precise 
picture of the social background of the people polled: 77 per cent of the 
over- 60s and 74 per cent of women declared they were in favour of CCTV, 
with only 44 per cent of those with three years or more post- secondary 
education and 35 per cent of 18-to- 24 year- olds.
 The 2007 survey also set out to assess the feeling of security given by 
CCTV in a public area. Of those questioned, 66 per cent said they felt safer 
in a public area with video surveillance, including 70 per cent of the 
women polled and 79 per cent of those claiming to be on the political 
right. The 2008 survey included a question on how people felt about the 
current growth in CCTV: 43 per cent of those questioned said there was 
‘not enough’, 33 per cent said there was ‘enough’ and 15 per cent ‘too 
much’, with 9 per cent ‘don’t know’s.
 The information given by these surveys is obviously not on the same 
scale as that provided by scientific research, such as the studies conducted 
in the United Kingdom by E. Charman and T. Honess (1992) and J. Ditton 
(1998), for example. Do we know if the people questioned live in the 
towns or districts where the CCTV is installed? Do they know how these 
systems operate and what their capacity is? Are they aware of the cost and 
the actual effect on delinquency? None of these factors were taken into 
account in the surveys, which takes away some of their effectiveness. This 
being said, the surveys confirm, unsurprisingly, that a considerable major-
ity of the population are in favour of CCTV systems in public areas. Only 
about 10 per cent of the people questioned come out strongly against 
CCTV (8 per cent in 2007 and 13 per cent in 2008 claimed to be ‘very 
unfavourable’).
The determinants of support
How can this support be explained? Several reasons could be put forward: 
the growing fear felt by the population of unknown or unidentified enemies, 
political action by the government, and the increasing influence of com-
panies selling security systems with efficient marketing backing. While all of 
these causes have been studied in depth (Ocqueteau, 2004; Le Goff, 2008), 
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we consider that there are other determining factors, which have either been 
neglected or underestimated, and which come down to the actual nature of 
a CCTV system. This is what will be examined in the this section.
 By entering individual details onto a police database, the police are able 
to keep a constant watch on anyone they believe needs to be kept under 
surveillance. This means that individuals of a certain category are put on 
file, even if the criteria for keeping a subject under surveillance have under-
gone considerable change as the political and ideological context has 
developed. It is when details that reveal the identity or actions of an indi-
vidual (such as personal details or fingerprints) are recorded in a file that 
fierce resistance or a gnawing anxiety is provoked. As C. Phéline (1985: 
110) rightly argues with regard to mug- shots, ‘By resisting a photograph 
being taken, an individual defends his or her personal and social identity 
against the power of the police.’ Similarly, anyone who wants to under-
stand the heated debate that erupted in France in the 1950s over the intro-
duction of fingerprints on national identity cards needs to bear in mind 
that fingerprinting is always thought of as being one of the first steps in 
what Foucault called the ‘penal ritual’. Does it not come down to the fact 
that being entered on police records is the first indication of the individual 
belonging (supposedly or in reality) to a deviant social category?
 CCTV is not seen at all in the same way. If it were a gas, it would be 
carbon dioxide – colourless and odourless. The development of CCTV 
systems, whereby the image is core to surveillance, marks a complete break 
with previous systems. The cameras record a continuous stream of images 
and produce a vast amount of data: if a camera records, say, twenty- four 
images per second, it will produce about two million images in twenty- four 
hours and so a system with twenty cameras will capture over forty million 
images in a single day! The CCTV system in a public area has a dual char-
acteristic: the images are captured without any specific target in mind and 
they are recorded without any criteria governing who is filmed; anyone who 
enters the camera’s field of vision is recorded. This means that the presence 
of CCTV has no effect on the personal and social identity of the people 
filmed. It could even be said that this identity is concealed from the police 
by the system, as an individual could adopt a different social status accord-
ing to their activities over the day. They could be seen successively as 
someone strolling, a consumer, a traveller or a spectator, a chameleon figure 
that is outside any pre- established police classification. While a police file 
records the past and foresees a criminal future – and the individual is con-
sidered as a potential recidivist – the video image captures the present, while 
putting all individual attributes aside for future consideration.
 A third characteristic of a video- surveillance system is its extraordinary 
versatility. It can operate in any kind of location and in any part of a town 
to capture images of people going about their business. The images pro-
duced by CCTV are part and parcel of all aspects of daily life (such as 
housing, education, business, healthcare and work), while there is an 
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enormous range of equipment available on the market, including fixed, 
swivel, analogue, digital and miniaturized cameras, cameras with zoom or 
with a light intensifier, and so on. The technical configurations can also 
take a myriad number of forms, from a single camera connected up to a 
computer, to a sophisticated computer system capable of displaying images 
from several dozen different cameras at the same time. The virtually unlim-
ited range of applications – nowadays cameras can be seen anywhere from 
a nuclear reactor to the stairways in a housing block – means that the use 
of CCTV has now broken out of the original circle of public and private 
organizations responsible for maintaining public order. Video surveillance 
has moved away from its original purpose, which was chiefly security- 
based, to operate in a much wider field, including visual assistance, flow 
management and decision support.
 This development in the use of CCTV has become particularly marked 
in the arguments used by local authorities to justify expenditure on the 
systems they install (Heilmann, 2008). In the late 1990s, the main, almost 
exclusive, claim emphasized the virtues of CCTV in reducing delinquency. 
By 2004 and 2005, anti- terrorism was providing fresh fuel to support its 
use, with considerable use being made of the British example. More 
recently, the accent has shifted to highlighting its life- saving features (alert-
ing the emergency services when people fall ill in the street) or providing 
assistance to municipal roads departments by, for example, reporting 
objects that might be blocking or obstructing a street. In less than a decade, 
the range of services offered to the community has broadened considera-
bly. While it may well be true that this is at least partly due to skilful polit-
ical and commercial manoeuvring, it also goes to show that the operators 
of CCTV systems have shown remarkable imagination in coming up with 
new ways of maximizing the use of their equipment.
Conclusion
Can the government and local authorities always rely on the backing or 
passivity of the population for expanding the use of CCTV?
 Information and communication technology has removed the barrier that 
once separated private from public life and the clearest example of this is 
reality television, where the intimate lives of a group of people are broadcast 
to an audience of millions (Tisseron, 2002). Also, nowadays, anyone can 
have a webcam or mobile phone with which they can produce their own 
images, from the most banal to the most intimate, which can then be placed 
on a personal or community website. It could therefore be said that the pres-
ence of CCTV cameras in urban areas is the symptom of an inexorable his-
torical process, whereby a society or an ideology of transparency and the 
tyranny of appearances subject individuals to permanent exhibition.
 The different ways the images are produced shows that they each have 
their own specific features and it would be wrong to seek an all- enveloping 
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explanation such as the ‘dispersal of discipline’ in contemporary society 
(Green, 1999; Lyon, 2001) to grasp the situation. If we examine the inten-
tionality of the operators, as suggested by Lianos (2003), we understand 
that when an individual produces images, it is based on claiming their own 
identity – the individual must be able to express his or her personal iden-
tity even within the public sphere – which is the opposite to what promot-
ers of CCTV systems on public highways set out to do.
 This being so, it is possible to see what might wake people up to the use 
of the systems. Technological advances are now making it increasingly easy 
to link up in real time the anonymous images recorded by CCTV with per-
sonal digital data stored on the servers. For the police, these technologies, 
which were only of limited use a few years ago, have produced a signific-
ant breakthrough in identifying individuals (Norris, 2002). Ever more 
importantly, however, from our point of view, the use of these new systems 
should encourage people to consider how surveillance is affecting them. 
The recent survey conducted by H. Wells and D. Wills (2009) in Great 
Britain on drivers and their attitudes to speed cameras, shows a sea change 
in thinking. The authors show that the use of the cameras has produced 
unexpectedly fierce resistance, expressed in quite singular terms:
This resistance is not characterised by complaints of ‘Big Brother’ or 
couched in civil liberties terms. The dominant motivating narratives of 
drivers and drivers’ groups are of challenges to identity and the per-
ceived misrepresentation of the individual in encounters with the par-
ticular surveillance technology.
(p. 259)
Speed cameras photograph a car if it exceeds the speed limit and then link 
the licence number up with its owner. The system has led to the formation 
of groups of drivers, all of whom describe themselves as ‘normal’ and ‘rea-
sonable’, who are protesting against the ‘inappropriateness’ of this form of 
surveillance carried out by police officers who would be better off using 
their resources to catch ‘real criminals’. So while the success of CCTV was 
based on creating a dichotomy between the respectable majority (who have 
nothing to fear) and a deviant minority (who should feel threatened), speed 
cameras have distorted the line separating the two categories. If the argu-
ment put forward here turns out to be correct, then it is possible that with 
this distortion, we are beginning to see the first signs of the emergence of a 
genuine, identity- based resistance to images produced by CCTV.
Notes
1 In the early nineteenth century, a new obligation was added to the French civil 
code: each citizen had to have a surname and a Christian name (or names) 
recorded on their birth certificate – see Lefebvre- Teillard (1990).
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2 For a summary version, see V. Francis (2009).
3 This resistance would continue for some years yet and spread to other countries. 
In his novel ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Being’ Milan Kundera described the 
first few days of the Prague spring: ‘People in every city and town had pulled 
down the street signs: sign posts had disappeared. Overnight the country had 
become nameless. For seven days, Russian troops wandered the country, not 
knowing where they were’ (Harper & Row, 1984, p. 166). See also J. Koudel-
ka’s illustrated report Prague 1968 (1990).
4 Ph. Boucher, ‘Safari ou la chasse aux Français’, Le Monde, 21 March 1974.
5 Most of them are members of the French Communist Party.
6 Ipsos survey, carried out by phone 2–3 November 2007; representative sample 
of the French population, aged 18 and over; quota method: gender, age, occupa-
tion of head of family, type of urban unit, region, and Ipsos survey, conducted 
by interviews, 14–17 March 2008; representative sample of the French popula-
tion, aged 18 and over; quota method: same as above.
9 Enemies- criminals
The law and courts against global 
terrorism1
Gabriella Petti
What about global terrorism?
Academics and legal experts have been tackling the question of global ter-
rorism for a number of years. In fact, various conventions exist that deal 
with the matter in different terms. The work undertaken by these profes-
sionals, from formulating theories and identifying countermeasures to 
negotiating agreements and normative bricolage that accommodate the 
supranational level at the national level, has led to global terrorism moving 
beyond the limited borders of the language of international bureaucracies 
and has merged the actions of different political groups that sometimes 
employ extremely violent methods of struggle into an ideal model.2 In fact, 
the positions adopted by the United Nations towards ‘freedom fighters’ 
and people who are militarily defeated or oppressed by the violence of 
occupiers are somewhat ambiguous.3 The ‘war on terror’ has made it even 
more difficult to draw a distinction between war and peace, and has in 
turn blurred the separation between internal and external enemies, thus 
leading to a deep transformation of the idea of enemy itself. Enemies, most 
reassuringly personified in the figure of the terrorist criminal,4 lose ‘any 
recognition of their status as combatants’ and may be treated ‘as a techni-
cal problem’, in the same way as a natural disaster or epidemic (Dal Lago, 
2005: 29). International consensus was built precisely on these ‘operative’ 
aspects and it was after 11 September 2001 that the need to strengthen the 
common struggle against terrorism asserted itself.
 The attack against the Twin Towers served as the trigger that enabled 
the dissemination of new operative standards and legislative reforms into 
different national contexts, which led to the tightening of control proce-
dures and the establishing of exceptional measures at all levels of the crimi-
nal trial, from investigations to sentencing. These reforms were introduced 
amidst a media- induced climate of fear and required the cooperation of 
several social actors, in particular experts from administrative bureaucra-
cies, to become affirmed.5 Documents produced by international institu-
tions have created a ‘profile’ of the Islamic terrorist built around the figure 
of the Arab and Muslim immigrant who, in turn, is identified as the quin-
tessential object of contemporary fears.
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 The European Union participated in the global offensive against terror-
ism but adopted an approach that was somewhat different to the one in 
English- speaking countries.6 However, in Italy, as in numerous other Euro-
pean countries, there has been growing concern among some jurists that 
the country’s penal system may be contaminated by a ‘wartime logic’7 
which would appear to confirm the assertion that there now exists a gener-
alized state of exception or, put another way, an unceasing management of 
emergency.8 In effect, the efforts by the media, opinion makers, law 
enforcement agency officials and political leaders in Italy have been so 
intense and continuous in producing a common portrayal of the presence 
of an Islamic terrorist threat that they have managed to sway public 
opinion and to impose particularly repressive legislative measures.9
 One consequence of the climate of moral panic was the exacerbation of 
measures, which included the introduction of the specific offence of interna-
tional terrorism.10 Particularly in the wake of the attacks in Madrid and 
London, persecution campaigns by the media and police against ‘suspect 
communities’ (Hillyard, 1993) resumed and a new cycle of reforms was set 
in place.11 All the laws were introduced in the form of ‘urgent decrees’. Thus, 
the alarm around the threat of possible terrorist acts was compounded by 
the fear that a multiplication of norms restricting fundamental human rights 
could entail the obliteration of democratic principles and the constitutional 
state. In reality, ‘emergency legislation’ through the use of governmental 
decrees that circumvent parliamentary debate is such a consolidated instru-
ment in Italy that it constitutes the model through which interventions on 
issues of security and repression are carried out (cf. Moccia, 1997).
 The matters described thus far must certainly not be underestimated. 
However, I feel that the stories of prosecutions, imprisonment, convictions 
and deportations that have marked the lives of many Muslim citizens in 
Italy cannot be understood as merely the effect of a continual climate of 
moral panic, or the consequence of the exceptional measures adopted, but 
should also be interpreted in terms of the practices that are at work in the 
places where they have largely been decided: the courts. The reference to 
Becker in the title of this first section stands as a reminder of the risks that 
may incur when ‘a class [is created] on the basis of how other people 
(judges, police officers, psychiatrists) have reacted’ (Becker, 2003: 483). If 
one leaves aside their assumed objectivity, ‘terrorists’ are particularly well 
suited in providing a mirror image of the mechanisms that produce them.
 Courtrooms are not just a place in which definitions of criminals (or ter-
rorists) are assigned and tested, but they are also the arena in which the 
right to punish and the power to divide the guilty from the innocent is ritu-
ally celebrated. From this perspective, I find the court, first and foremost, 
interesting as the setting where discourses, forms of knowledge and prac-
tices that reproduce social images of terrorism are developed and redefined. 
Nonetheless, I also believe that focusing the analysis on these particular 
proceedings may also contribute to an understanding of some of the 
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practices that are specific features of Italy’s courts, but which are usually 
overshadowed by routine organizational practices. The court, however, 
must not be regarded as a homogeneous community, but as a ‘field’ where 
professionals, possessing diverse types of capital and differentially situated 
within this space, compete from the starting point of a set of shared 
preconditions.12
 In short, trials tell us something about terrorism that is difficult to 
discern from official discourse and demonstrate how the practices and 
activities of courts, even the smallest of details, produce effects and influ-
ence the legal definitions of terrorism. In turn, dealing with terrorism in 
courts enables a better understanding of the logics that govern the trials 
themselves. By emphasizing the need to remain within the boundaries of 
law, ‘even’ in the fight against the terrorist criminal, means that these judi-
cial proceedings are particularly useful in illustrating how mechanisms of 
exclusion, neutralization and symbolic (or material) annihilation of certain 
categories of individuals are enabled, not so much by a situation of legal 
exceptionality, but through the normal, day- to-day workings of the courts.
War against the global enemy in the legal field
The issue of international terrorism had already been tackled in Italy back 
in the mid- 1990s. Investigations undertaken at the time targeted groups 
that held radical interpretations of the Islamic faith, but were clearly dif-
ferentiated in terms of nationality and generally comprised opponents of 
governments with which Italy had agreements or economic relations.13 The 
trials always ended in acquittals or a modification of charges. At the time, 
the Italian criminal justice order was motivated by the principle of the 
prevalence of national sovereignty, according to which an activity was, 
from a legal perspective, ‘subversive’ or ‘terrorist’ only if it directly 
involved the Italian constitutional order.
 Since 2001, investigations have generically concerned Bin Laden or the Al 
Qaida organization, while groups or individuals that were previously 
deemed to act autonomously have subsequently become alleged members. 
The measures used to establish whether an act is of a terrorist nature are 
essentially based on their pursuit of a particular cause. This involves an 
‘interpretation’ of jihad as a ‘violent strategy’ that, in turn, is attributed to 
associations14 or individuals.15 This generalization partly results from the 
fact that the theoretical reference model changed after 2001, as the interpre-
tation of global terrorism as an organization possessing a centralized 
command of operative divisions switched to the idea of an organizational 
structure based on a division of labour around territorial specializations and 
without a principal coordinating body. According to this vision, the various 
groups are unified not by their organization, but through a form of ‘franch-
ising’.16 The Italian component has supposedly specialized in ‘subsidiary 
activities’, such as training, recruitment, document forgery and funding.17
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 Besides the intense media coverage of attacks that never actually took 
place, the activities described in trial documents have always amounted to 
logistical and financial support for ‘terrorist’ activities, even though the 
verified economic transactions have been far inferior to the sums interna-
tionally agreed to constitute the funding of a terrorist organization. The 
channels followed are those typically used for immigrants’ remittances and 
the confiscated sums often comprise amounts in small denominations, as in 
the case of a suspect who had ‘around five thousand euros in small coins 
confiscated’ (Spataro, 2007).
 A global version of the dominant frame that considers ‘immigrants as 
an enemy’ appears to have asserted itself (Dal Lago, 1999b). The figure of 
the terrorist and its associated activities have become blurred with the 
figure of the migrant (Arab and Muslim) and with those practices, illegal 
or on the margins of legality, that are related to this condition. Thus, a 
group of people that covertly lives in an abandoned shack or in an anony-
mous flat may be viewed as a likely Al Qaida base in Italy. Even the rather 
widespread practice of entrusting documents to friends or acquaintances 
can backfire. In fact, the discovery of several identity documents stored at 
a single place of residence – of people living in a dormitory or, in any case, 
of those who do not have their own home – have led, on a number of 
occasions, to the conjecture that this must be a terrorist base. Street maps 
or tourist guides of cities in the hands of these immigrants turn into pos-
sible plans for attacks. Finally, and above all else, attending a mosque and 
expressing one’s ideas are elements that raise a great deal of suspicion. 
Thus, if all the suspicious conducts take place together, there is a very high 
risk of being considered supporters, if not members, of a terrorist organ-
ization. That such a set of circumstances might form the basis of a case 
history is not an exaggeration, for indeed it has surfaced in the trial docu-
ments of a number of investigations in Rome in which all the parts of the 
mosaic submitted by investigators were subsequently deconstructed into 
elements lacking particular significance or dangerousness.18
 However, it is not just that terrorists are denied their national and ideo-
logical identity as a result of their social characterization, but that the very 
offence of terrorism has progressively lost its specificity. The package of 
reforms adopted after 11 September meant that the existing offence now 
expanded to encompass other conducts, including activities undertaken 
against foreign countries, and hence provided the basis for bringing charges 
against people. According to its new wording, any political activity charac-
terized by violence against an established power falls within the scope of 
public order and hence may be prosecuted, even if it does not directly 
concern Italy. However, the definition is ambiguous and, as such, is often 
revealed too vague to lead to a conviction for international terrorism. It 
was precisely the difficulties encountered in trials that led to the introduc-
tion of new legislative provisions19 concerning activities that are suppos-
edly inherent to the ‘modus operandi of Italian cells’ (Viganò, 2007: 42): 
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recruitment of terrorists, training and supplying instructions (including 
through the use of video messages).20 This aspect was confirmed, to varying 
degrees, in many of the interviews with legal professionals. This is one 
example:
My first impression on reading the legislation [law 155/2005] was that 
in light of the trials that had already started, they had realized that 
certain forms of behaviour, whether or not regarded as evidence of ter-
rorism, were in reality neutral, and could not be punished precisely 
because of their characteristics. But these were nevertheless seen to be 
a reflection of the inherent dangerousness of the people carrying out 
such acts and, hence, they decided to turn them into criminal norms. 
In other words, the legislation was certainly influenced by the outcome 
of the first trials. [. . .] We were facing such a new situation that the 
legislator thought they could resolve the issue with a single move by 
introducing new legislation [in 2001], but then, in reality, information 
emerged as the trials evolved that was striking for the danger it pre-
sented but which could not have any implications of a penal kind. 
Thus, this was a political choice, obviously in the aftermath of the 
events in London.
(Magistrate)
The latest modification of the criminal offence of terrorism was implicitly 
introduced by a sentence of the Court of Cassation (Italy’s highest appeal 
court) in 2006 (no. 1152), which further extended its definition through 
the combination of different provisions from international legislation. The 
category of ‘terrorism’ was now so flexible that it enabled convictions even 
for people who contravened legislation on immigration or document 
forgery, as long as these activities fell within a programme of ‘terrorist 
intent’, which, in certain conditions, could also include actions aimed at a 
military target. From this moment onwards, trials have largely ended with 
convictions.
 Subjects implicated in police operations and trials conducted during this 
period have been unavoidably condemned to being labelled terrorists. They 
were designated terrorists even before the specific offence existed, and its 
introduction merely ratified this status. Moreover, this condition was not 
simply established by the outcome of proceedings. In fact, even when they 
ended in acquittals, some defendants were expelled for ‘public order 
reasons’. The same occurred to those whose trials for terrorism were 
pending and were released as a result of the indulto (a pardon introduced 
in July 2006 to ease the problem of overcrowding in prisons) and to those 
who had completed their sentences: all were terrorists for life, and the pos-
sibility of them mending their ways was not envisaged. Upon returning to 
their countries of origin, many of those expelled were arrested, sometimes 
subjected to torture or even disappeared.21 Finally, on occasions when 
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investigations did not lead to any results or were insufficient to initiate a 
trial, the suspects (especially in cases involving imams) were nonetheless 
repatriated for ‘pre- emptive reasons’.22
 Overall, it is not easy to establish the number of people affected by this 
pre- emptive activity or those implicated in investigations, also because it is 
not possible to accurately reconstruct the investigations that have ended in 
cases being shelved, to ascertain the actual number of people expelled or 
acquittals. The scant information that exists regards convictions alone; and 
these may be deemed significant only as a measurement of the activity of 
the police and the system for the administration of justice (Kitsuse and 
Cicourel, 1963). It is also for this reason that I have chosen to carry out 
qualitative research on the trials held in a single court: that of Milan, the 
most representative court in Italy where twenty- three out of the thirty trials 
between 2001 and 2007 were held.
De- politicization mechanisms and routes to disappearance
The offence of international terrorism was only introduced into the penal 
code after the attacks in the United States, whereas a majority of the pro-
ceedings – during the period in question – concerned matters that took 
place before 11 September. Moreover, the conducts described in the charge 
sheets of trials prior to 2001 are very similar to those ‘committed to trial’ 
by investigators after the introduction of the offence of international ter-
rorism. Often the protagonists of these judicial matters were the very same 
people. Finally, prior to 2001, the aggravating circumstances envisaged for 
internal terrorism were already being raised in the charges. In concrete 
terms, the introduction of a specific offence does not appear to have 
brought about major changes to proceedings. What did change was the 
atmosphere in which they were held. For everything now took place under 
the media spotlight.
 The hypermediatization of trials is a phenomenon that is by no means 
new in Italian justice, especially when courtrooms become ritual venues 
for celebrating the fight between good and evil. Here, I wish to stress an 
extra characteristic that appears to set these investigations apart: a mul-
tiplication of proceedings for the same events, to the point of determin-
ing a ‘judicial continuum’, which, in its basic outline, is reminiscent of 
the period of the maxi processi.23 Here, rather than to the number of 
defendants, I am referring to investigative and trial practices used to 
tackle internal terrorism or the Mafia that were later resumed during the 
judicial struggle against political corruption in the early 1990s. It is 
worth noting that such practices are currently part of the magistrates’ 
essential baggage, even though, for a long time, they were deemed the 
product of the emergency legislation, which, according to Luigi Ferrajo-
li’s definition (1989: 844–888), operated ‘under a criminal justice system 
of exception’.
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 Considering the extent to which these practices are entrenched, one 
could argue that judicial practices have taken primacy over legal defini-
tions. It is probably the combination of the technologies employed by legal 
professionals that enables the bringing together and blurring of different 
forms of behaviour, ideology and expressions of political violence into a 
single concept. In other terms, the hypothesis is that terrorism is more the 
‘resulting object’ of a combination of investigative and judicial procedures 
that are constantly reproduced than an expression of ideological and polit-
ical coherence. To be more precise, I believe that the meaning of interna-
tional terrorism – in other words, its typology, characteristics and operative 
modes – which has increasingly prevailed during trials, may have been 
partly determined by the use of investigative and procedural practices 
inherited from the fight against internal terrorism. Likewise, it is precisely 
the persistence of these judicial and police practices over time24 that 
appears to indicate a continuity in the treatment of the issue of terrorism 
which, to an extent, refutes a description of the recent situation in terms of 
exceptionalism. Let us now briefly look at some of the technologies that 
have been borrowed from the judicial season of the maxi processi.
 One of the most evident mechanisms is what Ferrajoli (1989: 861) 
defined as the ‘vertical expansion’ of proceedings; in other words, an 
increase in the offences for which each defendant is charged, which are 
either tautologically derived from each other – associative offences from 
specific offences and vice versa – or are attributed to other members of the 
association by way of external participation. In some measures adopted for 
international terrorism, especially those concerning preventative measures 
(Pepino, 2006: 862), the ‘programme of violence’ is drawn from conversa-
tions that are marked by religious radicalism, whereas the ‘associative link’ 
becomes concrete through an ideological support for jihad, which is 
assumed from the use of antagonistic language towards Western culture 
(Morosini, 2005: 411). Moreover, ‘the aptness of the organizational struc-
ture for terrorist intent’ is deduced from the commission of specific 
offences such as document forgery or the aiding and abetting of ‘illegal’ 
immigration. In turn, the ‘terrorist intent’ of these acts is demonstrated by 
the ideological adhesion to jihad or by the availability of propaganda 
instruments for its promotion, without direct involvement in attacks or 
specific knowledge about such facts being proved. Finally, the associative 
criminal offence is often proved using telephone contacts and a ‘circularity 
of relations’: not much, if one considers how difficult it was to prove Mafia 
membership or external complicity on this basis.25
 Vertical expansion is also accompanied by an extension of the length of 
trials and of preventative imprisonment (Ferrajoli, 1989). Some proceed-
ings have dragged on for years, with considerable intervals between the 
conclusion of preliminary investigations and the start of hearings. The 
overall periods of detention are sometimes longer than three years. A tech-
nical means employed to considerably lengthen the detention period is that 
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of alleging the use of weapons as an aggravating circumstance in the charge 
sheet. However, in each case, weapons were never found and the aggravat-
ing circumstance was always dismissed when it came to sentencing. Never-
theless, this charge is systematically used by public prosecutors. The very 
charge of terrorist intent, first as an aggravating circumstance and, after 
2001, as an offence has caused more than a two- fold increase in the length 
of detention. Furthermore, arrests often involve names that are already 
known, so much so that many preventative custody orders are received by 
people who are already in prison, turning these individuals into fixed 
actors in the repetition of the performance of the judicial drama. It is 
worth recalling that these practices are normally applied to avoid the 
problem of the expiry of deadlines for preventative imprisonment.
 The procedures described above are supplemented by the use of crimi-
nals turned state witnesses: without their statements, the Milan prosecu-
tors’ office’s hypothesis for bringing charges is often too fragile to lead to a 
conviction. The existence of propaganda material, the results of wiretap-
ping and surveillance of social networks, and the finding of counterfeit 
documents or sums of money in defendants’ homes were previously con-
sidered too weak as evidence to result in a conviction for the offence 
detailed in article ‘270 bis’. They have begun to take on the consistency of 
proof, especially after the appearance of criminals- turned-state witnesses. 
These are people who have been tried on different occasions by the Milan 
magistrates, sometimes for entirely different offences, such as drug dealing, 
and who, after plea- bargaining for their sentence, have started to 
cooperate.
 Finally, proceedings comprise documents that are thousands of pages 
long, and this is another element that means that the defence counsel’s 
activity is practically blocked, especially if defendants cannot count on 
legal aid for their defence. Only in rare instances has it been possible to 
appoint defence advisors or to undertake investigations for the defence. 
The game has largely been played out in the field of the evidence submitted 
by the prosecution. Moreover, the lawyers’ defences are not well 
coordinated and it is not uncommon for them to be in conflict with each 
other as a result of their different trial strategies or to simply compete for 
visibility, clients and credibility. In effect, the outcome of the first trials was 
strongly influenced by the decision of the defence to attain quick solutions 
that were not excessively costly (largely resolved through plea- bargaining 
or summary procedure), due to the lawyer’s difficulty in recovering the 
trial costs. Sentences issued on these occasions have sometimes been the 
basis for other convictions.
 These procedures allow for an understanding of how the entire judicial 
institution can become a place which, rather than ascertaining the exist-
ence of a criminal offence, is directly established through the procedures 
that are effectively at work in the administration of justice (Sudnow, 1983: 
146). A defendant ceases to be the actual subject of the trial, and instead 
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turns into the ‘arena of confrontation’ between the different implicated 
actors’ interpretations of facts and norms; the space where new legal defi-
nitions are reproduced or tested and the balance of elements within the 
judicial field are regulated.
 While the mechanisms outlined so far display a continuity with proce-
dures that are inscribed in the history of Italian courts, trials for Islamic 
terrorism do have some distinctive features of their own: a degree of ‘fick-
leness’ in the use of judicial interpreters and a unique lack of interest with 
regards the structure, opinions and political motives of the organizations 
that are implicated in investigations. The assistance provided by interpret-
ers poses several difficulties in investigations involving foreign citizens, but 
are more marked in cases of international terrorism. It suffices to consider 
that the list from which they are drawn is not always based on specific cul-
tural and linguistic competencies because the most sought- after character-
istic is for the advisor to be reliable. In fact, interpreters rarely share the 
same nationality of the defendants, which probably arises from the 
assumption that, at the end of the day, they all speak the same Arabic. 
Rather, it seems that it is the prosecutor’s office itself that recommends a 
shortlist of advisors ‘trusted’ by the magistrates who are examining the 
case.
We have a list. Finding someone depends on availability and on trust. I 
tell you this, when I did my first trial getting hold of an interpreter was 
a problem. And I’ll tell you straight away that I can’t remember the 
name of the interpreter on that occasion, but in any case, some time 
earlier the Procura della Repubblica [public prosecutor’s office] had 
mentioned the name of someone who, in fact, you don’t see around 
anymore. [. . .] He has never been charged as far as I know, I have 
never seen him as a defendant. ‘We report that some investigations are 
underway, it appears as though he may be a member or a supporter of 
extremist circles, etc.’ The public prosecutor’s office indicated him to 
us and I didn’t appoint him. So it isn’t easy because there are only a 
few of them, but with the agreement, in any case, even with the advice 
of the prosecutor’s office, saying ‘Well, do you have any problems with 
this one?’, it can be done, it can be done . . . we have found some inter-
preters who are always the same ones, after all.
(Judge)
According to most of the lawyers interviewed, the same superficiality 
towards linguistic and cultural issues also applies to the knowledge of the 
political inclinations and is particularly apparent in the blurring of ‘terror-
ist’ organizations with radical organizations. Apart from a few exceptions, 
different groups are muddled up and placed under the same label of jihad. 
In this way, the radical simplification of the language used by terrorists – a 
unified Arabic produced in vitro by the judicial machine – is accompanied 
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by a drastic reduction of the political motives of their alleged membership. 
More accurately, the de- politicization of terrorists is achieved by creating a 
split moral personality, suspended between the extremes of religious radi-
calism and those of personal emotional traumas, which may then sway 
between the suffering during childhood and the typical ‘disorientation’ of 
immigrants who do not feel welcome in the host society. These are thus 
individuals with weak identities, who are easy prey to indoctrinators who 
instruct them in a creed that, in most cases, they have never previously 
professed.26
 In other terms, terrorists progressively slide from the political field to 
that of pathology. Their profile is recomposed around the compromise 
figure of the ‘religious fanatic’, lacking any social or political motivation, 
who is on the verge of madness and who escapes the brutality of reality 
by seeking refuge in the comforting space of divine justice. It amounts to 
a dual nonage produced by an unspecified pathology and by the flight 
from political maturity towards a blood- stained religious dream. Hence, 
whereas national subversive groups were recognized as possessing a clear 
and autonomous ability for political and ideological analysis, in the case 
of Islamic terrorists this ability is denied and becomes blurred with their 
‘barbaric character’. This is exemplified in the words of a public 
prosecutor:
So, the names of groups were found because we stumbled upon them 
during the investigations. In contrast to internal terrorism and the 
clearly defined structure of the Mafia – the Red Brigades had a 
Marxist- Leninist type of organization with a particular vision [. . .] 
while a Mafia family has its rules – here there are no well- defined 
structures. More than anything else, there are movements. So, if I want 
to use a category, they are movements that are based on a general 
readiness to kill the largest possible number of infidels. If someone is a 
member or in some way close to one group, this does not necessarily 
mean that they cannot belong to another group.
To summarize, I feel that it is precisely the formal fairness of trials that has 
enabled the violation of the rights of many Muslim individuals accused of 
membership of terrorist organizations, rather than the need for discretional 
or exceptional practices that delegitimate the role of the judicial system. A 
more effective result can, in fact, be attained by simply reproducing, 
through the ritual of explicit or implicit court procedures, the combination 
of social prejudices which reflect Foucault’s definition of ‘state racism’, 
which in the case of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ is taken to its extreme due to 
their ‘a priori exclusion from humankind’ (Dal Lago, 2005: 30).
 It does not seem to me that the ‘state of exception’ which is often used 
to describe the strategies of the fight against terrorism can be detected in 
these practices: the play between the sovereign’s right to kill and the 
148  G. Petti
bio- power rendered through mechanisms enacted by racism is ‘effectively 
inscribed within the functioning of every state’ (Foucault, 1998: 225). In 
the examples discussed here, rather than causing to die, it is more a matter 
of leaving to die – an operation more compatible with a normalized soci-
ety’s techniques of government – which is aseptically applied to all those 
individuals who are not allowed to live. One of the acquittal sentences 
clarifies this mechanism well when it states:
A different treatment in trials cannot be conceived for certain categor-
ies of defendants. The notorious opinion of Günther Jakobs that ‘ter-
rorists do not have rights’ can certainly not be followed, because it is 
in open conflict with the Italian penal system and even the Convention 
on human rights.
Even though the same judge fully acquitted the defendants, if one reads 
between the lines, it is apparent that he nevertheless considers them poten-
tially dangerous due to their proximity to ‘fundamentalist milieus’. Accord-
ing to the defence counsel, in fact, there is a passage written in the ruling27 
that undermines the situation of its clients because it leaves open the risk 
of deportation ‘for public order reasons’. This possibility would entail their 
return to a country where one of the defendants has been subjected to 
torture, according to the information gathered from the telephone inter-
ceptions that form part of the trial documents.
 The court can therefore be understood as a space in which the enemies 
of society are constantly reproduced. Moreover, it is one of the symbolic 
places in which the social legitimation to reproduce these enemies is estab-
lished. The courtroom becomes a sort of transitional space that leads 
towards the dark areas of administrative control, where degraded and 
depoliticized subjects are situated. From this viewpoint, the court, in 
accordance with the ceremonial procedures laid down by law, represents 
the possible point from which terrorists, migrants and an entire body of 
abnormal humanity set out on an invisible journey towards their own ‘dis-
appearance’, to the general indifference of the public and without causing 
a stir.
 Translation by Yasha Maccanico and Nick Dines.
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Part III
The reshaping of global 
society

10 Peacetime war discourse
The political economy of bellicose 
metaphors
Marcello Maneri
People react to fear, not love. They don’t teach that in Sunday school, but 
it’s true.1
(Richard Nixon)
A significant tradition of studies, which could be summarized by the 
expression ‘truth (or grammar) is the first casualty of war’,2 has been con-
cerned with examining the ideological nature of political and media dis-
course during wartime. Rather than seeking to answer the question ‘What 
does war do to politics’ (or to the media), here I want to examine what 
political and media discourse does with the rhetoric and language of war, 
particularly in peacetime.
 At a time of war, the act of violence upon words is amplified and laid 
bare through forms such as (self-)censorship, euphemisms, metaphors, 
orders and threats. Instead, during peacetime (or, to be more accurate, in 
the absence of wars that are explicitly recognized as such), the exercise of 
violence through words can pass more or less unobserved. This is a lan-
guage that is often just as militarized, but one which is not forced to cir-
cumvent the close scrutiny of the consumer of the spectacle of war.
War and danger in the US ideological consensus and the 
new European political realism
The discourse of the War on Terror is the most recent case in which a bel-
ligerent statement in peacetime has established a sphere of intervention in 
order to legitimate a permanent state of low- intensity war. After 11 Sep-
tember 2001, the speeches made by Bush and members of his executive 
regarding the ‘War on Terror’ imposed themselves as the framework for 
understanding and opposing threats against the internal security of 
Western countries.3 As many observers have noted, the main characteristic 
of these speeches was the declaration of a permanent state of war, by rede-
fining what were initially labelled as ‘acts of terror’ as acts of war. Rather 
than framing what happened as a ‘crime’ (which occurred in similar cases 
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in other countries), the US administration preferred to speak of an act of 
‘war’ and ‘combat casualties’, thus clearing the way for a military response 
rather than recourse to police repression and the criminal justice system.
 Another relevant characteristic of this discursive construction was the 
obsessive identification of an unprecedented threat capable of ending the 
American way of life, the very essence of society and world peace. The 
‘enemies’ and ‘the American people’ found themselves locked into a Bibli-
cal clash between civilization and barbarianism and between good and evil. 
This exaggerated threat, bound up in a Manichaean morality, was prepar-
ing a devastating response on a scale that was just as great. As Jackson 
(2006) has documented, the US administration ended up adopting the tried 
and tested rhetorical, thematic and narrative arsenal used by the Reagan 
administration in the first war against terrorism.
 Pruned of its more specific elements, in reality this rhetorical arsenal has 
a far wider reach. Its modern expressions stretch back at least to the 
origins of the North American political experience, which has always iden-
tified a threat as an indispensable premise for the nation’s consolidation, 
be this red (the native Americans, workers’ movement and Soviet bloc), 
brown (fascism in the 1930s), or green (Islamic terrorism) (Campbell, 
1998; Jackson, 2006). In many cases, the reaction to this threat has turned 
into a permanent mobilization that is both rhetorical and real, and a dis-
course that revolves around the idea of the ‘war on . . .’ (Glover, 2002). It 
does not just apply to states, regimes, peoples, military actions, and, in 
turn, terror/ism, ‘rogue states’ or ‘red hordes’, but also, and more interest-
ingly, to a variety of social problems and phenomena. These range from 
drugs (opium, alcohol, marijuana or crack, depending on the decade) to 
crime and in a less coherent way, as we will see, to poverty and cancer.
 Two aspects can be singled out. At one level, there exists a discourse of 
fear that might refer to any kind of phenomena, from the political to the 
natural (hurricanes, earthquakes, pandemics) to the human- induced (such 
as satanic sects or child abuse). At another level, there is the rhetoric of 
war, which is normally associated with the element of fear, although this is 
sometimes missing (as is, in rare cases, the very figure of the enemy, like in 
Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’). The discourse of fear and the rhetoric of war 
both have a long history; they have traditionally reinforced each other and 
most recently have reached their climax in the War on Terror.
 The discourse of the ‘war against . . .’ something often does not refer to 
an actual war, nor even to the basic acts of military action. It is therefore a 
metaphor. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), apart from determin-
ing the way in which a phenomenon is read, metaphors alter our conceptual 
structures, exalt specific elements and introduce a perspective and a set of 
sub- schemes. In the case of war, the metaphor includes: threats that endan-
ger our survival, or at least state (and moral) sovereignty; extraordinary 
efforts and appropriate sacrifices; the existence of armies (with their heroes); 
hostile enemies; attacks and defences; a rational strategy assigned to our 
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leaders; the expectation of victory; and the inevitability and legitimacy of 
bloodshed. It is not simply a matter of the use of powerful rhetoric in order 
to tackle a political issue; the metaphor will also shape the way in which the 
public will perceive, think about and believe in a phenomenon, to the point 
that the metaphor and the object in question become blurred. The meta-
phor creates a new social reality that directs our actions, which in turn 
strengthens the power of the metaphor itself, making it plausible and coher-
ent. As Lakoff and Johnson note, it is a veritable self- fulfilling prophecy.
 In the United States, the war metaphor resounds forcefully with the 
nation’s founding myths, from the War of Independence and Civil War to 
the victory over Nazi totalitarianism in the Second World War. The flag 
and national anthem are only the most central of a series of symbols and 
narratives (from the gun- wielding borderland epic to the war heroes with 
their hyper- technological arsenal), which go hand- in-hand with a patriot-
ism forged in military conflict. Practically every US president has promoted 
his own war, regardless of whether this was real or metaphoric, with the 
backing of a sprawling and gargantuan military- industrial complex.
 In Europe, this metaphor is far less attractive for historical reasons, 
largely due to the wartime destruction experienced on its own territory. 
Therefore, in many cases, the rhetoric has been substituted by a pervasive 
agonic lexicon (such as the ‘fight against’ or the ‘battle against’) that is 
more or less internationally ubiquitous in cases that range from ‘petty 
crime’, ‘drugs’ and ‘insecurity’ to paedophilia, bullying and hacking.4
 This does not mean that the language of war has been absent. Indeed, it 
has been employed insistently on various occasions (Steinert, 2003). In the 
United Kingdom, Blair, whose most memorable slogan was ‘tough on 
crime, tough on the causes of crime’, periodically launched ‘wars on crime’ 
and campaigns against ‘anti- social behaviour’. In France, there was a shift 
from the Jospin government’s ‘fight’ against insecurity (Bonelli, 2008) to 
Sarkozy’s ‘crusades against crime’ and ‘merciless war against drug traffick-
ers in the banlieues’ (Mucchielli, 2008). Meanwhile, in Italy, there has been 
obsessive and insistent talk about the ‘war on urban blight’ and ‘illegal 
immigration’. In any case, even when not clad in agonic metaphors, polit-
ical discourse has increasingly relied on the main ingredients of this 
pattern. It is not so much a question of the use of metaphors drawn from 
the military domain that have long been part of its ‘arsenal’, nor is it about 
the widespread use of warmongering expressions such as ‘zero tolerance’, 
‘no pity’ and ‘utmost firmness’ that have become part of the language of 
representatives of every political party. Rather, what is at issue here is a 
particular construction of social problems.
 The emergence of the discourse of enmity in Europe can be recon-
structed by using the example of Italy, a country where such a develop-
ment has been particularly pronounced. Shortly before the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, long after the post- 1968 youth and worker upheavals had ended, 
and at the end of a decade – the 1980s – which had seen far- reaching 
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de- industrialization undermine the cohesion and political strength of the 
working class and the fight against ‘red’ terrorism draw to a close, Bettino 
Craxi,5 during a visit to the United States, suddenly declared that ‘drug 
addicts’ had to be ‘punished’.6 Indeed, his abrupt conversion overturned 
the position of lay and socialist parties, which had long championed the 
freedom of choice in private affairs. It followed a meeting with the Man-
hattan district attorney Rudolph Giuliani, whose ability for making a name 
for himself 7 as ‘accuser- in-chief ’ (Simon, 2007) had impressed Craxi 
(Sarkozy would be similarly bedazzled when he met the former mayor of 
New York in August 2002). A few days later, a timely poll showed that 
‘according to the majority of Italians, drug addicts must be punished’.8
 From help and rehabilitation, the emphasis thus shifted to combating 
the phenomenon and punishing its users and, over the following two 
decades of legislative changes, Italian prisons would be subsequently filled 
with drug addicts.9 More generally, since the late 1980s, there has been a 
series of campaigns targeting a host of threatening subjects inflicted with 
varying doses of enmity: ‘hooligans’, ‘cowboy drivers’, ‘paedophiles’, 
‘hackers’, ‘bullies’, ‘baby gangs’, ‘stalkers’, ‘wasters’,10 alongside political 
enemies such as ‘social centre youths’, the ‘black block’, ‘terrorists’. Many 
of these categories were the upshot of the construction of new social prob-
lems that had previously not been topical. And many of these enemies 
were carbon copies of analogous categories that had already been con-
structed or identified in the United States and, to a lesser degree, the 
United Kingdom, and often imported without even being translated (as in 
the case of ‘hooligans,’ ‘hackers’, ‘bullies’, ‘baby gangs’ and ‘stalkers’). In 
any case, they represented the outcome of an extraordinary synergy that 
had arisen between a political class seeking visibility and legitimation, a 
media attracted by emergency situations, apparatuses of control eager to 
produce results in the fight against phenomena that ‘arouse the greatest 
social alarm’, various service and technology providers thrilled to gain 
access to new markets, and a plethora of experts ready to appear on tele-
vision, publish books and publicize surveys certifying the intellectual, sci-
entific and democratic legitimacy of the alarm. The notoriety of these 
various enemies did not always last for long. However, although all would 
be subject to laws and tailor- made measures, the investment in rules, the 
practical and symbolic mobilization and the attribution of danger 
(Douglas, 1992) would never reach the extreme level reserved for immi-
gration, especially if this was ‘illegal’ – apart from the exception of ‘red 
terrorism’. ‘Immigrants’ and ‘terrorists’ ‘are considered ‘total enemies’. In 
contrast to drug addicts, ‘bullies’, ‘cowboy drivers’ and ‘wasters’, they are 
excluded from mainstream society, the former through the denial of cit-
izenship and the latter as a result of their radical and sometimes violent 
opposition to the ideological consensus. Both can therefore be subjected 
to acts of vicious hostility or even to systematic persecution, deportation 
and annihilation.
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 The idea of immigrants as enemies began to spread at the beginning of 
the 1990s during a deep crisis of legitimacy. After occasionally being pre-
sented in the late 1980s as an ‘invasion’ but also as an issue that exposed 
the problem of racism, immigration swiftly became synonymous with 
petty crime. This would become central in the mid- 1990s to the overarch-
ing category of ‘security’, which quickly became an issue that could win 
or lose elections. The theme of security, that like petty crime does not con-
sider the Mafia or organized crime, encloses a series of aspects and phe-
nomena that are partly unrelated but are nevertheless constructed as a 
meaningful, unitary phenomenon. At the core lies street crime against 
people and property, but this is encompassed by other issues, such as 
counterfeit goods, drug trafficking, prostitution, homelessness and 
decorum in public space, and it is no coincidence that, with all these con-
cerns, immigration is seen to play a part. Even when security is presented 
in a moderate and constructive version, as a frame that thematizes ‘us’ as 
the victims, it nevertheless sets in motion a series of military- style 
responses that are very similar across the board, despite the disparate 
nature of its objects.
 After 11 September, the alarm concerning terrorism merely deepened 
this fracture, providing new legitimacy and new instruments to military- 
style practices and discourses. The succession of enemies and threats that 
began in the late 1980s (from ‘drug addicts’ to ‘terrorists’) appears as an 
escalation that, on the one side, identifies opponents who are increasingly 
excluded or excludable from the moral community and, on the other, lays 
the premise for their exclusion. The more the enemy is rendered an ‘Other’, 
threatening and immoral, the more it can be targeted by a war dispositive 
that seeks its elimination and increasingly assumes a strategic role.
 Using the experience described above as a starting point, I shall now 
seek to outline an ideal type of war discourse during peacetime by listing 
some of its principal characteristics and indicating its various functions.
Characteristics and properties
A wealth of literature has already described similar phenomena, develop-
ing concepts such as moral crusade (Gusfield, 1963), moral panic (Cohen, 
2002), not to mention the much older idea of the scapegoat (Girard, 1982) 
and the more recent discourse/politics/culture of fear (Furedi, 2005, 2006; 
Altheide, 2003; Glassner, 1999; Robin, 2004; Simon, 2007). As of 11 Sep-
tember, there has been a lot of talk about the politics of fear and the way 
in which this instrumentalizes widespread anxieties and fears. The literat-
ure has perhaps paid too much attention to the society of ‘fear’ (Bauman, 
2006), ‘risk’ (Beck, 1992) or ‘insecurity’ (Castel, 2003). The fact that these 
anxieties and concerns exist means that for such literature an implicit cause 
and effect relationship is taken for granted. However, the world is full of 
concerns, fears and outrage without these ever leading to a ‘war’ against 
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those responsible for them. Fear (but also outrage) should rather be con-
sidered as a form of rhetoric, the sociological nature of which consists pre-
cisely in it being made public.11
 Of course, the spread of uncertainty, fear about change, growing social 
isolation, and a sense of a loss of control over the surrounding world, all 
create a fertile ground for the discourse of fear. The news media’s por-
trayal of reality plays an important role in this respect. Unlike the search 
for patterns and consistency that characterizes the scientific method, the 
journalistic representation of experience tends to select all that is atypical, 
exceptional and beyond norms. In this way, the media does not just will-
ingly ‘host’ the emergency of the moment, but ultimately provides the 
impression that we are inundated with events (terrorist attacks, murders, 
acts of violence) that are, in reality, rather rare. People increasingly have 
the impression that the world is somehow ‘out of control’ and naturally 
this can have serious effects on their emotions. But what is important is 
not so much whether these feelings are particularly widespread or not, but 
whether they appear culturally plausible and are embodied by activists 
who have access to the public sphere (‘Citizens in the trenches to obtain 
security’).12 The point is the ability to say ‘the people are scared, so  . . .’, 
ending the prospects for any other political possibility. As Robin (2004) 
argues, personal fears, which are a product of our mental attitudes and 
experiences, have scarce impact beyond ourselves. Conversely, political 
fear is born out of conflicts within a society and between different socie-
ties. By treating this as an apolitical feeling, but nonetheless using it as a 
foundation of our public life, we refuse to see the injustices and conflicts 
that lay at its base, and in the process create the conditions of becoming 
hostage to its influence.
 My aim here is to sketch a model of the ‘peacetime war discourse’ as 
something that constructs its objects, their causes and solutions in a par-
ticular way. I will consider it as a discursive formation in which the use of 
the war metaphor in its different expressions produces relevant effects. It 
appears at the moment when a political centre, aided by a complex galaxy 
of cooperating agencies, launches itself into battle and places its seal on 
those themes that literature on moral crusades has often attributed to the 
activity of pressure groups. The process that characterizes the success of 
discourses of enmity has a basic underlying structure that is the same for a 
wide array of social and political problems:
•	 Through	 a	 series	 of	 repetitive	 and	 stylized	 statements,	 one	 or	 more	
political leaders define the principal object of collective moral fear and/
or outrage.13 In doing so, they will almost always exploit a real threat 
or problem. Their work consists in establishing which threats are 
worthy of political concern and which ones are not.
•	 Through	an	insistent	action,	and	exploiting	the	privileged	access	to	the	
media that their position guarantees, this political coalition, often 
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entirely informal and aided by a number of allied or influenced agen-
cies and institutions, manages to give prominence to ‘its’ social 
problem in the public sphere. This requires fear and outrage to be con-
tinuously renewed through the publicization of a series of ‘facts’ and 
the cooperation of several ‘independent’ agencies.
•	 Fear	becomes	a	profession	and	a	career.	On	the	one	hand,	 it	enables	
the subjects who commit themselves to its proliferation to acquire 
status and visibility and, on the other, it redefines the tasks and prior-
ities of the bodies that are responsible for its management. Their 
exploits, statistics and statements fuel the problem’s status as a reality 
and enhance its long- term success. This success can, and in a certain 
sense must, feed off failures. The continuing failure to eliminate drugs, 
terrorism and the sources of insecurity provides an infinite number of 
symbolic resources for those intent on keeping tensions high, brings a 
continuous flow of new resources to bodies in charge of control and 
provides many opportunities for heroic acts against such vast threats.
The war discourse during peacetime has reached such a degree of visibility 
and clarity that it is perceived, used and, to an extent, consumed as a kind 
of format. The resemblance between discursive shifts, themes, accusations 
and remedies, if not actual clichés, suggests that it is considered by political 
and media actors, to varying degrees of awareness, as a ready- made dis-
positive that they merely appropriate.
 From a discursive perspective, the peacetime war discourse performs a 
number of operations and invariably features a wide but well- defined array 
of elements, as follows.
Production of a social object
Foregrounding/backgrounding: the Problem
First, the war discourse during peacetime places a problem in the spotlight 
while radically shifting all the others into the background. This is not only 
a zero- sum game, in which the space occupied by the ‘Problem’ in the 
public sphere removes the visibility of competing themes, but is also a con-
stitutive element of the discourse: war requires an exceptional effort and 
sacrifices for everything else. ‘Security’ is the ‘priority of priorities’.14 In 
some cases, this leads to denial about the existence or seriousness of com-
peting issues.15
Framing: bringing evil into focus 
Within the Problem, a structure of relevance is established by selecting 
certain events and promoting them as elements that, de facto, define the 
Problem itself. ‘Insecurity’ in Italy, as in France and Great Britain, is never 
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a problem about the outlook of the future or about guarantees in the 
present, but about threats to one’s personal safety, only if these come from 
the street and its most visible users (and not, for instance, from organized 
crime), and only if they concern us, the autochthonous people. The degra-
dation of the urban environment is part of this, but only in the form of 
graffiti or illegal markets, and not when it assumes the guise of unauthor-
ized building or illegal rubbish dumps. The definition of the Problem gives 
rise to precise interpretations as to its causes and effects, as well as moral 
considerations and predetermined solutions.
 The frame that imposes itself as the Problem is soon able to cannibalize 
all other issues, re- translating them into its own terms. As Simon (2007) 
shows, there are numerous examples of how the fields of schooling, family 
and employment are increasingly controlled and managed through the 
frame of crime. Another exemplary case is that of the various Wars on 
Drugs that have allowed a re- framing of problems caused by economic and 
social inequalities to be treated instead as the effects of the use and traf-
ficking of drugs by African- Americans (Johns, 1992).
 Problems defined by the peacetime war discourse tend to have recurring 
characteristics. The discourse targets threatening phenomena, but only if 
these can be traced back to a deviation from formal or informal social 
norms, hence, if they can be construed as an ‘Other’ that besieges or infil-
trates the ‘community’. It often prefers to disregard the causes, or to resort 
to more or less surreptitious explanations that implicate the nature or 
culture of individuals. In any case, the emphasis in the so- called Western 
societies is invariably placed on individual responsibilities, hardly ever on 
social responsibilities and even less so on state or corporate ones.16
Description: opacity
The peacetime war discourse constructs a vague object through recourse to 
abstraction (once again, with terms such as ‘terror’ and ‘insecurity’, but also 
‘drugs’, which in Italy is wilfully used in the singular (droga) so as to 
encompass the many implicated substances under a mythical unity), the use 
of metaphor (the ‘axis of evil’) and often the deployment of terms that act 
as wide- ranging containers (such as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ and ‘Al 
Qaida’, which are both used to refer to extremely varied elements). Overall, 
the object is defined by the context rather than by its own presumed fea-
tures. Guerrilla fighters or acts of war are labelled terrorist when they 
operate against us. A substance is only a ‘drug’ when it is made illegal. An 
attack, a sexual assault or simply stealing someone’s snack becomes an act 
of bullying, especially when it is committed in a school environment. This 
vagueness allows powers to be largely exempted from any sort of evalu-
ation of their performance (Glover, 2002; Collins, 2002). It creates enemies 
against which it is possible to obtain significant victories, but which cannot 
be permanently eliminated and are therefore effective for turning panic into 
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something cyclical. At the same time, the vague definition of the Problem 
guarantees a large degree of freedom to choose who to fight.
Construction of a deep narrative structure
Complication: threat
Naturally, and necessarily, the ‘Problem’ appears because something has 
happened and a threat to the community has emerged. The less the object 
is a threat, the more the war discourse is inappropriate. Identifying and 
continuously reviving a threat is possibly the most cumbersome, lengthy 
and strategic task that the fear machine has to undertake. During the 
‘alarm’ (a good word, if ever there were one) over ‘Islamic terrorism’, the 
main element of the ‘facts’ reported by newspapers in Italy17 has consisted 
precisely in the voicing of the alarm itself: ‘alarm’, ‘risk’, ‘the shadow of Al 
Qaida’, ‘terrorist danger’, ‘threat of attacks’, ‘beware’, ‘suspects’, ‘they 
were preparing’, ‘they wanted’, ‘they organized’. The alarm, which is itself 
a metaphor for war (originating from the battle cry ‘all’arme’ – ‘take 
arms!’), is often the expectation of something that does not exist, but 
which nonetheless is predicted to happen. This situation of stasis is con-
trasted with the frantic actions of our protectors with terms such as ‘blitz’, 
‘wiped out’, ‘discovered’, ‘controlled’, ‘investigates’, ‘steps forward’, ‘train-
ing exercise’, ‘unmasking’ and ‘manhunt’.
 A typical way of justifying an emergency (another much- loved word) is 
through the use of the term ‘a new type of ’. Hence, we often read of ‘a new 
type of ’ terrorism and weapon (WMD), a ‘new type of ’ youth deviance 
(baby gangs) and drug (‘crack’, synthetic drugs, the ‘rape drug’ and ‘super- 
marijuana’, claimed to be five, ten, twenty- five or even fifty times stronger 
than the previous variety), or a ‘new type of ’ crime or criminal organization 
(‘mugging’,18 or the ‘Chinese Triad’). If something new has happened and 
this something entails unprecedented threats, we do not have just an emer-
gency but also a justification for measures that are equally unprecedented. 
The creative work that underpins these new threats is evident in the market-
ing used to transmit them. Neologisms are often coined for this purpose (the 
very term ‘marijuana’ was chosen in the 1930s by FBN (Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics) officials who took the name from the Mexican state of Sonora), 
but the discourse that coins them is so hegemonic that the objects that it 
constructs are subsequently perceived as objective and natural facts.
Partition: us–them
The basic operation achieved by the peacetime war discourse consists in 
producing entities that participate in the representation of the Problem and 
which are separated from each other by strict boundaries that render them 
internally homogenous. It is the typical opposition between us and 
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them that refers to a specific layout of social relations. G.H. Mead cap-
tured this movement perfectly when he wrote:
Social organization which arises out of hostility at once emphasizes the 
character which is the basis of the opposition and tends to suppress all 
other characters in the members of the group. The cry of ‘stop thief ’ 
unites us all as property owners against the robber. We all stand shoul-
der to shoulder as Americans against a possible invader. Just in pro-
portion as we organize by hostility do we suppress individuality.
(Mead, 1918: 591–592)
This opposition must be continuously maintained and legitimated. Con-
versely, its effect as a source of identity (the creation of community and 
not just enmity) does not require a particular amount of effort. Speeches, 
rituals and calls that directly invest in ‘us’ and feed off an apparent ‘wish 
for community’ are common, but these are mainly a by- product of the 
primary opposition.
 Naming and qualifying are the first linguistic tools used in this process. 
Those responsible for causing fear must share a common identity and the 
easiest way to identify such people is to name them. Through an act of 
symbolic violence, difference is constructed, categorized and controlled. 
The repeated use of stereotypical descriptions continually confirms the pre-
sumed common features that justify the existence of ‘them’. On the oppos-
ite front, in the ‘war against’, the nation’s identity is stronger than ever, 
although this consists, of course, in a strained unity that hides hierarchies 
and inequalities, conflicts between interests and different prospects. This 
identity is the outcome of a series of oppositions (illegality/legality, moral/
immoral, contempt/respect, dirty/clean, violent/peaceful, archaic/modern), 
in which the emphasis is placed more on them than on us, so that identity 
normally emerges through difference.
Characters: the community of victims and its monsters
The basic us–them construction is represented by figures who tend to 
possess recurring features. In most cases, ‘us’ is verbally expressed accord-
ing to a range of generalities, of which the most important one in ideo-
logical terms is the embodiment of an idea of community. The nation, the 
city, the neighbourhood, the ‘people’, the ‘residents’ and the ‘citizens’ are 
all universals (insofar as they appear to indicate something in an abstract 
manner without distinctions) that conceal their discriminatory and exclu-
sionary logic. For example, the Roma or immigrants are never referred to 
as ‘residents’, the ‘city’ or the ‘people’, but neither are drug addicts, hooli-
gans or paedophiles. In this way, the community is construed as the com-
munity of the included, which widens or shrinks on the basis of the issue 
at stake.
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 In the war discourse focused on the theme of crime in all its guises, a 
new ‘testimonial’ has become increasingly recurrent and central in the por-
trayal of fear: the real or potential victim (Robin, 2004; Furedi, 2006; 
Simon, 2007). This especially takes place in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, where this figure plays a social role that is shaped accord-
ing to a precise cultural script (Altheide, 2003), while in mainland Europe 
this role often assumes more abstract forms. The bond between the testi-
monial and the community (‘Everyone is a victim’, as one British Labour 
Party policy statement announced back in 1995) performs a double func-
tion: on the one hand, it projects the agency onto the most recent scape-
goat and, on the other, through the celebration of an imagined community 
(Anderson, 1991), it confers democratic legitimacy to even the most auto-
cratic of war discourses. In both the ‘War on Terror’, with its accent on a 
sense of mourning and public rituals commemorating victims, and the fight 
for security (where insecurity has become defined as a ‘popular sentiment’, 
the concept of ‘perceived insecurity’ has been formulated and the overall 
theme has been renamed ‘demand for security’), ‘what people want, say or 
think’ becomes the true means of legitimating policies of enmity.
 The victims re- evoke age- old figures, such as the ‘honest- father-of- the-
family’ and ‘housewife- dedicated-to- her-home’. They are the embodiment 
of the ‘normal citizen’, a caricature of normality that uses sentiment rather 
than duty as its measure. This normality has always been set against an 
otherness that lies outside: deviance, the fundamental cornerstone of news 
media discourse.
 A victim requires a tormentor. But what are the characteristics of an 
enemy? Almost everywhere one finds the same strategies: dehumanization, 
sub- humanization or super- humanization. During the Reagan period 
(Jackson, 2006), terrorism was already being portrayed through the use of 
medical or disease metaphors (scourge, cancer, infection), just as fascist 
racism had once done and contemporary racism continues to do, seeing 
lumps, sores, viruses and, most importantly, the need for ‘bonifiche’ 
(decontamination and redevelopment) (Maneri, 1998). These forms of 
dehumanization – drug addicts advance ‘like ghosts’, the Roma petty thief 
‘climbs like a cat’, immigrants ‘crowd their flats like mice’ – are often 
accompanied by ‘atrocity tales’ that conjure up myths of superhuman or 
subhuman monsters. In Italy, if a crime is defined as ‘heinous’, the person 
who committed it in the 1990s was invariably an ‘Albanian’, or a ‘Roma-
nian’ during the last decade (Faso, 2008). A foreigner who is arrested ‘flies 
into a rage’ and resists ‘with superhuman strength’.
 Dehumanization and ‘monsterfication’ are functional to the creation of 
the threatening figure and to the construction of an irrational, unknown 
and dangerous ‘Other’. As several observers have noted, ‘barbarians’ (the 
enemies) can be equated with the Freudian Id: irrational, violent and dan-
gerous, and often libidinous. Thanks to this projected image, we can ‘ori-
entalize the Other’ and construct our Western identity (Said, 1978). 
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Orientalizing the Other, any other, is attractive because it provides us with 
the screen on which to project all unspeakable evils; unspeakable not only 
in the sense that they are extremely complex but because they are much 
closer to home than we are willing to acknowledge. As Escobar (1997) 
claims, dehumanization is necessary to turn the Other into a mirror image 
of our demons: it is the return to our threatened humanity.
 The enemies targeted by peacetime war discourse are inevitably weak 
ones. As a discourse of power, the war discourse never grapples with itself. 
In Italy, during Tangentopoli (the great crisis during the early 1990s that 
wiped out an entire political class involved in a widespread system of polit-
ical corruption), ‘emergency’ and ‘alarm’ would have seemed almost sober 
definitions, yet nobody used them. Similarly, no one ever considered 
waging a ‘war on corruption’ or treating the individuals responsible as 
enemies. Enemies lack a voice, and this is never the case for a corrupt 
politician.
 In many cases, policies of enmity have devastating effects on their recipi-
ents. In others, they are limited to a sort of announcement- effect, in which 
war mainly consists in its declaration while, apart from the cultural sphere, 
the concrete effects are largely irrelevant for those on the receiving end. 
Whether a matter of inflicting heavy defeats on the enemy class, or simply 
announcing a firm response, what is often most important for the leaders 
is to convince voters that they are the only ones who can be trusted. 
During periods of rapid change in which certain social groups are unsettled 
and their status is threatened by the arrival or emancipation of other 
groups, minorities or populations, being perceived as the last bulwark 
against these dangers may be the only objective that entrepreneurs of fear 
set themselves. It is difficult for them to wage a direct attack because this 
runs the risk of accusations of cynicism or, worse still, racism. Rather, it is 
easier to identify certain issues (drugs, petty crime, the oppression of 
Muslim women) that can be readily associated to the true target of hostil-
ity. War on opium! (‘Finally someone does something against the 
Chinese’). Ban marijuana! (‘It’s the Mexicans’ turn’). Let’s prohibit the 
veil, female genital mutilation, the mosque and even minarets! (‘If it 
weren’t for them, there would be no one standing up against the invasion 
of Islam and immigration . . .’). These are all symbolic fronts that voters 
effortlessly recognize.19
Agency: reacting, with sharp reflexes
Just as wars often begin with a real or deliberately provoked incident that 
may justify a reaction, the narrative in peacetime war discourse starts with 
an entirely external agency (we have been attacked, infiltrated, poisoned, 
besieged, threatened and groped, hence we must react). The rhetorical dis-
positive of defence is necessary to justify hostile and violent speeches and 
actions, by shifting the initiative onto the bearers of threats through an 
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often carefully prepared strategy. In contemporary society, increasingly 
dominated by the media, this dynamic has been increasingly exasperated. 
In situations where the media tends to construct emergencies in order to 
strengthen the impact of a news item, politics expresses itself by producing 
responses to the previous day’s emergency. A lady was killed and the mur-
derer’s nationality was Romanian? ‘Easier expulsions for Romanians!’ or, 
better still, ‘200,000 foreigners will be kicked out.’20
Positioning: I am above you – I am like you
So far, we have encountered characters from Manichaean accounts. A 
speaker, however, ambiguously overlaps with the story and its actors (the 
victims and tormentors). When Maroni, the Italian interior minister who 
took office in 2008 following the centre- right’s electoral victory around the 
issue of ‘security’, decided to deploy Italian army units in four cities, he was 
finally able to declare that ‘the time for firmness has come, let’s get rid of 
fear’.21 Maroni constructs the rulers and the ruled as a single unit that pos-
sesses common feelings (‘let us get rid’). He also calls on the community to 
pull together, while simultaneously carving out his role as its protector. Here, 
the figure of the protector is both different and the same as the victim 
(Maroni is scared, while the faces of a thousand presidents enter into our 
homes embodying the feelings experienced by victims). This is able to happen 
because the protector is both in the story and on the outside as its narrator. 
At the level of énonciation, as developed by Émile Benveniste, the substantial 
and foundational ambiguity of the peacetime war discourse basically lies in 
superimposing a ‘me–you’ onto the ‘us–them’ dichotomy, producing a ‘me–
you–us’ versus ‘them’. This vertical unity, in which the ‘community’ is treated 
as an infant and sheltered under the protective umbrella of its leaders with 
whom it simultaneously identifies, is precisely what politicians strive for. 
Fear, as Robin (2004) recalls, is also a feeling of the powerful towards the 
weak. Hobbes said that ‘the end of Obedience is Protection’, but he might as 
well have said ‘the end of Protection is Obedience’.
 The dialogic- rational confrontation is terminated because the imagined 
community resulting from the mobilization of war holds no love for those 
who are not patriotic. Dissent is delegitimized in the name of a necessary 
unity and is replaced by a carte blanche for those in power. Rather, cit-
izens have to all become informers.22
Valorization and emotions
The morals of fear
War discourse during peacetime brings a dimension of passion into the core 
of policies and their accompanying discourses, which are otherwise ideally 
considered the reign of practical rationality. Alongside fear, feelings such as 
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compassion and solidarity for victims (even love in the case of abused chil-
dren) play an important role. At the same time, the identification of a peril is 
projected onto a system of values that classifies problematic behaviour as an 
offence against morality. Outrage is one of the feelings that is most often 
represented in the discourse of enmity, which overflows with a highly moral-
istic vocabulary. As with the classic reactionary discourse, insistent refer-
ences are made to traditions, customs and values that are idealized and 
caricatured in response and retaliation to some kind of change. This explains 
why the theme of ‘decorum’ in public spaces has played such a key role in 
the discourse and policies on security. With apparently little bearing on the 
alarm about threats to personal safety, the well- kept state of a small neigh-
bourhood park comes to symbolize the threshold of civility and society as a 
moral value. The need for decorum is also about a need for mental hygiene 
and for the maintenance of the boundaries between the inside and outside, 
us and them. More generally, the peacetime war discourse is about establish-
ing a unity with clear boundaries: between the centre and the margins, the 
legitimate and the illegitimate, dirt and cleanliness, attraction and repulsion, 
the known and the unknown, order and disorder, and, last but not least, the 
human and the inhuman.
Performativity
First and foremost, mobilization
Drawing on passion and moral outrage and invoking threats all aim at 
encouraging involvement while preparing a call to action. As a myth about 
rebirth and regeneration, war always presupposes a mobilization, an active 
attack and a strong position against something. This is another reason why 
politics is so attracted to its discourse: ‘now we will act’. As it is a process 
that legitimates, requires and produces bloodshed (‘to counter illegal immi-
gration and all the ills it brings, we have to be nasty not conciliatory’),23 
the action that this discourse invokes must assume a belligerent dimension, 
which automatically excludes or ridicules any solution that seeks to under-
stand the social and political conditions that lie at the roots of threatening 
behaviour. As Mead stated, ‘to understand is to forgive’ (1918: 592), and 
the immorality and dehumanization of the bearers of threats does not 
allow this to occur. On the other hand, the time scale of the war discourse 
is the present. This enables the dehistoricization and decontextualization 
of the causes of problematic behaviour, which, in turn, is naturalized.
A disciplinary regime: loved by politics, welcomed by the 
media
It would seem that the resort to militarized metaphors started to spread 
through Europe after the disappearance of the traditional enemy personified 
Peacetime war discourse  167
by the Soviet bloc and ‘communism’ and, over the last few years, has 
experienced a powerful acceleration. Some medium- and long- term factors 
have assisted its rise.
 For a number of decades, there has been talk of the crisis of politics in 
societies increasingly conditioned by the action of supranational bodies, 
organized capital and various pressure groups, and of its subsequent diffi-
culty in creating long- term legislative programmes that channel the specific 
and diversified interests present in society. Thus, the need arises for legiti-
mation, visibility and consensus, which is most readily achieved by resort-
ing to populist policies that give prominence to situations of crisis, stir up 
fears and allow specific differences to become unified. The war discourse 
provides the necessary simplification for this populist and Manichaean 
management of the crisis and, in many ways, leads us back to the Europe 
of the 1930s. It is a perfect distraction that covers up the evasion of more 
complex social problems that produce conflict and damage powerful inter-
ests, and which cannot or do not want to be tackled.
 A second revealing element regards the enemies of the war discourse. If 
we consider internal enemies, it appears evident that they are selected from 
the sorts of social problems for which states do not want to take respons-
ibility. It is plausible that there exists a very close relationship between the 
retreat of the welfare state – interlinked with the tax revenue crisis of states 
and the competitive pressure that comes with the globalization of the 
economy – and the construction of a discourse that portrays recipients of 
public welfare policies as enemies of society. While the mainland European 
left, in particular, had tended to pinpoint the social causes to problems, 
these are redefined by neo- liberal thought, which instead places the stress 
on individual responsibility as the cause, linchpin and resource to tackle 
them. On both sides of the Atlantic, those considered responsible for and 
creators of their own problems are derided, stigmatized and often criminal-
ized. They include ‘Welfare scroungers’ (Hall, 1980), ‘single’ and ‘teenage’ 
mothers (Sidel, 1996; Glassner, 1999), drug addicts, the unemployed, the 
homeless, mental patients, beggars, street hawkers and Roma people, all of 
whom have been removed, in varying degrees according to each case, from 
the protection of the welfare state and have above all been treated – some 
to a greater and others to a lesser extent – as menaces to society and as 
problems that they have brought us.
 The war against immigration clearly appears to be a strategic question. 
In the light of the conflicts between capital and labour during the 1960s 
and the 1970s, the welfare state represented a class compromise. Once the 
native working class has disappeared or has been rendered innocuous, it is 
no longer necessary to make compromises with the new labour force in the 
unqualified service sector, industrial and agricultural production and con-
struction: it is enough to strip it of its rights. As such, the new international 
division of labour produces a class of non- persons (Dal Lago, 1999b). 
However, the shift from class compromise to exclusion requires that 
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certain human beings be permanently removed from society: a removal 
that must be continuously legitimated. Hence, they are no longer class 
enemies, but a class of enemies situated outside society. The centrality of 
the contemporary bellicose discourse is therefore bound to this strategy. 
However, it rests on far broader foundations. Relations between the global 
North and South, characterized by growing inequalities, an ultra- colonial 
plundering of natural and environmental resources and political and mili-
tary interference that is no longer partially contained and legitimized by 
the division of the world into two conflicting blocs, produce two sorts of 
relevant consequences. On the one hand, they trigger migratory move-
ments that are not even deterred by the militarized management of borders 
and, on the other, they provoke resentment and public disorder that arouse 
greater fear the less they are channelled through institutional and control-
lable forms.
 These two effects of the neo- liberal global order have been tackled in 
two distinct ways. The first can be defined, without exaggeration, as a war 
on migration (Palidda, 1996b). Patrols, camps, deportations, round- ups, 
detention centres, hyper- technological surveillance mechanisms and data-
bases are just a few of the military- style instruments used to control 
migrants. The second has been confronted by a series of ordinary military 
intervention operations that are ambiguously indicated by well- known 
oxymorons: peace keeping, international policing, pre- emptive war and 
humanitarian war. 11 September represented the fusion between the 
internal and external fronts, because from this moment on – and starting 
from the logical premise that a majority of ‘terrorists’ were immigrants – 
every immigrant became a potential terrorist (all the more so if they came 
from an ‘Islamic’ country).
 The two fronts of intervention are interesting because, in both cases, the 
metaphor of war is continuously corroborated in public experience. Terror-
ism, which originates (or rather, must originate)24 from the outside, is 
perfect to bring the military inside.25 Bars, walls, guards and checkpoints 
disseminate a military and prison aesthetic to a greater extent than ever 
before, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom.26 Migrants, 
Roma people, refugees and asylum seekers are increasingly present in public 
and media discourse as a result of the images and language produced by the 
institutions that directly deal with them, such as police forces, border 
guards, customs, the navy and Frontex. It is a vocabulary that speaks of 
countermeasures and controls and that reflects the respective outlooks and 
priorities of these agencies, foisting them upon the public, together with the 
objects that they handle, modify, produce and define (Maneri, 2010). These 
media sources are the oligopolists of a linguistic production that confers 
meaning to the ‘problem of the moment’. Against the backdrop of this 
iconic, verbal and physical landscape, declarations regarding the ‘war 
against’, despite the repeated failures, appear culturally plausible. Indeed, 
they seem paradoxically to be the only discourses that make any sense.
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 This discourse regime is a powerful instrument of social control. 
Freedoms acquired through struggle and otherwise untouchable have, with 
a few strokes of the pen, been sacrificed on the altar of the discourse’s 
objectives. Wars around crime, drugs, terrorism and security have released 
military personnel and police forces from the binds of red tape and 
exempted them from any accountability. Entire categories of individuals 
are normalized by repressive apparatuses deployed for this specific 
purpose. At an international level, as the ‘war against narcoterrorism’ 
during the 1980s demonstrated, the old imperial policy of gunboat diplo-
macy finds its present- day justification in the metaphor of war. In all these 
forms, the peacetime war discourse appears to us like a disciplinary regime 
(Foucault, 1975) founded upon the use of force and useful to govern viol-
ence so as to guide its effects.
Notes
 1 This famous statement was attributed to Nixon by one of his confidants.
 2 Widely used, this phrase dates back at least to the time of Aeschylus.
 3 The ‘War on Terror’ became a global emergency thanks also to the ability of 
the networks among the various countries’ secret services to spread their predic-
tions of imminent (and often non- existent) threats, which in turn were pre-
sented almost in unison as ‘facts’ by media around the world.
 4 This is also the effect of the growing mediatization of political discourse. The 
media appreciates momentum, dramatization, excitement, personification, sim-
plification, and the agonic discourse delivers them in abundance. War terminol-
ogy itself is one of the main components of media jargon, whereby a criticism is 
an ‘attack’, a police operation is a ‘blitz’, immigrants are an ‘army’ and their 
movement an ‘invasion’, a protest is a ‘revolt’ or ‘crusade’, and so on. In a 
certain sense, war has forged the language of the media and the latter, in turn, 
has told politics how to speak.
 5 Craxi was the secretary of the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) 
and head of the government in the 1980s.
 6 This was reported in La Repubblica, 25 October 1988, under the title ‘Let’s 
punish drug addicts’.
 7 This is how La Repubblica introduced the figure of the district attorney: 
The Manhattan district attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, is one of the most 
prominent representatives of this new society. His name is a synonym of 
intransigence, strictness and tenacity. Here in America, when one talks of 
the fight against the Mafia, corruption and dirty deals, one is talking about 
Giuliani.
(Repubblica, 25 October 1988)
 8 This poll was conducted by the SWG Institute and reported in La Repubblica, 
30 October 1988.
 9 It is estimated that those entering prison for drug- related offences amount to 47 
per cent of all prisoners (Scandurra, 2009).
10 The Italian term ‘fannulloni’, meaning people who work very little or not at all, 
was used as a negative epithet by the minister for the civil service of the current 
Italian government to refer to employees of the public administration who were, 
in fact, accused of not working enough.
170  M. Maneri
11 Along similar lines Dal Lago (1999a: 9) defines fear as ‘the interpretation and 
collective legitimation of generally arbitrary signs of danger as irrefutable evid-
ence of the threat to the stability and existence of a society’.
12 Il Corriere della Sera, 25 November 2009, p. 21.
13 In the alarms about epidemics or environmental catastrophes, such as the case 
of bird flu, the initiative came from representatives of the scientific community. 
But these are discourses of fear, not of a ‘war against’.
14 This slogan – like the more philosophical ‘security is the fundamental right 
upon which all the others rest’, voiced initially by ‘left- wing’ philosophers – has 
been used in Italy, as in France, on countless occasions.
15 It is not a frequent case because it is usually enough not to talk about it. 
However, during the 2008 elections, Berlusconi displayed his notorious opti-
mism when he went as far as to deny the economic crisis.
16 As Johns (1992) recalls, the cases of overdoses from legal drugs in the USA, 
home of the War on Drugs, were three times more than those from heroin at 
the start of the 1990s. Likewise, while all methods were used to persecute 
people suspected of ‘aiding terrorists’, important companies were allowed to 
continue doing business with countries suspected of terrorism.
17 I have analysed the articles about international terrorism that appeared in the 
daily newspapers Il Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica and La Stampa between 
2002 and 2006.
18 On the ‘arrival’ of ‘mugging’ in England, see Hall et al. (1978).
19 For a subtle analysis of the stakes involved in symbolic policies in the case of 
‘cultural crimes’, see Brion (2010).
20 I refer here to the urgent meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Italian gov-
ernment on 1 November 2007 that approved a decree for expulsions. The exact 
number was proposed by Fini, the current president of the Chamber of Depu-
ties (the lower house of parliament), but who at the time was in opposition.
21 This was the title of the online edition of the Corriere della Sera on 16 May 
2008.
22 The citizen informer is not just expressly encouraged by police forces and 
authorities of all countries, but is also often placed in a position of not being 
able to refuse to do so (Simon, 2007). In Italy, landlords who do not report 
their ‘illegal’ immigrant tenant risk between six months and three years in 
prison, and a similar penalty is also envisaged in France.
23 These are the words of interior minister Maroni, reported in La Stampa, 3 Feb-
ruary 2009, p. 5.
24 Consider, for instance, the loss of interest in the investigation into the anthrax 
attacks once it became clear that the likely culprit was an American biological 
defence expert.
25 This is so much the case that, for the first time, the US now has a military 
command for North America.
26 See Graham (2009). It had already become widespread with the war on crime, 
for example, with measures such as curfews in hundreds of cities. In 2008 and 
2009 in Italy, a state of emergency was declared in five regions ‘in relation to 
the settlements of nomadic communities’. The neighbourhood watch pro-
grammes and ronde (citizen patrols), which were introduced in Italy in 2009 
with a law called the ‘security package’, and which despite the enormous public 
hype actually saw a very low level of participation, are based on the presump-
tion that criminals come from outside. Here the affinity with war itself is at its 
most striking.
11 Global bureaucracy
Irresponsible but not indifferent1
Mariella Pandolfi and Laurence McFalls
The United Nations once dealt only with governments. By now we know 
that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnership involving 
governments, international organizations, the business community and civil 
society. In today’s world, we depend on each other.
(Kofi Annan)2
‘The party is over’3
New York, Vienna, Geneva, Washington, Paris, Rome: the offices and 
meeting rooms in buildings that belong to the United Nations, to other 
intergovernmental organizations or to major non- governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) all seem to resemble one another, their etiquette, architec-
ture and social urbanity gravitating around the perennial duet of 
cosmopolitan utopia and anxiety. Men and women, chosen on the basis of 
quotas allocated to each donor country, move along the corridors, interact 
in meeting rooms designed with identical egalitarian table arrangements in 
mind, with ample room provided for simultaneous interpreters: each move-
ment is dictated by time constraints and incorporates an ‘international’ 
sense of urgency. Employees and functionaries with forward contracts for 
periods that normally range between six months and two years and identi-
fied by means of designations like P2, P3, P4, P5, or D1 and D2, which 
represent ascending hierarchical levels at the UN, but the designations 
themselves can also be adopted and understood by other international 
organizations. These abbreviations are emblematic of the UN’s autonomy 
in shaping its bureaucracy; a great deal of attention is paid to these codes 
because, as of the 1990s, no job can be considered permanent, and there-
fore each abbreviation reveals an employee’s position and status: the 
cosmopolitan denizens of this transnational galaxy are very sensitive to the 
duration and renewal of these coveted contracts.
 The stress between the end of one contract and the beginning of the next, 
both at headquarters and at the local offices handling emergencies and 
crises, is palpable: ‘I was in Macedonia, will they send me to Darfur?’, ‘I 
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“did” East Timor; maybe they’ll send me to Afghanistan?’, ‘I have problems 
with my boss, perhaps they’ll move me from New York to Nairobi.’ In the 
multiethnic corridors, gossip follows dangerous paths: undercutting a 
colleague or a boss by revealing confidential or unofficial information is not 
an unusual strategy among these cosmopolites. The indiscretions and 
scoops that bounce from these corridors to the media, making use of real or 
alleged secret reports, are just another tool for lateral negotiations within 
the network of power relations that rule this international galaxy.
 These petty intrigues call into question the technocratic rationality upon 
which the global bureaucracy bases its legitimacy. Michael Herzfeld in 
The Social Production of Indifference (Herzfeld, 1992) provides an 
interesting interpretation of the symbolic roots of modern Western 
bureaucracy, which, he argues, is not the result of a process of rationaliza-
tion. Bureaucracy, so central to contemporary societies, seems to Herzfeld 
to be quite distant from, and almost stand in contradiction to, the appar-
ent foundations of our contemporary world. He shows how, contrary to 
common opinion, bureaucracy does not create responsibility through clear 
hierarchies of command, but rather indifference and irresponsibility. The 
circle of irresponsibility becomes a fatalist theology, where bureaucracy 
turns into a system that constantly legitimizes its behaviour by shifting 
blame from one part of itself to another in a Kafkaesque manner that calls 
for bureaucracy’s reinforcement as an antidote to its own failings. Bureau-
crats can always shift criticism onto their boss, onto those of inferior rank, 
or onto the system itself and can therefore protect themselves through a 
mechanism that produces distance and indifference.
 While Herzfeld’s dystopian analysis may hold for the modern bureau-
cratic state, our own experiences of contemporary global bureaucracies 
have shown that we must distinguish between irresponsibility and indiffer-
ence. By projecting onto bosses whose careers are rising or falling, onto the 
locales in which they operate, onto experts who create distrust and suspi-
cion, cosmopolitan bureaucrats resort to a strategy of personal irresponsi-
bility, but not to indifference. In fact, they enter a cycle of passions, fear, 
envy and rage that become tools that feed the bureaucratic mechanisms 
themselves. They are sincere about their objectives and in their frustrations 
with their failures. The bureaucrats in the international community’s ‘cos-
mopolis’ feed on information and mandates for action on a global scale 
and are therefore not constrained by a closed system of values and prac-
tices, which could indeed lead to indifference. Precisely because they are 
not indifferent to the outcome of their missions, their passions become the 
embers that constantly rekindle the flame of a mechanism of projection of 
responsibility onto others. Paradoxically, the continuous accumulation 
of information, to which their actions contribute, draws on the logic of 
modernity but produces a virtual rationality: the more they learn, the more 
they can blame others in an ultimately irrational cycle of scapegoating. 
This endless projection of blame is possible, however, only because the 
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global bureaucracy has, since the end of the Cold War stalemate, become 
but one facet of an extremely slippery configuration or network of cosmo-
politan actors that includes independent experts, public and private sub-
contractors, and an exponentially growing army of NGOs. In this chapter, 
we propose to explore this cosmopolis (Zolo, 1997), both ethnographically 
and theoretically, first describing the mechanisms and logics of global 
bureaucracies and their symbioses with expert consultants and NGOs and 
then characterizing the peculiar form of legitimate authority exercised by 
this complex, tentacular apparatus of global government. We shall argue 
that the diverse and diffuse practices, techniques and logics at work within 
this cosmopolitan nebulous constitute a new form of domination on a 
global scale.
Global bureaucrats
We can see the logic of this irresponsible but not indifferent apparatus at 
work in the career trajectories of permanent functionaries, hired consultants 
and volunteers. Meeting in circumstances marked by war and a sense of 
urgency, during dinners attended by experts, project coordinators, journal-
ists, peace keepers and reporters, young volunteers freshly adorned with 
their ID badges and enjoying their first international experiences hear stories 
about the rollercoaster fortunes of upper- and mid- level functionaries at 
international headquarters, fortunes which swing between ascent to the 
highest reaches and to crushing losses of power. Alongside the Ps and the 
Ds, another army summoned by urgency energizes the international com-
munity: a multitude of experts recruited to complete ad hoc projects is 
gathered, one might almost say compressed, by the pressures of emergen-
cies. The contracts regulating the experts’ career brief and term of duty, 
often issued for one single project, are called L contracts. Resorting to con-
tractual employees is an indication/admission of a state of paralysis or inef-
ficiency in offices that should be capable of dealing independently with 
most of the tasks that they end up subcontracting.
 Contracts issued to experts belong to a ritual regulated by the ‘TOR’, or 
terms of reference. The TOR present the task to be performed; they consti-
tute a document halfway between a schematic and bureaucratic description 
of what has to be done and a more technical plan dealing with where and 
how to proceed. ‘To implement’, i.e. to carry out a mandate whose techni-
cal correctness does not itself come into question, is the key phrase in the 
experts’ jargon, and they will use it repeatedly while drafting their TOR. 
Both the mission’s stated goals and agenda must be outlined in the TOR, 
which becomes a map of the project’s different phases. After each mission, 
a report is drafted upon the contract’s completion, which will subsequently 
authorize and legitimize the experts for their next missions.
 The TOR is a vital document, which in principle ought to distinguish 
the hired expert from the permanent bureaucrat, but which instead 
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becomes the first step towards the contracted expert’s normalization. One 
needs to think, plan and operate in a manner that not only follows con-
tractual obligations but, above all, follows procedures already routine to 
the programme or project into which the expert has been recruited. The 
formal, bureaucratic network and the implicit demands that gave rise to 
the request for the expert’s services shape, control and surround the 
experts’ plans with informal barriers and often succeed in having these 
experts join the ranks of the ‘innocent and innocuous’, conforming to 
these international organizations’ common- sense logic. The operations for 
drafting and accepting the TOR thus tend to reproduce, though not explic-
itly, pre- existing procedures: from formatting rules to the adoption of a 
formalized style, to practicality as the essential requisite; the path from the 
first drafting of the TOR to the completion of the assignment and finally to 
the submission of the final report is one that allows little deviation from 
the existing institutional norm.
 Indeed, the experts’ roles themselves are subject to ambiguous logics: 
were experts called upon only because a specific programme or office was 
not able to achieve the result which the competence of the individuals 
involved would have led one to expect? Or were experts enrolled to cor-
roborate or reconfirm the programme’s or office’s conclusions? Indeed, if 
project coordinators bolster their legitimacy by resorting to the experts’ 
professional competence within their organization, they are also extremely 
anxious about the work these experts perform and the final product they 
deliver. Anxiety, unfortunately, although useful and legitimate in the 
context of achieving one’s objectives, is rarely useful for a serene evalu-
ation of the work accomplished: it instead leads to situations in which 
experts enjoy little autonomy. The experts’ work becomes bureaucratized 
and subjected to control micro- mechanisms and to standardized 
performance- based evaluation criteria so that they ultimately lose all 
critical sense. Furthermore, co- optation, whether through friendship or 
political networks, often determines who can become part of the circle of 
experts, even for only six- month renewable contracts. Experience and pro-
fessionalism are, to be sure, extremely important but ancillary virtues: per-
sonal connections come first; individual expertise will become a 
determining factor for career ascendancy only later.
 Pandolfi, as an expert for several projects under the auspices of the 
UN and other international organizations between 1999 and 2001, found 
it extremely difficult to sidestep the bureaucratic negotiations that 
characterized the different phases of her work. The drafting of her TOR 
was extremely complicated, involving several practical issues, the first 
being her ability to preserve a degree of autonomy and avoid the bureau-
cratic constraints inherent to the TOR. The second, even more alarming, 
at least from the point of view of an anthropologist who does not conceive 
of the mission as a ‘cut and run’ operation, was the need to confront the 
logic of scheduled meetings on location. After all, one can easily travel 
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through countries, meet many people and still continue to have a partial 
and conformist view of the places one has visited, especially if one 
adheres to a standard agenda that has been assembled in an office by 
others. The presumptuousness of experts who claim to have understood a 
country or a crisis area by going to dinners in diplomatic circles or events 
sponsored by international organizations is disconcerting. At other times, 
the ‘unscheduled’ but predictable discovery of local cultural practices by 
experts often accelerates processes of exoticization or essentialization of 
the ‘other,’ particularly in places such as the post- communist Balkans, 
where the terror and excesses of totalitarian rule lead the expert to expect 
to ‘discover’ the worst pathologies of a traumatized society. The need to 
meet local social actors is often reduced, within the schedules prepared by 
the secretaries of the local offices, to a series of encounters within a circuit 
that generates its own information, and which therefore tends to marginal-
ize and exclude other points of view. Pandolfi remembers telling a particu-
larly zealous secretary assigned to organizing the operational details of her 
mission that she had not come to Albania to immerse herself in society life 
and that, above all, as an anthropologist, she wanted to choose her inform-
ants, and therefore her information, on her own, or at least with a limited 
level of support from institutional actors. The secretary could not under-
stand Pandolfi’s reaction, and her disappointment was obvious: she had 
put great effort into organizing a ‘prestigious’ and, one should add, rather 
standard series of meetings with authorities whose analyses complemented 
those that were circulating on Albanian soil – albeit only within the inter-
national community.
 As a hired consultant, Pandolfi met with ministers, ambassadors and 
representatives of international organizations who invited her for coffee, 
breakfast or lunch. After initially allowing herself to be subjected to this 
preordained ritual, she finally balked. War in Kosovo seemed inevitable 
and attempting to understand the social fragility of the areas of Albania 
that would soon have to support an extraordinary influx of refugees was 
her priority for her first professional assignment with the UN, and yet her 
requests to freely move around the country, and especially to meet non- 
institutional social actors, were perceived as eccentricities that were diffi-
cult to comprehend. Pandolfi decided first to talk to the project coordinator 
and then to the programme director in a tug of war that would last several 
days until she was finally granted full autonomy in her work. Meanwhile, 
the diligent secretary saw her castle of prestigious meetings crumble to the 
ground, with every change to the planned schedule being perceived by her 
as an obstacle or a threat to her contract renewal. In actual fact, most 
experts end up accepting the bureaucratic agenda that has been prepared 
for them and passively integrate it, as a marginal detail, into the mission’s 
results. The habit of not meeting non- institutional actors, or in any case 
actors who are outside the international circuit, is part of the normal state 
of affairs in most missions.
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 The final phase of most missions is the drafting of a confidential 
report. Indeed, countless reports circulate between offices, reports 
requested from various experts and used to produce other ad hoc reports; 
and so the reports multiply and accumulate. Their language is invariably 
English, a simplified English however, a pidgin that mechanically uses 
categories and definitions that hide both local violence and the violence 
of universal utopia: words such as implementation, building democracy, 
power- sharing, law enforcement . . . Usually these reports simply accumu-
late on shelves in the offices of the various organizations and join the list 
of innumerable descriptions of the evils of the world and the equally 
numerous facile utopias for their solution. The reports are usually drafted 
at the headquarters of the organization that drew up the initial TOR: 
each TOR authorizes one contract, and it in turn shapes the mission’s 
coordination and support at the crisis location. It thus also predetermines 
and frames the first evaluation report as well as the final report, in which 
the overall success of the mission is analysed and accounted for, but 
always from the perspective that had generated the mission in the first 
place . . . At this point, however, the report can follow two distinct logics 
and take two different paths. If the contract was signed in New York, 
Vienna, Washington or Geneva, the report will have fulfilled its task, and 
it will be added to the countless others that have accumulated in the 
offices of the various P2s, P3s, P4s and P5s, or perhaps passages, those 
that confirm the organization’s mission or testify to its success, will be 
integrated into an annual report. The report may, however, be more or 
less officially put back into circulation and arrive at some local office that 
belongs to the galaxy of the mission’s partners, yet if it does arrive at one 
of these local offices, it will now obey the rules of a second logic. By this 
point, the reports have often attained confidential status. They may then 
be given to you by the local elite as a sign that you, like they, have been 
accepted, that you, too, are part of this cosmopolitan community, that 
you have entered the circles of global civil society. Above all, they wish 
to show that those who have access to confidential reports have superior 
bargaining and negotiating powers in a society in which humanitarian 
crises, political transitions and regional conflicts have in reality blocked 
all autonomous forms of bargaining power. The group of people with 
access to these reports is undoubtedly small, but the relative power 
generated by control of this type of information, especially in areas of 
crisis, transition or international tutelage, is significant because those 
who share this information can claim membership in, and the incumbent 
privileges of, a transnational network which, to be sure, depends on the 
resources of the global bureaucracy but surpasses the reach of its formal 
procedures and hierarchies of command.
 Indeed, the novelty of contemporary global politics resides not in the 
fact that the global bureaucracies, be they associated with the UN, the 
Bretton- Woods institutions or other intergovernmental organizations, 
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can, now that they are finally freed from the constraints of the bipolar 
Cold War order, promote ‘global governance’, but rather in the fact that 
they do so as but one element within a complex apparatus whose govern-
mental logic we shall attempt to define after briefly describing the other 
predominant institutional mechanism of the contemporary global order: 
the NGO.
The symbiosis between global bureaucracy and non- 
governmental organizations
Within the complex galaxy of global authority, a new type of political 
actor plays a pivotal role, its centrality distinguishing contemporary global 
power relations from past imperial or colonial forms. Although non- 
governmental organizations derive from charitable groups whose emer-
gence paralleled and accompanied the imperialist projects of the nineteenth 
century (Duffield, 2007), their explosion in numbers and in mission types 
since the 1990s have made them an integral part of the global apparatus 
that manages populations in (potential) crisis zones. Despite their label and 
their pretensions to autonomy, NGOs are intimately linked to governmen-
tal and intergovernmental organizations, operating internationally through 
their personnel, their sources of expertise and knowledge, their normative 
claims to legitimacy and their funding. They are the institutionalized sub-
contractors who implement the global bureaucracy’s programmes, and in 
so doing they accentuate the cycle of irresponsibility while reinforcing the 
moral imperatives that sustain the bureaucracy’s constant, roaming action. 
At the same time, NGOs reconfirm the global bureaucracy’s utopian belief 
that the implementation of its expert programmes will entail its own with-
ering away as societies become self- governing, albeit in conformity with 
the programmes the global bureaucracy (re)produces and propagates.
 This illusion is particularly predominant in the post- communist socie-
ties of central and eastern Europe where confusion between NGOs and 
the concept of civil society reigns. The proliferation of NGOs has arisen 
from contradictory demands as they are expected both to substitute for 
fragile political institutions in the wake of communism and to present 
themselves as the kernel of a true, autonomous civil society. While the 
NGO boom has indeed permitted the emergence of new polyglot social 
actors, capable of constructing networks that have been granted recogni-
tion both locally and internationally, thus erasing the image of indi-
viduals tied to or oppressed by paralyzing pasts, their pursuit of 
mechanical, uncritical, forms of imitation of arrangements established by 
international organizations, as if these were the only acceptable logic of 
adaptation, has also had unintended consequences. As Hilhorst (2003) 
notes, the various dimensions of NGOs’ strategies need to be examined, 
since they simultaneously provide services, erect ideological fortresses, 
respond to bureaucratic plans and attempt to legitimize their work by 
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following a universal logic of accountability. The NGOs’ thousand faces 
vary depending on whether their interlocutors are local populations, 
donors, colleagues, their own staff or other international organizations. 
Works that analyse NGOs’ procedures, ideologies and practices show 
that the discursive practices intrinsic to the hegemonic nature of 
development exercise a constant and non- negotiable form of control on 
relations between the universalizing rhetoric of aid and development and 
the strategies that emerge from the local context (Ferguson, 1990; 
Hobart, 1993; Escobar, 1995). Obviously negotiation is fragile in con-
texts that were subjected to authoritarian forms of government. In post- 
communist Europe, the most frequent strategy established special, hybrid 
tutelage/laboratory combinations that encouraged the proliferation of 
local NGOs in the midst of the growing administrative and bureaucratic 
confusion of the new democracies, while international NGOs operated 
in parallel.
 This complex layering of interventions, of policy implementation and of 
authority involving international (inter)governmental organizations, inter-
national NGOs and local, allegedly autonomous, indigenous NGOs in net-
works of organizational, personal, financial and epistemic interdependence 
such as we have observed in Albania or Kosovo makes it possible for all 
actors to avoid responsibilities (Pandolfi, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008). NGOs, 
however, can in particular claim their innocence, even as they vaunt their 
flexibility, adaptability to circumstances and moral commitment to what-
ever their particular cause may be. To be sure, the unlimited and uncritical 
power/right/duty to intervene has given way in the last decade to a chorus 
of criticisms, doubts and public confessions by both military and civilian 
protagonists. Once again, a savvy use of the media has shown that this 
sector is capable of recognizing its mistakes, rethinking its operational 
frameworks and reviewing its intervention strategies – that is, 
simultaneously to shirk responsibility and to reinforce its mandate (Yala, 
2005; Brauman, 1996/2002: 42). To short- circuit criticism, the NGOS 
have first articulated eyewitness testimony of their own action, then offered 
an ethical and operational self- criticism, and finally proposed their own 
professionalization in a move that distances them from their role of ethical 
witnessing. Paradoxically, they operate on a global level, in the accelerated 
temporality of the need for action, in a universalistic ethical perspective, 
but they are answerable only to internal and self- referential criteria. If 
there are management problems, they are resolved by means of verification 
procedures that are internal to the NGO itself; if there are abuses of power, 
once again internal procedures, flexible and fast- tracked, determine 
whether any of the individuals involved should be expelled or moved; if 
there are criminal acts, they are often covered up by the reports’ lack of 
transparency, since they occurred in a location whose jurisdiction lies in an 
ambiguous no man’s land between international law and the local or 
national law.
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Migrant sovereignty and therapeutic domination
Motivated by its mission to save the planet, to save the sick, to save the 
poor and to save the warring from each other and themselves, the cosmo-
politan community of global bureaucrats, experts- without-borders and 
NGO operatives perpetuates both its bottomless benevolence and ultimate 
irresponsibility through a novel form of authority that we characterize 
with the concepts of migrant sovereignty and therapeutic domination. 
Quite literally, the cosmopolitan community is migrant, its primum mobile 
being urgency. In emergency situations, it assumes a strong and authorita-
tive identity, and is able to act invoking norms and strategies that are so 
independent of the locations in which it operates that it is able to impose 
itself, under the pressures of the need to inform and help, by adopting a 
new form of domination. The group composing this community has 
become progressively homogenized, both at the level of the protocols of 
the imagination and at the level of discursive practices, though differences 
in power relationships within the community itself remain significant. We 
contend that the category of ‘migrant sovereignty’ is particularly suited to 
describe the peculiarities of the phenomenon as a whole. This category 
defining the complex and heterogeneous world of the ‘internationals’ in 
crisis areas (soldiers, civilians, bureaucrats) is not metaphoric: it refers to a 
network of actors, actions and discourses that legitimizes its presence by 
invoking ethical- temporal rules and a meta- historical category that can be 
defined as the ‘culture of emergency’.
 The migrant and deterritorialized community that constitutes the 
cosmopolitan apparatus operates through the practices of social actors 
who recognize one another though they belong to different nationalities. 
This community arrives upon a location, occupies it logistically, suspends 
existing norms, imposes others, insinuates its own lifestyles and strings 
barbed wire to protect the individuals and things that belong to it. Para-
doxically, the multiplicity of cultures displayed by individuals who belong 
to the migrant sovereign become progressively marginal under the pressure 
exercised by the culture of emergency action, be it military, humanitarian 
or developmental. The standardization of procedures applied, the proto-
cols expected for each type of action, the technology of practices that 
require experts’ certification and the ideology of actions that consider 
themselves both necessary and redemptive define a community that identi-
fies reflexively with the project of belonging itself and which, apparently 
united only at the moment action is required, actually shares a common 
utopia at a deeper level.
 This migrant sovereignty suffers precisely from the problem that it does 
not view itself as a cosmopolis, i.e. as a coherent community at home 
wherever it operates. Instead, its members view their respective actions as 
fragmented and autonomous and, in the cycle of irresponsibility, they can 
blame one another for the failure of their implicitly shared utopia to come 
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to fruition. They create a permanent dissociation anxiety and hence prac-
tise a false self- representation. Despite this lack of self- recognition, the 
concept of migrant sovereignty identifies the elements that bind this com-
munity. The definition of sovereignty includes not only the element of 
legitimacy but also that of legality; it describes a form of authority that is 
both political and moral. The global bureaucracy today thus evokes not 
only a ‘duty to intervene’ or a ‘right to intervene’ but a ‘responsibility to 
protect’ in the name of an emergent transnational rule of law that would 
exercise control and sometimes replace national legal systems since these 
can justify the destruction of citizens and minorities. Sovereignty also 
includes a socio- anthropological dimension that cannot be overlooked: it is 
tied to the behaviour of actors, organizations and programmes that arrive, 
occupy and manage a specific territory. We qualify this sovereignty as 
migrant because this cosmopolis is deterritorialized; it is a mobile, flexible, 
exportable form of government, capable of moving individuals, logistical 
infrastructures and manufactured goods rapidly, always following the 
same standardized procedures.
 The international community today is very different from that of the 
colonial period, though references to direct and indirect forms of rule 
abound in discourses and strategies critical of these contemporary forms of 
intervention. It is precisely the idea of intervention – an extraordinary 
action that pretends to restore order as opposed to the ordinary instaura-
tion of colonial or imperial order – that creates a divide between the occu-
pations of the past and the more recent ones that appeal to the right/duty 
to interfere and the responsibility to protect. To understand the legitimacy 
claimed by this new, migrant sovereign, we turn to Max Weber’s sociology 
of domination (Weber, 1978: vol. 1, ch. 3). According to Weber’s 
Herrschaftssoziologie, any social order relies, at the micro- social level, on 
dominant actors’ particular claims to legitimate authority. Weber (1978) 
identifies three ‘pure’, or ideal- typical, forms such claims can take: the tra-
ditional, the charismatic and the legal rational. Weber’s typology implies a 
fourth, unnamed form. To explain this fourth form, we must recall that 
Weber’s three modes of legitimation do not describe the normative con-
tents of the claims rulers make to justify obedience to their commands but 
derive from the form of relationship between rulers and subordinates. 
Thus, traditional authority refers to a relationship in which the norm for 
obedience is inherent to the ruler’s person embodying (a) value(s) in a 
‘timeless’ regime of continuity, whereas charismatic authority emanates 
from the person of the ruler in an extraordinary, revolutionary regime of 
rupture. By contrast, legal- rational authority is literally disembodied in 
that the ruler appeals to an impersonal norm or procedure necessarily in a 
regime of continuity, the validity of the norm depending on its personal 
and temporal decontextualization.
 This formal typology logically suggests a fourth mode of legitimation, 
namely one in which a ruler makes an impersonal claim to authority in a 
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context of rupture with existing norms. By metonymic analogy to medical 
knowledge, we call this fourth pure form therapeutic domination (McFalls, 
2010), for, as in the doctor–patient relationship of command, the ruler 
claims obedience by virtue of the application of a scientifically valid, 
impersonal procedure – a treatment protocol – in the extraordinary context 
of crisis. The concept of therapeutic domination can make sense of power 
relations on sites of military and humanitarian interventions in political 
and medical crisis zones, where an international corps of experts, the 
migrant sovereign, arrives with a panoply of standard operating proce-
dures to cure social and physical ills with varying degrees of success but 
also with paradoxical side effects, including a self- defeating form of 
resistance to therapeutic domination that we label iatrogenic (‘physician- 
induced’) violence. Analogous to patient non- compliance or refusal of 
treatment, iatrogenic resistance further pathologizes the targets of expert 
intervention in a self- perpetuating cycle so that intervention begets more 
intervention as the provision of food and shelter, for example, quickly 
necessitates not only the establishment of physical infrastructures but ulti-
mately legal, political, economic, social and cultural reforms to make life- 
saving measures effective, efficient and enduring. Therapeutic domination 
can thus spill over from the context of crisis management to become a gen-
eralized mode of government, just as preventive medicine can take over 
every aspect of a (potential) patient’s life.
 The technical correctness of therapeutic domination exercised by inter-
national humanitarian and development NGOs and intergovernmental 
global bureaucracies thus expands and perpetuates an order of domination 
that pretends to be localized, temporary and restorative. What is more, by 
provoking the futile resistance of iatrogenic violence, it prolongs and re- 
legitimates itself in a manner that frees interveners from responsibility for 
failure and reconfirms their normative engagement, or non- indifference. To 
be sure, critiques of their own power (abuses) have arisen within the ranks 
of international NGOs, and they do not draw on the formal logic of our 
concept of therapeutic domination; but the concept sheds light on a global 
political order in which a host of technical experts exercise authority 
around the globe and over the heads of traditional state institutions in the 
name of human development, human rights, human security and human 
survival. The question remains, however, how and when this new govern-
mental apparatus came to fruition.
The birth of a new biopolitics
This new form of sovereignty, suspended somewhere between the discourse 
of universal human rights and the technical practices of therapeutic 
domination, emerged fully with the Kosovo crisis. In the wake of the 
political- humanitarian catastrophes of Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, 
crises that constituted laboratories for the technical perfection of the 
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military- humanitarian-development complex, the intensifying ethnicized 
political conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo provided the liminal 
occasion for the therapeutic apparatus to congeal as a coherent global 
governmentality. Proclaimed as the first ‘humanitarian war’, the NATO 
bombardment of Belgrade in the spring of 2009 was accompanied by the 
simultaneous deployment of a huge army of global bureaucrats, NGOs, 
and their incumbent independent experts and consultants set to save lives, 
to manage refugee flows and heteronomously to establish the political, 
juridical, economic and social conditions necessary for Kosovo’s future 
‘autonomy’. As with the oxymoron ‘humanitarian war’, conventional lan-
guage has had difficulty expressing the novelty of the political entity that 
Kosovo has become. Thus, for example, the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo concluded, in 2000, that the NATO- led inter-
vention was ‘illegal but legitimate’ and that ‘Kosovo now exists regardless, 
for better or for worse’.
 Kosovo, we contend, is not anomalous but paradigmatic for the new 
global therapeutic order. On the discursive level, from the first campaigns 
to legitimate intervention in the name of prevention of ‘another genocide’, 
down to current campaigns to market Europe’s poorest territory as a 
beacon of hope for self- sustainability within a globalized economy, Kosovo 
has illustrated the rhetorical efficacy of an appeal to the ultimate value of 
human life. It has contributed to the construction of a political space in 
which global information admits only those appeals capable of producing 
emotions, passions and the desire to defeat the evils of the world. The 
emergencies that provoke indignation and compassion are expertly 
exposed by international organizations. While the institutional machinery 
and the articulation of messages of global solidarity grind forward in both 
the donor and recipient countries, the cosmopolis shows it is ready for 
action, that it is able to collect funds and launch appeals in a short period 
of time, not only to individual nations, but above all to the entire planet’s 
population. The media present us with the world’s tragedies and simultan-
eously tell us that we have to be present, intervene, provide assistance: and 
it is not the world’s powerful who are called upon but instead all the ‘for-
tunate’ human beings who inhabit the planet. Religion, culture, power 
seem to be of no consequence in these appeals to fight the world’s evils. 
We thus face what seems to be a democratically constructed information 
mechanism: a space that appeals to the need for interventions or the pre-
vention of catastrophes and appears democratically irreprehensible. Next 
to this passive form of participatory democracy – that is, one that receives 
information but cannot manage it, except by sharing the gist of the 
message itself, making donations and considering the intervention itself as 
absolutely necessary – we find intervention itself, which, once activated, 
becomes impossible to control. We thus confront the paradox of the 
coexistence of the noblest will to share information and of the most 
opaque procedures implemented in zones of intervention. The combination 
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of the mobility of the cosmopolis, of the urgent need for action in face of 
real (or feared) emergencies and of the undeniable social utility of many 
interventions makes it nearly impossible to establish any global democratic 
mechanism for controlling interventions, despite their appeal to a certain 
democratic legitimacy.
 On the practical level, Kosovo testifies to the enduring nature of an 
authority that claims to be exceptional. The past decade there has exposed 
the dangers of managing crises by freezing them at the political level and 
creating a growing ‘grey area’, in which compassion, the rhetoric of human 
rights and the idea that one can fight with weapons to export markets and 
democracy all came together in a moral and practical swamp. Today this 
situation of the ‘protected’ unilateral independence of Kosovo is an 
emblematic example that can show us how fragile the management of 
post- bipolar crises really is. But this situation of fragility could be extended 
to the propaganda with which the mission in Afghanistan is managed, 
where a strategy of confusion conflates the protection of women’s rights 
with the war on terrorism. The history of international relations and of 
politics in general offers no precedent, namely, where the alleged objective 
of political normalization draws on such an ambiguous confusion of polit-
ical and military strategies. Whatever the original strategy might have 
been, it seems to have become lost in the rivulets of long- term emergency 
economic assistance, of UN missions, in which UN forces gradually milita-
rize areas of long- term crisis, and of humanitarian goodwill gone awry in 
the micro- management of daily life.
 Be it in Kosovo, Afghanistan or elsewhere, the idea of managing crises 
in the grey zone that calls itself humanitarian not only pathologizes inter-
vention zones, it also pathologizes any peace accord; it pathologizes 
development; it pathologizes a democratization process that is staged with 
endless rhetoric but with little promise; just as it has pathologized the 
independence that Kosovo proclaimed in February 2008. The urgency/
emergency is permanent: a paradigmatic oxymoron of our contemporane-
ousness. The emergency’s duration is transformed into an endless state of 
control and tutelage on the part of the complex machinery of the interna-
tional community. The experts exhort us to be patient: getting used to 
living with the idea that ‘there is still a lot to accomplish’ has become 
the leitmotif in the corridors of New York, Vienna, Geneva, Brussels, 
Washington, Paris and Rome.
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12 The space of camps
Towards a genealogy of places of 
internment in the present
Federico Rahola
Our age – with its modern warfare, imperialism, and the quasi- theological 
ambitions of totalitarian rulers – is indeed the age of the refugee, the dis-
placed person, mass immigration.
(Edward Said, Reflections on Exile)
Definitions
The passage cited above comes from an impassioned essay by Edward Said 
dedicated to the form of displacement that gets defined, in a slightly elegiac 
tone, as exile (Said, 2002: 174). Said’s words allude to a point of no return 
where exile, as a specifically individual experience, reveals something that 
we no longer are. In fact, today the status of ‘out of place’ individuals is 
captured in political language through a series of totalizing categories and 
truisms: ‘internally displaced people’ and ‘asylum seekers’ (depending on 
whether the dispersal takes place inside or outside a state’s boundaries), 
‘temporary refugees’ or ‘prima facie refugees’ (persecuted individuals 
assigned temporary humanitarian status) and migrants, who may be ‘eco-
nomic’ and ‘regular’. One might well argue that these naming exercises 
amount to little more than words. In reality, such definitions end up pro-
ducing exactly what they indicate by branding individuals whose existence 
reflects a condition that exceeds univocal forms of belonging. The only 
way to define this ‘excess’, therefore, consists in cancelling out all its dis-
crete elements, attributing it with cumulative categories and, on the basis 
of these classifications, making choices and decisions about the fate of the 
individuals in question. Two further considerations, however, need to be 
borne in mind.
 The first consideration regards the arbitrariness of such distinctions and 
how these can overlap in the story of a single life. In other words, after 
being forced to leave (and therefore falling under the definition of the 
‘internally displaced’), it is possible that an individual manages to cross 
national boundaries and to apply for asylum in a third country (hence 
becoming an ‘asylum seeker’). What can then happen, although the 
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chances are extremely reduced, is that the application for asylum is 
accepted, even if only temporarily (thus the individual becomes a ‘prima 
facie refugee’). It should be remembered that applications made to consu-
lates or the border police nearly always remain dead letters, and the rejec-
tion takes the form of a decree which prohibits a reapplication in other 
countries, thus leading to practical banishment (Valluy, 2005). In any case, 
the right to asylum, redefined as a generic form of humanitarian protec-
tion, is today conceived as a temporary instrument that presupposes the 
eventual normalization of the situation in the land of origin (UNHCR, 
2006). Once the asylum status expires, it is presumed that the person will 
spontaneously return to his or her own country of origin. Otherwise, they 
will be threatened with a deportation order that, in most cases, will remain 
unexecuted, but which will nevertheless subsume their prior existence as 
internally displaced, ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘temporary refugees’ under a 
situation of precarity and blackmail that hastens their advance towards a 
definition of ‘illegality’. The point, then, does not concern the commonly 
presumed ‘objective’ differences between individuals that share a condition 
of displacement, but rather the arbitrariness of such definitions and the 
political effects that these generate.
 The second consideration directly regards the focus of analysis in this 
chapter. Each stage of the ‘moral career’ of these individuals in fact corres-
ponds to a camp or temporary centre that is more or less equipped for the 
purpose of detention. Here, the official language also abounds with euphe-
mistic formulae. Besides the various play on words accentuating either a 
detention or humanitarian aspect, there are a series of definitions that 
obsessively stress the transitory nature of such places: ‘emergency tempo-
rary locations’ or ‘temporary protected areas’ for the ‘internally displaced’; 
‘transit processing centres’ or ‘identification centres’ (depending on 
whether they are located in transit or destination countries) for ‘asylum 
seekers’; the more uninspired term ‘temporary reception centres’ for ‘tem-
porary refugees’; and, lastly, detention centres or, in the case of Italy, 
‘centres of temporary stay’ (which were renamed more explicitly as ‘centres 
of identification and deportation’) for undocumented migrants.
 Thinking in less euphemistic terms, if it is theoretically possible that an 
individual passes through all the definitions discussed above, it is also 
politically constant that each of these definitions corresponds to one of 
these ‘centres’ or, put another way, definitively temporary zones. The abso-
lute temporariness of these places of transit clashes with their equally 
peremptory relentlessness, as material epiphanies of the deterritorialized 
borders of the present.
The camp as form
It is from this constancy – the permanent transit through temporary places 
– that the hypothesis of a ‘camp- form’ takes shape: a common matrix able 
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to account for the various manifestations in which camps inhabit the 
present (Rahola, 2003). Camps represent, first and foremost, the only ‘pos-
sible’ territory that reattaches a humanity in movement to borders and a 
univocal sense of belonging. The impression, in other words, is that it is 
the insufficient status of individuals which gives a ‘sense’ to camps. They 
exist as ‘wasted’ places for ‘wasted’ subjects, responses which exceed for 
subjects who exceed. Yet, this thesis is too mechanical and formal, and 
ultimately removes the ‘dynamic’ dimension of camps. For this reason, it is 
essential to consider not just the status of individuals but also the ‘lives’ of 
those who are forced to transit through a camp, including the forms of 
action and rebellion that take place there. From this perspective, for 
example, Michel Agier identifies a political space in camps that is in per-
manent tension and, in many ways, ‘open’ (Agier, 2008). Recovering the 
dynamic nature of camps, nonetheless, also means taking into account the 
sinister complementariness that welds places and individuals together, and 
hence the particular ‘productive’ dimension which permeates such disposi-
tives. The way in which camps bear down on displaced individuals as a 
spectral possibility, defining their living conditions in time (in terms of pre-
carity) and space (in terms of confinement), does not mean that camps can 
be dismissed as simply ‘wasted’ places. Any serious reflection on the issue 
must rather wrestle with a series of questions: what does it mean to be 
marked out as subjects whose fate is overshadowed by a camp? What role 
does a dispositive like the camp play in producing this condition? What 
dimension of power and what political space does this lead to?
 The idea of a camp- form emerges out of the responses to such ques-
tions. It underlines the importance of taking into consideration all types of 
camps in the present, but also indicates an approach for rereading the 
history of this dispositive of confinement. A starting point is offered by 
Hannah Arendt, who defines camps as ‘substitutes for a nonexistent home-
land’, where individuals who do not belong are interned:
Every attempt by International conferences to establish some legal 
status for stateless people failed because no agreement could possibly 
replace the territory to which an alien, within the framework of exist-
ing law, must be deportable. [. . .] [T]he only practical substitute for a 
nonexistent homeland was an internment camp. Indeed, as early as the 
thirties this was the only “country” the world had to offer the stateless 
[italics added].
(Arendt, 1958: 284)
The impression in just these few lines is that Arendt intended to assume the 
internment camp as a matrix in order to reconstruct a general historical 
narrative able to shed light also on its most extreme examples. It is this 
very ‘matrix’ that should become the focus of our attention and which 
needs to be brought up to date. The fact that camps represent a looming 
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prospect for a range of ‘out- of-place’ individuals continues to appear a 
decisive element. Migrants and refugees share a condition of displacement 
that is primarily an act: that of transgressing the political imperative which 
attaches an individual to a place and of claiming other forms of (non)mem-
bership. This nonetheless regards an ‘excess’ that is also an evident (quali-
tative rather than quantitative) symptom of a point of no return, which 
throws all that is still considered ‘in its place’ into crisis. Stephen Castles 
and Alistair Davidson capture the sense of implosion of the forms around 
which political membership has been organized during the course of 
modernity:
Millions of people are disenfranchised because they cannot become cit-
izens in their country of residence. Even more people, however, have 
formal membership of the nation- state yet lack many of the rights that 
are meant to go with this. [. . .] There are increasing numbers of cit-
izens who do not belong. This in turn undermines the basis of the 
nation- state as the central site of democracy.
(Castles and Davidson, 2000: viii)
These words pinpoint the overall crisis of an inclusive system and of the 
dialectical relationship between inclusion and exclusion, whereby the latter 
is absorbed into the idea of a democratic state and of the rule of law. Here, 
I advance the hypothesis that the existence of camps is at times the most 
immediate sign of such a crisis, in the way that it alludes to an ‘other’ 
space that exceeds the borders of the state itself.1
 There exists a substantial literature which describes camps in terms of 
exception. Through a rereading of modern sovereignty around the dialectical 
pairing of biopower and bare life, Giorgio Agamben (1998; 2005), for 
example, sees the camp as a paradigmatic place where sovereign power 
and life confront each other, leading to a suspension of every mediation 
and right. Agamben attempts to reflect upon that which is produced as an 
‘outside’ in relation to a given legal system, and which can be captured and 
‘taken outside’ (or, to use the Latin term, excipere; Agamben, 1998: 92), 
by suspending ordinary legal instruments and appealing to a transcendent 
idea of sovereignty, as the instance that decides the state of exception. In a 
perspective closer to the Foucaultian idea of governmentality, I believe that 
it is necessary to focus above all on the meaning of places and practices 
that define and govern subjects without necessarily referring to the tran-
scendence of a sovereign decision, which on the contrary proves true on an 
immanent level, in the gestures and in the immediate effects produced by 
such places and practices (Foucault, 2007). Put in other terms, this means 
assuming the dispositive of the ‘camp’ for its specific ‘positive’ and there-
fore productive capacity. From this ‘positiveness’ originates the idea of the 
camp- form. Here, form is not understood in its immediate sense as a 
neutral frame devoid of signs and direction, but rather in its dialectic 
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meaning of a ‘principle that concretizes’, a ‘strange factor of attraction that 
distorts and prejudges’ and which ‘colors the entire field in question’ 
(Žižek, 2002b: 29). This idea of form, associated with the matrix of the 
camp identified by Arendt, captures something that ‘produces a difference’: 
in other words, by superseding every experience of exclusion, it ratifies a 
radical difference. This idea is connected with an excess and determines the 
existence of individuals who ‘exceed’ the meaning of a place.
 Camps ‘give form’ and ‘produce a difference’. Their ‘productiveness’ is 
the ability to decree the existence of individuals liable to internment, over 
and above individual responsibility and biographical factors. Given the 
absolute temporary dimension in which they pass judgment and the transi-
toriness that they ratify, camps are not simply the only territory for dis-
placed individuals, but, as a looming possibility, differentially define 
human beings who exceed borders and forms of belonging as ‘detainable’ 
and ‘deportable’ (De Genova, 2002). This appears to me to be the govern-
mental character of camps: places where power is produced; dispositives 
through which a ‘difference’ is established.
 It could be argued that every form of sovereignty endows itself with 
instruments capable of producing differences, and that power (in all its 
expressions, from its sovereign variant to the more microphysical power of 
an institution) is concretized through the act of establishing a minimal but 
incommensurable difference. Similarly, a sovereign decision is at stake in 
the case of the camp. However, this is a sovereignty that, instead of being 
presupposed, is produced and produces; that rather than decreeing excep-
tions on its inside, emanates from and acts upon a space that transcends 
the specific borders in which the concept of sovereignty derived its domain 
of enforcement. In other words, rather than being situated in a space 
marked by a suspension which takes exception to the legal system, camps 
seem to be governed by a logic that exceeds that space. And if they also 
reflect a performative decision, this is done in a way that exceeds every 
univocal dimension of sovereignty, being rearticulated in a multiplicity of 
anonymous powers and in a proliferation (rather than a suspension) of the 
normative sphere. Camps are therefore governmental dispositives that act, 
nonetheless, on individuals and impinge on a space in radical discontinuity 
with the national order.
 The question therefore shifts to the political quality of this space and the 
type of power that it exerts. If such a space exceeds every idea of border 
founded upon a dialectical relationship between the inside and outside, and 
is invested without ever being absorbed back into such borders, it follows 
that the form of sovereignty subsequently produced will always be some-
thing that exceeds every conventional representation and acts upon and 
through a series of subjects who, rather than taking exception to forms of 
state and national power, will continue to exceed those as well.
 I shall return to this matter later. Here, I want to simply suggest that 
camps delineate a separate history, which transcends every dichotomy 
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between the inside and outside. The idea of a ‘separate’ history does not 
mean denying a rapport with the national order. Rather, this is something 
that is qualitatively incommensurable with a disciplinary dispositive that 
operates in a specific territory and system (all those institutions that, fol-
lowing the work of Michel Foucault or Erwing Goffman, are called ‘total’): 
a rapport where there is no osmosis; in which every ‘dialectic’ between an 
inside and outside is transcended. In other words, camps exceed national 
space and allude to a different scale, but one which does not simply clash 
with the national scale. On the contrary, this scale both invests and is 
invested by the national scale in an increasingly destabilizing way. For this 
reason, the space of camps is not even qualifiable as a simple surface, nor 
is their action assimilable to a gesture that ratifies a form of exclusion. 
Rather, camps are the symptom of an overlap and imbrication in which 
the global and the national interpenetrate each other. Abandoning the idea 
of a straightforward contrast, it is necessary to realize that the meaning of 
camps is inscribed, first and foremost, in the act of decreeing differences of 
status in an intricate, multi- scalar dimension, where working out the dis-
tinction between an inside and outside becomes increasingly arduous, and 
where the global violently impacts upon the national, generating new solid 
concretions of borders (such as camps).2
Excess
This indication, among other things, allows us to return to a controversial 
issue which, since Arendt, has characterized many reflections on camps: the 
idea of superfluity that unites the places and the human beings destined to be 
interned there. The Arendtian hypothesis in fact betrays a certain aversion 
towards all that is not situated along the absolute political border that 
separates those who belong from those who do not, the citizen from the 
stateless person. Not belonging, though, does not mean not producing, nor 
is it true that camps are necessarily unproductive places. Their productivity, 
however, does not respond to an immediate economic logic (with the excep-
tion of the forced labour camp), nor to ‘functional’ criteria (if one considers 
the fact, for example, that most migrants held in detention centres are not 
deported but are released as illegals). This productivity is instead inscribed in 
the act of ratifying a radical difference: decreeing the existence of subjects 
liable to internment and managing their bodies; that is, governing them, dis-
ciplining them and making them illegal. The productivity of camps, in other 
words, is reflected in the particular excess condition of those who are 
interned in them, as well as in the specific productivity that characterizes 
such excess. Certainly, defining the condition of a refugee as ‘productive’ 
would appear far- fetched. Excluding the various ‘humanitarian’ economies, 
the drama of deportation and forced movement seems, on the contrary, to 
suggest the desolate sense of something ‘beyond all calculations’, which Arif 
Dirlik invites us to extend globally:
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Those who do not respond, or the ‘basket cases’ that are not essential 
to those operations – four- fifths of the global population by the man-
agers’ count – need not be colonized; they are simply marginalized. 
What the new flexible production has made possible is that it is no 
longer necessary to utilize explicit coercion against labor at home or in 
colonies abroad. Those peoples or places that are not responsive to the 
needs (or demands) of capital [. . .] simply find themselves out of its 
pathways.
(Dirlik, 1994: 351)
These words suggest an absolute waste. For example, the human condition 
that crowds a refugee camp can appear along these lines; therefore it is not 
even worthy of the common language of exploitation. However, I do not 
think that the dramatic reality of the ‘basket cases’ continually produced 
by global capital allows for the excess to be read exclusively as superfluous 
because of its unproductiveness. Moreover, the new ‘flexible’ production 
resorts to forms of coercion of living labour which inundate both the (ex)
colonies and metropolitan cities, leading to the overlapping of maquilado-
ras and sweatshops, immaterial and slave labour, formal and real sub-
sumption. And contemporary migration responds to a decidedly productive 
logic by representing a humanity as exploited because unrecognized (or 
recognized on a strictly differential basis), because rendered illegal and 
because in excess. Distinguishing between a productive excess and a ‘resid-
ual’ and abstractly political excess in fact sanctions the arbitrary differ-
ences and partages inherent in government strategies (for instance, between 
forced and economic migration or between migrants, refugees and evacu-
ees) and, as a result, loses a continuum (even biographical, as I have tried 
to demonstrate) which is the underlying cipher of the contemporary excess, 
insofar as this comes under the more general circuit of mobility. I believe 
that the significance of excess, as a condition that claims a right to mobility 
and is situated beyond every exclusive form of membership, is materially 
defined in the spectral possibility of labour separated from all rights, and 
blurs every distinction between productivity and unproductiveness, exploi-
tation and abandonment. In other words, it is around the deep rift between 
labour and rights and between life and its contingent surroundings that the 
true boundary of excess is constructed: a political border that is at the same 
time economic and which rearticulates every relation between the eco-
nomic and political. Out of this emerges, like a common thread, a distorted 
image of precarity that defines the existence of today’s non- persons and 
stateless people, as well as the millions of ‘citizens who do not belong’ or 
whose membership is a shadow without substance.
 The spectre of a camp looms over this humanity in excess as the ‘only 
possible territory’. Camps, as such, indicate the way in which new 
differences of status, class and ‘race’ are rearticulated globally. They are 
the material and territorial residue of the increasingly abstract and 
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deterritorialized borders of the present. The differences they produce 
confirm a human condition that exceeds every idea of exclusion, and is 
instead ‘included’, according to a radically differential logic tantamount to 
apartheid, as confinable and deportable.3
A genealogy
If camps delineate a separate history, the roots of this history are located 
outside the West. Various works (from that drafted by Arendt, through to 
the ‘resentful’ study by Andrzej Kaminski, up to the more recent and con-
tentious work by Kotek and Rigoulot) (Kaminski, 1982; Kotek and Rig-
oulot, 2000) have highlighted how the recourse to administrative detention 
of ‘civilians’ originated in colonies, first in Cuba after the 1894 insurrec-
tion and then in South Africa six years later. The origins could be dated 
back even further to the time of the first reserves where Native North 
Americans were interned. Yet, if the idea of colonialism is conceived along 
Gramscian lines, the colonial matrix of camps seems to be confirmed in all 
these cases. A lacuna, however, exists, only partially attributable to Arendt, 
who in fact forcefully denounced the ‘administrative massacres’ of coloni-
alism, but one which is more serious in successive work: this regards the 
capacity to interrogate the sense of this origin, without simply acknowl-
edging it as a historic fact.
 Needless to say, camps are not the only dispositive that came into 
existence in the colonies only to then move towards the centre, and in 
doing so overturn the narrative according to which history has always 
occurred first in Europe. Carlo Ginzburg has reconstructed the Bengali 
origins of fingerprints as a practice used by the population to locate indi-
viduals in a family system, which was later transformed by the Raj into an 
instrument of identification (Ginzburg, 1989). On being imported into the 
heart of the Western metropolis, fingerprints would preside over a funda-
mental internal border between the ‘labouring’ and ‘dangerous’ classes, at 
the convergence between disciplinary and control techniques. A similar 
denouement occurred in the case of the machine gun which, after the 
American Civil War, was banned in the wars that took place in the ‘West’, 
only to take on a key role in the Scramble for Africa, although it continued 
to be used in the United States in the final campaigns against the Native 
Peoples and in order to repress the strikes at the end of the nineteenth 
century. When the same weapon was deployed in the trenches of the First 
World War, a decisive qualitative leap had occurred: the ‘total war’ already 
practised in the colonial campaigns now began to expand across the Euro-
pean continent itself. The idea of the return of the margins to the centre as 
essential to an understanding of ‘metropolitan’ matters is relayed in Aimé 
Césaire’s call for a reading of totalitarianism as the importation of colonial 
practices into the heart of Europe once the ‘living space’ of the overseas 
territories appeared to be running out. He went one step further, suggest-
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ing that the taboo shattered by Nazism consisted (also) in the fact of apply-
ing directly to European ‘citizens’ what had once only been conceivable for 
colonial subjects – in other words, the rendering of life and death as 
equally straightforward, practicable options (Césaire, 1972; Du Bois, 
1992). This particular kind of transgression that locates the Holocaust in 
an already ‘postcolonial’ dimension forces us to rethink the absolute viol-
ence of colonialism and, above all, to see how the condition of the colonial 
subject is vital to understanding the significance of the camp- form in its 
modern evolution. Ultimately, a genealogy of camps is necessarily a genea-
logy of excess, in which the figure of the colonial subject represents the 
matrix or, put another way, the point of no return.4
 The trajectories of the camp- form delineate a movement that, from the 
colonies, is destined to move towards the centre, ‘provincializing’ Europe in 
the process, prior to its culmination in a problematic postcolonial scenario. 
Camps would be imported into the West during the First World War, as 
detention and labour facilities for war prisoners, as well as places to intern 
civilians of ‘foreign’ nationality and colonial subjects. They would then 
spread in the 1930s in a Europe saturated with borders and in a geopolitical 
situation that continued to be colonial but which was on the verge of cata-
strophe. After the abyss of the Shoah, their presence dissipated but did not 
disappear: as a reinforcement of the bipolar borders after the Second World 
War, they plunged into the hell of the Soviet gulags and forced labour camps 
of China and Eastern Europe, and continued to overshadow an entire world 
in the process of decolonization. The tally of administrative dispositives and 
spectral ‘substitutes for a homeland’ would be reaffirmed at the end of the 
1980s and scattered across the apparently smooth surface of the present. 
These represent the principal junctures in the specific history of camps 
(Rahola, 2003: 61–113), and the basis from which I want to now single out 
three closely interrelated points for reflection.
From the colonies to the world
The first point is a question of method and regards the implications of a 
genealogical approach. Following Foucault, this consists in a non- 
chronological, retrospective method in which the unweaving of the present is 
weighed down, redefined and complicated by the shadow of the past 
(Foucault, 1984). Through such an approach, it is possible to recover the 
‘separate history’ of camps. While this history does not entirely explain what 
happened in camps, it nevertheless reiterates the fact that one day in history 
it was decided that these should exist and that human beings could be 
interned in them, and thus they surely turned into something new. Now, the 
fact that this day is geographically located in the colonies and that the ‘first’ 
confinable and deportable individual is associated with the figure of the colo-
nial subject means that any discourse on camps is situated in a specific time–
space order and within the Border upon which this order is based.
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 At the end of Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said called for the entire 
colonial project to be reread according to a more general ‘principle of con-
finement’ which constitutes its compass and underlying matrix (Said, 
1994). The effect was that of a dichotomous world divided along the 
‘physical and epistemic’ Border that separated the metropolis from the col-
onies and sanctioned the coexistence of subjects and citizens in a unified 
time and a polarized geography. The colonies, in other words, represented 
a space in excess, which evaded and questioned dialectical images of 
national boundaries and an inside–outside logic, and for this reason were 
governed by a colonial law that ‘exceeded’ (rather than took exception to) 
the legal system of each colonial power.5 It is in this very dimension of 
excess – the discursive translation of which converged with the idea of an 
invested but distinct ‘living space’ – that the principle of confinement 
operated: the artifice under which colonial space could coexist at a distance 
from the metropolis in a synchronic and ‘modern’ time. Whether the 
space–time of the colonies and the Border upon which it was based have 
both been definitely overcome is an issue that does not cease to provoke 
debate. Without denying the persistence of relations of domination, and 
the ongoing existence of occupations and protectorates that are the corol-
lary of contemporary wars of prevention or intervention, I nevertheless 
think that it is reductive to represent the present in reiterative and (neo)
colonial terms. Before anything else, this would overlook the disruptions 
which, from the struggles for independence onwards, have redrawn an 
entire geography and forced capital to establish itself at another, neces-
sarily global, level. Drawing on the area of studies known as ‘postcolonial-
ism’, it is thus useful to recover the sense of a transition having taken place 
but one which has by no means been resolved, which inevitably problema-
tizes the very significance of the prefix ‘post’ (Hall, 1996; Mezzadra and 
Rahola, 2006). In short, this entails detecting the continuing traces of a 
past of domination and exploitation in the present, but without being able 
to still situate them within a polarized geography and an absolute Border. 
This is the particular ‘backward’ movement imposed by a genealogy: while 
the past looms over the present, the present continues to disturb the linear 
thread of that same past. This means, among other things, that the Border 
is today virtually displaced across the globe to the point that it separates 
the centre of the metropolis from its banlieues and the enclosure of 
‘gated communities’ from that experienced in slums and favelas. More 
importantly, it means that the shadow of this border continues to be cast 
on the subjects who today exceed it: namely, migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers. These individuals, like the colonial subjects of yesterday, 
appear perennially ‘out of place’ as they continue to overreach, violate and 
transgress the shattered border. Finally, returning to the focus of this 
chapter, it is also in the shadow of this shattered border that the camp- 
form spreads across the apparently smooth surface of the present, populat-
ing the ex- metropolises and ex- colonies with camps.
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Camps and war
The second element that needs to be considered regards the relation 
between the recourse to camps, as dispositives legitimized by security 
measures, and the ‘state of war’. This war is neither declared nor recog-
nized, and is, above all, radically asymmetrical because it unfolds beyond 
the borders that provide the basis for its organization and configuration. In 
tracing a history of camps, one continually encounters insurrections, 
revolts and violated borders. Indeed, camps came into existence for the 
first time as a response to struggles or the simple trespass of borders and 
based on a logic that radicalized the borders that had been infringed: in 
Cuba, following the insurrection against Spanish rule, in South Africa 
during the Boer Wars (without getting embroiled in that other internal 
border constructed along the ‘colour line’), in Namibia, where the Herero 
people were putatively concentrated and exterminated by the German 
Imperial Army because their sheer presence exceeded the aberrant Leben-
sraum, and later in Libya, Vietnam, Algeria and Kenya. The ‘uncounted’ 
(Rancière, 1999) masses who populated the Europe of the 1920s and 
1930s, the same Europe that would later be crowded with camps, con-
veyed an analogous ‘subversive’ potential in the way they contested the 
principle of inclusion founded on peremptory boundaries of race, nation 
and class, or, more prosaically, because they crossed borders in flight from 
the ghettos where they had been confined for centuries. In both cases, these 
‘impossible’ presences indicated the irreversible crisis of an inclusive model 
based on their ‘difference’ and would provoke a reaction that radicalized 
this difference through the resort to a dispositive of detention, which did 
not derive out of a national legal system but from a colonial space that 
exceeded the reach of this system. That is why the introduction of camps 
in the West, rather than pointing to the possible suspension of the rule of 
law, was the symptom of a condition that, as previously for colonial sub-
jects, went beyond exclusion because it alluded to a space that exceeded 
every ‘inside–outside’ logic and specific form of border. This, ultimately, 
was a space in which peace and war appeared absolutely reversible 
options.
 The use of chemical weapons and the first planned exterminations 
(such as those by the Germans in Namibia, the Italians in Libya and the 
French at Sètif ), the first so- called ‘random’ civilian victims and the use of 
torture as a practice for unidentified enemies are all elements which enable 
us to deduce the colonial matrix underlying today’s asymmetrical con-
flicts, but without the binary geography of the past. In a certain sense, 
behind the unclassifiable figure of the ‘terrorist’ or dehumanized enemy 
liable to extraordinary rendition and torture hides the situated figure of 
the colonial subject that rebels: a subject whose act of violence, by defini-
tion asymmetric, will always be labelled with the disqualifying category of 
‘illegal enemy combatant’. This implies that places like Abu Ghraib, 
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Bagram or Guantanamo are not exceptions but instead appear to totally 
reflect the (post)colonial matrix of the camp- form, in that space that 
exceeds every legal system and specific dimension of borders. They repre-
sent the distorted and global projection of those various special places 
where ‘differential’ colonial subjects were concentrated and tortured. 
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and Bagram are metonyms of the politics of 
security and the deterritorialized geography of the war on terror. The 
analysis needs to focus on the very specificity of this geography. Exactly 
what sort of space determines such places?
The space of camps
The hypothesis advanced here is that an answer to these extreme disposi-
tives – considered by many to be places of exception and beyond the law – 
lies in the ‘serial nature’ of detention centres for ‘irregular’ migrants or 
identification centres for asylum seekers. It is the distinctive space of the 
camp- form with its origins in colonialism which determines the specificity 
of Guantanamo. The third and final question we need to consider, there-
fore, regards the very ‘quality’ of this space.
 The point has been raised that, in an exceptionalist logic, camps are the 
dispositive through which sovereignty can capture the outside on its inside. 
So, for example, it would be possible to explain how detention centres for 
migrants operate inside a specific legal system, while suspending that same 
system. But besides the ‘formal’ question about the presumed suspension 
of the legal system, and hence the elements of alegality typical in the insti-
tution of camps (and undeniable if one reasons in terms of normalized 
spaces and their internal exceptions), I believe it is necessary to concentrate 
upon their specific geography and, above all, upon the material effects pro-
duced by the deployment of such dispositives. Furthermore, the same axiom 
that the space of camps is always and only a suspension of rights (and, in 
turn, the outcome of a sovereign decision) proves to be question able. Even 
an extreme place like Guantanamo, continuously evoked as a ‘black hole’ 
and legal abyss, given its institution as an emergency measure (Weber 
would term it a ‘substantial legitimation’), appears if anything to be 
characterized by a normative proliferation. The volume of government 
decrees and administrative acts on Guantanamo might not remove the 
burden of a sovereign decision, but it certainly blurs it and, above all, rein-
flects it in a multiplicity of different subjects, ‘sovereigns’ to varying 
degrees, who manage and command the extreme measures adopted in such 
a place. As Fleur Johns affirms, ‘the detention camps of Guantánamo Bay 
are above all works of legal representation and classification. They are 
spaces where law and liberal proceduralism speak and operate in excess’ 
(Johns, 2005: 615). The ‘excess’ here regards the normative proliferation 
that invests Guantanamo, and the law which, rather than being suspended, 
operates beyond itself and its own limits. But its significance can also be 
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extended to comprehend the statuses of the interned subjects (who exceed 
the figure of the enemy and every form of membership), the multiplicity of 
anonymous powers and new ‘legalities’ that are produced (and which 
exceed univocal ideas about sovereignty6), as well as the very extraterrito-
riality of Guantanamo, which reproduces colonial forms beyond the geo-
graphy of colonialism. The same character of excess, as already explained, 
applies at varying degrees for ‘more specific’ and serial manifestations of 
the camp. Rather than an exception and suspension of law, the existence 
of camps should hence be interpreted as something that bends the law, and 
creates new legal figures, new statuses and, at most, new acts and forms of 
sovereignty.7 In other words, it is the sign of something that exceeds 
insofar as it produces ‘differences’. In this case, it amounts to a radical dif-
ference which is determined when an individual becomes ‘confinable’, and 
therefore to the material institution of a differential regime through camps.
 Put another way and coming closer to a Foucaultian idea of governmen-
tality, when considering power, it needs to be remembered that its effects 
are often more important than its causes, to the same extent that 
sovereignty itself is not presupposed but is rather conceived as something 
that is produced and, by being produced, establishes differences. Thus I 
believe that an exceptionalist reading – which tends to always put the 
power that establishes places ahead of the effects of power upon indi-
viduals – ultimately situates the institution of camps within a history des-
tined to revolve around itself, which in turn continually reconfirms a logic 
of a steady, indestructible, omnivorous sovereignty. This is a logic that, 
first and foremost, persists and ‘rebounds’ within definite national bounda-
ries, and therefore within the binary dialectic – the inside–outside – around 
which the idea of sovereignty developed.
 With regard to this development, camps seem instead to indicate a dif-
ferent spatiality: they are deterritorialized places, as demonstrated by the 
tendency to locate them far away from national boundaries into an increas-
ingly pronounced extraterritorial dimension. This is the case of 
Guantanamo or Bagram, but also the hundreds of ‘preventive’ centres of 
detention and identification that are scattered thousands of kilometres 
from the borders that they are supposed to preside over; and the ‘humani-
tarian’ camps that, by preventively confining the displaced in situ, deny the 
possibility of applying for asylum in a third country. What, then, are the 
definite borders that can be associated with these ‘forms’ of camp? What 
type of sovereignty institutes them and is exerted over them? Is the answer 
really to be found by resorting to traditional borders and exceptions within 
them, and to decisions that revert to a unitary sovereign subject? Or is it 
rather necessary to turn elsewhere, towards a space that exceeds such 
borders and towards figures who exceed such a univocal dimension?
 In this chapter, as should now be clear, my suggestion has been to look 
elsewhere. This is the reason why, instead of the storyline that sees camps 
as the reflection of a principle of sovereignty that decrees the state of 
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exception (and therefore as something that is included ‘through exclu-
sion’), a different interpretative thread has been preferred, which questions 
the borders in which camps are supposed to have been instituted and 
where exclusion is included. Moreover, Cèsaire’s idea that totalitarian 
regimes imported into Europe what had been ‘normal’ in the colonies does 
not only indicate the possibility of detecting continuity in a history, but 
more radically the necessity of decentring that history and reading it 
according to a different set of criteria. Certainly, it could always be 
objected that the exception was the rule in the colonies. But a different 
‘quality’ of political space (and, with it, a different form of sovereignty) 
emerges out of the colonies, and it would be reductive, to say the least, to 
revert back to national sovereignty through the passe- partout category of 
‘exception’.
 The space of colonies has always exceeded and challenged forms of 
binary logic (such as inside–outside and friend–enemy) and conventional 
representations of borders.8 At most, it was a space characterized by a ‘per-
manent war’ and ‘low- intensity conflict’ and therefore by security policies 
intent on compartmentalizing a territory and population.9 As such, the 
colonies were extraordinary ‘governmental laboratories’ that implemented 
techniques of government which reflected the more general division of 
status between colonists and subjects (Chatterjee, 2004). Thus they are not 
areas of ‘waste’ or a suspension of the law, but excessive places: in the 
sense that they are spaces which exceed the reach of the ‘national’ legal 
system but nonetheless are invested with a proliferation of administrative 
decrees and security policies. It is in this governmentalized territory, where 
security becomes the ultimate goal of government action, that camps 
belong.
 The colonial origins of the camp- form therefore point to a different and 
more ‘distant’ trajectory. It is not a question about how camps can be cap-
tured in a legal system by taking exception to it (eccependolo), but rather 
understanding how they sanction the limit of the reach of that system by 
exceeding it (eccedendolo), and signalling at a more mundane level a 
border between exclusion and inclusion, and between an inside and an 
outside that no longer exist. To completely accept this matrix, and there-
fore to write a genealogy of camps, thus means to relocate camps in a ter-
ritory that exceeds every representation of modern national borders while 
indicating its spectral artificiality and intrinsic weakness. From this per-
spective, camps are the symptom of a space that has always transcended 
the specific space of nations, within which it has been historically colo-
nized, plundered and racialized, but never totally absorbed. It is a space 
(and this is the postcolonial sense of the global present) that, whenever it 
penetrates the specific space of states, violating its borders and subverting 
distinctions between an inside and outside, produces holes and abysses. 
And in each of these holes, there sits a camp.
 Translation by Nick Dines.
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Notes
1 For an analogous interpretation of camps as the symptom of a more general 
process of the multiplication and autonomization of borders, see Mezzadra and 
Neilson (2008).
2 Saskia Sassen (2007) insists on the multiscalar character of globalization, where 
the national and the global intersect, generating new kinds of borders.
3 For Etienne Balibar (2005), the process of European integration is based on a 
logic of apartheid, due to the presence of a subcategory of ‘citizens- subjects’ 
composed of migrants.
4 Gayatry Spivak (1988) has demonstrated how the ‘biopolitical’ status of the 
citizen, vested with the care and control of the state, is unthinkable without con-
sidering the material costs of such a transition (a history that Foucault ‘wrote 
only halfway’) in the colonies.
5 The double standard between colonial law and the national legal system is theo-
rized, for example, by the Italian jurist Santi Romano (1918: 14–123).
6 Judith Butler (2004b: 50–100) interprets Guantanamo as the expression of a 
hybrid form that superimposes sovereign instances and governmental strategies, 
recreating instrumentally the former on the strength of the immanent logic of the 
latter.
7 The hypothesis of a transformation of law rather than its suspension is advanced 
by Claudia Aradau (2007) who, on the basis of the colonial geography implicit 
in the Schmittian nòmos, interprets Guantanamo as the expression of an ‘other’ 
exception, no longer attributable to a sovereign decision but instead bowed to 
the needs by the government of space and society under the imperative of 
security.
8 The otherness of colonial space partly coincides with what Robert J. Walker 
(1993) defines as outside of the modern inside–outside, to the extent that such 
exteriority transcends any absolute dichotomy between inside and outside.
9 For an analysis of the continuum of violence that characterizes the colonies, see 
R.J. Young (2001: 329–335). The hard and fast spatial dichotomy of the colo-
nies is described by F. Fanon (1963).
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